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ABSTRACT
Muslim Brotherhoods have been a prominent feature in the 
spread of Islam in West Africa. Missionaries and traders from 
SJcrth Africa brought with then the cult of bar aka, a spiritual 
power which inhered in certain holy men and was transmitted to their 
disciples who formed a tariqa or Sufi brotherhood. The leaders of 
the brotherhoods became focal points of loyalty and obedience 
within a network of religious centres scattered throughout 
West Africa. In this way the brotherhoods formed cohesive 
groupings over a wide geographical area which cross-cut ethnic 
tie3. The religious obligations and ritual practices of the 
tariqas enabled the members to maintain close relationships 
with one another. As a result* the brotherhood leaders emerged 
a3 rivals of the traditional rulers who had been the patrons 
of the holy men. The jihads of the eighteenth end nineteenth centuries 
aimed at eliminating those rulers and chiefs who refused to 
accept the stringent religious ethic advocated by the I Muslim 
leaders and establishing in their place theocratic states under 
the rule of the religious reformers.
The policies pursued by the two colonial powers in the area 
altered the course of events. In Nigeria* the British policy 
of Indirect Rule gave a large measuro of autonomy to the Fulani 
Hrirs who were members of the Qadiriyya Brotherhood and had 
gained power through the jihad of Uthman dan FOdio. In Senegal 
the Muslim leaders and the semi^pagan rulers joined in an 
uneasy alliance to defeat the French. VJhen Ilolof resistance 
to the French collapsed* the colonial 'Administration destroyed
the indigenous political system by replacing hereditary rulers 
with appointees of the central govemmait* As a result* the 
Muslim leaders became the sole representatives of popular 
aspirations. The agricultural policy sponsored by the French 
enabled the Mxslim leaders to rally their followers by en­
couraging them to engage in groundnut production. Thus* the 
leaders of the Muridiyya and Tijaniyya Brotherhoods managed , 
to achieve a nodal position in the economic life of Senegal. 
Because of their acknowledged religious and economic position 
the Brotherhoods have continued to play a decisive role in 
Senegalese political development even after independence.
2h Nigeria the Fulani Emirs discouraged brotherhood 
activity among their Hausa subjects* During the post-war period 
when Nigeria was preparing for self-government* the Fulani viewed 
the end of Indirect Rule as a threat to their monopoly of 
political power in the Northern Region* The dramatic increase in 
the activity of the Tijaniyya order at that time indicated the 
extent of popular resentment felt by the Hausa with regard to 
the Fulani rulers* Hence in both regions the activity of the 
brotherhoods is a sign and a symptom of profound social and 
political changes*
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CHAPTER PM
IHTROUUCTIOITt MUSLIM BROTHERHOODS AS AGENTS OP MOBILIZATION
Many of the sociological and anthropological studies of religion in
Africa have been concerned with religious movements which are termed
,,nativistH or "separatist" • The majority of these sectarian movements
have teen connected in one way or another with the activity of Christian
missions during the colonial period although the process of fragmentation
shows no sign of abating even after the establishment of independent
states* On the other hand, full-length studies of Muslim religious
movements are relatively few* E vans-Pr it chard* s study of the role of
the Sanusiyya Brotherhood in the formation of the Libyan state still remains
the point of departure for investigating the role of the various brotherhoods
in the politics of those areas of Africa which either have a predominantly
2Muslim population or contain a substantial Muslim minority*
Recently several monographs have appeared which deal specifically with
the role of the brotherhoods in contemporary Senegal where the influence
of the Tijaniyya and Muridiyya Brotherhoods has been a conspicuous feature
3
of the political and economic landscape* The emphasis of these authors 
has, for the most part* been confined to the eoonomic and political function 
of the leaders of the Muridiyya Brotherhood in present-day Senegal*
1* J*D*Y* Peel* Aladura* A Religious Movement Among the Yoruba. 19685 
Bengt Sundkler.Bantu Prophets in South Africa, 1964$ David Barrett* 
Schism And Renewal in Africa, 1968*
2* A. Cohen* Custom and Politics in Urban Africa, 1969; I.M. Lewis* 
"Sufism in Somaliland: A Study in Tribal Islam" Bull SPAS* 1955-56* 
pp* 581 - 602, 145-160*
3* L*C* Behrman, Muslim Brotherhoods &nd Politics in Senegal* 1970;
Donal Cruise-0^Brien. The Mourides of Senegal» 1970; Tldiane Sy,
La Confrerie Senegalaise dea mourides* 1969*
7nevertheless, frequent reference is made to the parallel activity of two 
other brotherhoods, the Tijaniyya and the Qadiriyya# The Qadiriyya is 
the parent order of the Muridiyya and is the oldest established order in 
West Africa while the Tijaniyya Is numerically the largest orier in West 
Africa and in certain respects its influence is more far-reaching than 
that of the other two orders#
The activity of the brotherhoods has been markedly successful in West 
Africa south of the Sahara, so much so, that to be a Muslim is practically 
synonymous with membership in a brotherhood (Ar# Tarlqa)*^ The dramatic 
rise In the number of adherents began in the nineteenth century although 
the Qadiriyya order had been active in the jihad movements which marked 
the history of the Islamic states in Futa Toro (Senegal), and Futa jallon 
(Guinea) during the eighteenth century* Indeed the two events whose 
consequences have affected profoundly the influence of Islam in West 
Africa are the celebrated jihad of the Fulbe Qadiri leader Uthman Dan Fodio 
which was waged in Hausaland between 1804 and 1810, and the jihad of the 
Tokolor leader al-HaJj Umar whose military conquests between 1853 and 1864 
spread the Tijaniyya order throughout the Western Sudan# This process of 
Islamic expansion and consolidation resulted in the formation of theo­
cratic states which embraced large amounts of territory containing ethnic 
groups who at times were mutually hostile toward one another#
With the advent of the colonial powers, the process of state forma­
tion underwent considerable alteration# The recently established Tijanl 
states in Senegal and Mali were abolished, while the Fulani state set up
A
J«S* Trimingham, The History of Islam in West Africa, 1962, p#159
81)7 Dan Fodio was absorbed into the indirect rule system which united 
di a jurats ethnic groups in the new Colony of Algeria* Thus, in the 
French system the indigenous political system was dismantled while the 
British kept intact the theocratic basis of Fulani rule by recognising 
the authority of the Emirs who were the successors of Dan Fodio# In 
both cases the native populations had to reconcile themselves to the 
new power alignments imposed upon them* Hew patterns of interaction 
were called for, which in several instances led to ambivalent results*
On the one hand, the centralization of authority under the aegis of the 
European rulers and tho introduction of modem means of communication 
and agricultural production increased the possibility of interaction 
cutting across tribal and ethnic boundaries* On the other hand, the 
new criteria governing tho allocation of positions of power and authority
brought about competition not only between members of different ethnic
5groups but also between members of the same group* The intensity of 
competition and rivalry would depend on the degree of autonomy allowed 
to the indigenous authority structure by the colonial regime# In a 
situation where considerable authority is left in the hands of traditional 
ethnic or tribal leaders, the formal political system of the group remains 
intact beneath the Veneer of the colonial administration* Hence com-* 
petition for office in such a system will be articulated in terms of 
traditional Idioms such as hereditary rank, kinship, and client relation­
ships • Similarly, the external posture of the group vis a vis outside
5^ See H*0* Smith, "Historical and Cultural Conditions of Political 
Corruption Among the Hausa" * Comparative Studies in Society and 
History* ¥1, 2 (1964)#
6
Behrraan, op* cit*» PP.87 - 89) pp< 99-102
9groups will assume & rather monolithic stance due to the unity created 
by the perduring system of authority and administration* This type of 
system is exemplified by the Fulani Sokoto Caliphate in Northern Nigeria 
tinder British nils*
If, however, the indigenous political system is radically altered, 
or replaced by & new political apparatus directly controlled by the 
colonial power, then the new situation demands new methods of recruit­
ment for administration office, new criteria for the allocation of 
prestige roles* Hence, in such a system more emphasis is plaoed on 
personal achievement rather than on asoribed status since the colonial 
administration has already prevented the traditional system from operat­
ing as a formal political apparatus* Nevertheless, even in ideal 
conditions, the new administrative power elite still requires support 
from the population in order to facilitate the exercise of authority*
To win this support and strengthen the claim to legitimacy the ruling 
elite attempts to utilise symbols and slogans which are culturally 
apposite but at the same time cut aoross ethnic or olass boundaries*
Since the elite have been installed in office by the colonial administra­
tion which ostensibly seeks to decrease tribal feeling, any appeal to 
tribal or ethnic loyalties would be self defeating for a broadly-based 
formal political system* This situation is illustrated by the government 
of Senegal where the Christian Leopold Senghor is supported by the 
rural Muslim population* By sedulously showing deference to the leading 
marabouts (Muslim religious leaders), Senghor has captured the vital 
rural vote while at the same time he has effectively neutralized potential
1°
Muslim opposition#"^ For this reason religious activity has remained
informal and religious leaders exorcise political influence only indirectly#
Similarly in Northern Nigeria religious opposition to the formal
political system maintained by the system of indirect rule was neutralised
by the assurances given by the British to respect the Islamic character
of tho Fulani system# As a concrete token of their respect, the British
curtailed the activity of Christian missions in Fulani territory thereby
severely limiting educational opportunities in the north# Such a
situation was consonant with the British aim of bolstering the authority
of the Emirs by making the emirate system an integral part of the
machinery of the colonial regime# As a result thero would be a single
government in which the emirs and their subordinate officials had well
8defined duties and an acknowledged status# Through such a policy the 
colonial government was "islamized" to a large extent in the Northern 
Beglon of Nigeria* Any challenge to the authority of the government 
would be interpreted as a challenge to the preferential treatment 
accorded to Muslim beliefs and institutions* Thus the utilization of 
a religious idiom as a rallying standard in a program of opposition or 
reform was neutralized to a considerable extent*
This process of neutralization evolved in different ways depending 
on the structural conditions which existed in Senegal and in Northern 
Nigeria* By focussing on the activity and growth of Muslim brotherhoods 
among the Wolof in Senegal and among the Hausa in Northern Nigeria f this
^ Walter E# Stewart, "Indirect Buie and the Political System in 
Northern Nigeria11, Acta Afrlcana* II, 2 (1970), 50 - 84*
8
M# Crowder, Tho Story of Nigeria* 1962, p*245*
11
thesis hopes to illustrate the function of informal Interest groups in 
maintaining and adapting a traditional social system in the face of 
changes introduced by a formal political system, first under colonial
auspices, and secondly under the leadership of a native elite after
9
independence* By examining the polioies of the brotherhoods during
certain critical junctures in the recent histoiy of Senegal and Nigeria,
the brotherhoods themselves will be seen as informal Interest groups
attempting to preserve ethnic and religious integrity in the face of
economic and political changes which threatened to affect the foundations
10of Y/olof and Hausa society*
Overt political opposition to the imposition of colonial rule was
suppressed In Senegal and in Hausaland by military means* In 1866 the
defeat of the Wolof leaders at Dekkile opened up the interior of Senegal
to the French, while the defeat of the Sultan of Sokoto at the Battle of
11
Burmi in 1903 put an end to the independent empire of TJthman Pan Fodio* 
During this time of defeat and humiliation Islam, which had p reviously 
been confined to certain elitist groups and had only superficially affected 
the mass of the native population, began to penetrate the peasant popula­
tion of Hausaland* At the same time the former pagan warrior class in 
Senegal embraced the faith which they had once bitterly opposed* As a 
result, practically all the Wolof became Muslim in the period between i860
Q
* See A* Cohen, op* cit. I969 for an explanation of what is 
meant by "formal* and "infernal* interest groups, pp*3 ft*
0fBrien op« pit** pp*J2 - 35*
11 Crowder, op* oit** p*228
12
and 1927* As for Nigeria, one author states that fifty per cent of the
Hausa were pagan at the time of the British occupation while by the I960* s
12eighty per cent were Muslim#
The process of islamiz&tion has been effected mainly through the 
agency of three brotherhoods! the Qadiriyya, the Muridiyya, and the 
Tijaniyya# The dissemination of the brotherhoods in West Africa seems 
to be the result of the activity of certain Moorish clerical tribes who 
served as propagators of the sufistio type of clerical Islam which 
characterizes the Maghreb# As a result of this contact Islam in the 
Western Sudan has been stamped with the cult of baraka (Ar* "blessing"), 
a religious power or charism which inheres in certain leaders or holy men*
Thus religious leadership among Muslim groups became associated with a 
divine power which was handed down through a chain of spiritual masters 
(silsilat-ul-baraka) , This power was shared by the followers of the
saint or spiritual master (Ar* mucaddaml through a ritual formula
, K 13
(Ar* wird) which is an expression of membership in a particular brotherhood#
In the nineteenth century several religious leaders affiliated to
the Qadiriyya or Tijaniyya orders embarked on military careers which
oulminated in the establishment of a Fulani-ruled state in Hausaland and
14several Tljani states in what is now Senegal and Mall* The linking 
of religious movements with military and political power has historical 
precedents in West Afrioa and for this reason the colonial governments
12
TrlmlnghaffljOp. cit* 1969# p*230
^  See the Articles "Tasawwuf" and "Tariqa* by L« Massignon 
in The Shorter Encyclopedia of Islam eds* H#A#R* Gibb and 
J#H* Kramers, 19&L, pp.578 - 5&3 and 373 - 578.
14 J# Abun-Nasr, The Ti.janiyyat A Sufi Order in the Modern 
World* 1965* p.100*
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tended to view with suspicion the reforming seal of the native religious
leader (in Senegal, marabout j in Nigeria, malam) * This situation was
altered in Senegal when the French sought the support of religious
leaders to further the economic designs of the mother country with
15respeot to the export of groundnuts* As a result, in Senegal, tariqa 
membership became linked with two factors} first, the preservation of 
traditional ethnic values, and secondly, the economic policy of the 
eentral government whieh favoured the communal organisation of the brother­
hoods as a means of rapid exploitation of land suitable for growing 
groundnuts* Under such conditions the marabouts filled the double role 
of religious leaders and farming magnates*
In Nigeria on the other hand, the traditional ruling elite was left 
intact apart from the removal of those emirs viio had resisted the British 
occupation of the Hausa States* As a result the Muslim leaders, to a 
large extent, preserved their political autonomy under the overall 
authority of a British Lieutenant Governor* British policy with regard 
to the Individual emirates was implemented through the agency of a resident 
officer who avoided being over-oonsplcuous in public* In this highly 
structured system of government, the role of the malam (Hausa equivalent 
of marabout) is severely restricted* Authority and rank in Hausa society 
depended directly on kinship with or descent from the Fulani ruling 
families rather than on religious expertise* M*G* Smith describes the 
situation in 2aria Emirate which may serve as a model of the Hausa system*
With the exceptions of title holders drawn from the 
slave families already referred to, there are dis­
proportionately few non-Fulani who hold or are
15^ Behrman, op* oit.* pp*35 ff.
Ill
eligible for ranks of this central series; that is 
to say, with due regard to the diminishing circles 
of eligibility* linked with the increasing order of 
importance of the offices concerned, it is true to 
■ say that the central series of titles and offices 
which form so important an element in the Hmirate's 
political structure, are usually attainable only by 
members of a class whose basis is Fulani descent
Thus the ruling class in the Hausa states is based on ethnic ties and
descent from Muslim reformers and conquerors associated with the jihad
of TJthman dan Fodio. This group composes the sarakuna class who are
entitled to hold the highest offices in the Fulani system. However, the
vast majority of the population of the Fulani empire are peasants, traders,
and urban oraftsmen who oomprise the talakawa or commoner class. The
main means for a talaka or commoner to attain prestige in this formal
stratified sooiety is through religious observance either as a malam
conspicuous for “Arabic learning” or, if he is wealthy, through pilgrimage 
17
to Mecca.
From this brief summary, it is evident that the position of the 
Wolof and Hausa was comparable in a number of Important respects. Both 
societies had long been in oontaot with Islam but the strict observance 
of Muslim religious obligations was oonfined to ritual specialists 
(marabouts and malams) • Both societies were mainly subsistence agri­
culturalists although many Hausa were engaged in long distance trade which 
resulted in a considerable Hausa diaspora from Timbuktu to Kumasi. Both 
societies faced the advent of a colonial power which threatened the fabric
of traditional sooiety* However the British polioy of indirect rule
16 M.&. Smith, The Economy of Hausa Communities of Zaria. 1955# P*91*
17 E.R. Yeld, "Islam and Social Stratification in Nigeria", British
Journal of Sooiology XI (i960), 119$ A* Cohen, op. olt*. 1969. 
pp*170-171«
Msharply differentiated the political evolution of Northern Nigeria from 
that of Senegal# Hence the growth and development of the Muslim 
brotherhoods as informal interest groups shows several interesting 
Variations in the two areas# Even though the same brotherhood may be 
aotive in the two regions, its function and influence develop in quite 
different ways* Nevertheless in both regions the Muslim brotherhoods 
are concerned with the preservation of customs and traditions which are 
considered essential to the practice of Htrue Islam”# But as Trimingham 
points out, ”true Islam** in West Africa manifests wide divergencies from 
area to area#
The pliability and adaptability of Islam allows it to function at
one and the same time as a reforming or revolutionary movement and as
a guardian of custom and tradition* The twin functions of reform and
conservation generate a consciousness of a wider religious universe#
Communal ritual aotivity broadens the conceptions of group relationships
and personal Integrity* This ”democratization” of belief is expressed
19in the proposition "All Muslims are equal before God#” In this context 
Muslim brotherhoods share, to a certain extent, the aims of the millenarian 
cults of the South Pacific and the Ethiopian and Zionist Churches of 
Africa#
But it la this heightened sense of belonging that gives rise to the 
problem which is variously termed tribalism, ethnicity, parochialism, or 
even fanaticism, which, from time to time, have had disastrous consequences
18 Trimingham, The Influence of Islam upon Africa# 1968, p*66*
197 J# Andre, Islam Nolr, 1924* p.6l#
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in the political development of newly independent stantes* Clifford 
Geeriz calls these foci of cleavages in traditional societies "primordial 
sentiments" , i«e*, express ions of identity and solidarity in terms of 
blood ties, race, region, religion, custom and language* These senti­
ments are "givens" of social existence and at times have an enormous
20power of coercion in and of themselves* In a very real sense these
Idioms of mobilization are concerned with power* In particular,
religious systems have as thoir major focus the ordering of different
kinds of power which is expressed in a code of beliefs or systems of
ritual* As Kenelm Burridgo says* "These truths are community truths,
truths which command a consensus* From them are derived the sets of
moral imperatives, obligations, and rules of conduct to which men, because
21they live in community, subject themselves*"
The operative word in the statement above community which in the
Senegalese and Hausa context cannot be understood in the sense of Bed—
fields "Small Community" which is a relatively homogeneous, self-
22
sufficient, distinctive grouping* For both the Wolof and Hausa had 
developed under the political structure of centralized states whioh had 
a considerable geographical spread* Secondly the circulation of Fulani 
and Tokolor religious elites within the Wolof and Hausa ambit, as well as 
the Hausa Involvement in long distance trade, assured a wide network of
20
Clifford Geertz, "Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in 
the Hew States" in his Old Societies and Hew States* I963
p*109p 112 - 113*
21
K. Burridgo, Hew Heaven, Hew Earth, 1969, pp*5 - 6*
22
Bedfield, The Little Community and Peasant Society and Culture*
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communication and interaction between different linguistic groups*
Even today tho ruling dynasty of Sokoto is referred to as Toronkawa, 
indicating their provenance in Futa Toro In northern Senegal* Finally, 
the incorporation of great numbers of Wolof and Hausa into the Muslim 
community of believers through, adherence to a tariqa added an inter­
ethnic dimension to commimity consciousness* This community .is 
essentially an ideal way of looking at things and not merely an expression 
of local loyalty* It is in this sense that a Muslim brotherhood is a 
community*
The rapid growth of the brotherhoods during the colonial period may 
be viewed as a communal response to new power alignments within the 
political system. The new alignments between colonial rulers and subject 
peoples introduced new rules and regulations which modified, restricted, 
or abolished traditional institutions and patterns of political behaviour* 
The coercive system introduced by the colonial power prevented expressions 
of dissent in a formal political idiom* On the other hand, the brother­
hoods with their emphasis on ritual activity and other worldly goals 
stood outside the political system* The more tho complicated apparatus 
of the colonial administration impinged upon the world of the Wolof or 
Hausa peasant, so much the more did the peasant seek means to reassure 
himself against the seemingly arbitrary use of power by an alien and 
distant central authority* It is in this situation of uncertainty and 
threat that religious leaders achieve a nodal or liminal position in the 
process of communication between rulers and subjects* As healers, 
diviners, and spiritual guides armed with the mysterious power of baraka*
18
the Muslim holy men are able to Integrate large numbers of people into
informal groupings through emotionally charged face-to-face relations
22in a ritual context#
In certain respects the granting of independence to .African states
/
was even more traumatic than the imposition of colonial rule# Geertz 
points out that the independence movement with its ideology of moderniza­
tion has actually strengthened the force of "primordial sentimental"
This thrusting of a modem political consciousness upon the 
mass of a still largely unmodernized population does indeed 
tend to lead to the stimulation and maintenance of a very 
intense popular interest in the affairs of government# But# 
as a prlmordlally based • corporate feeling of oneness* remains 
the fona et orl^o of legitimate authority—  the meaning of the 
term ’self* in self-rule —  much of this interest takes the 
form of an obsessive concern with the relation of onefs tribe, 
region, sect, or whatever to a center of power that, while 
growing rapidly more active, is not easily either insulated 
from the web of primordial attachments, as was the remote 
colonial regime, or assimilated to them as are the workaday 
authority systems of the * little community*# Thus, it is 
the very process of the formation of a sovereign civil Btate 
that, among other things, stimulates sentiments of parochialism, 
commuzialisra, racialism, and so on, because it introduces into 
society a valuable new prize over which to fight and frighten­
ing new force with which to contend
While the above statement contains a number of insights, it is not
universally true# Membership in a communal group, In this case a Muslim
brotherhood, need not necessarily result in an "obsessive concern with
the relation of that group to the center of power1* • Indeed membership
in a brotherhood seems to be a movement away from parocbd&l norms
towards western standards #*^
22
Compare Cohen, 1969, op» clt#t pp.168 and 179#
^  Geertz, op# cit# 1963# p#120#
2A.
Fisher, "Separatism in West Africa" in JT# Kriizeck and 
W#I# Lewis eds* Islam in Africa# 1969, pp# 127 - 340#
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The Tijaniyya# Muridiyya* and Qadiriyya brotherhoods* despite
differences in ritual and organization are similar in that they incarnate
the divine supernatural force which governs the affairs of mankind*
This mystical power* baraka* has become a potent mobilising element in
the confrontation of crises which threaten the traditional order of
things* The one who possesses baraka becomes the object of reverence
and through his intercession the success of crops* commercial ventures#
and marital unions is assured* The importance of the holy man is
illustrated by a Moroccan writer of the nineteenth centuryi "Without
them ( the walls or saints)* the sky would not send rain* the earth would
not cause its plants to grow, aid calamity would pour Upon the inhabit
tents of the earth * * * •" J Baraka» when it is transmitted by a saint
to his disciples# becomes the nucleous of a new community bound together
by submission to tho authority of a shaikh whose person reincarnates
the baraka of the original founder* This process resembles Turner^
communitas* a social bond that does not quite fit into the structural
pattern of the particular societyj in this case# the formal politioal
system with its well defined categories of roles and statuses* The
Muslim holy men and their disciples fora a communitas which# in
Turner1 a words t
* * * breaks in through the interstices of structure# in 
limlaalityj at the edges of structure# in marginal!ty$ and 
from beneath structure# in inferiority* It is almost every­
where held to be sacred or fholy* possibly because it trans­
gresses or dissolves the norms that govern structured and 
Institutionalised relationships and is accompanied by 
experiences of unprecedented potency*2^
 T' ' ' ' " J :  - ■rrf - i ..... r ... i.... r    r i.. i t .......... -
Abun-Masr# op* clt** pp.5 - 6# citing Abu la1 far al-Klttani*
26
Y* Turner# The Ritual Process# X9&9* P#X28* Turner derives the concept 
of liminality from van Gcnnepf3 The Bites of Passage (London# Boutledge 
and Kegan Paul* I960)* The Latin word Ilmen means ^threshold"* "door", 
or "entrance"* Thus the concept implies access to# or mediation of Boma 
power lying beyond the normal range of human capacity* In this study the 
us© of the concept differs from Turner1 s use* When applied to a marabout 
or Muslim holy man# the term implies a permanent rather than a temporary 
status»
Halams and marabouts# with their possession of baraka, illustrate 
tho quality of liminality which is a necessary feature of communitas*
The power of baraka enables tho holy men to stand "betwixt and between1* 
the positions assigned by 1a\i$ custom# convention# and ceremonial* As 
such, thoir ambiguous and indeterminate attributes are expressed by a 
rich variety of supernatural powers and symbols in the many societies 
that ritualize social and cultural transitions* ^
Because the brotherhood loaders manifest a "betwixt and between" 
social character# they are at one and tho samo time able to mobilize 
numbers of clients and disciples into a cohesive group and to assert their 
political neutrality with regard to the central government* But tho 
very fact that they are able to mobilize cohesively large sectors of tho 
population by appealing to 1primordial sentimentsf maizes the brother­
hoods a potential throat to the authority of the administration* Hence 
tho activity of the Muridiyya in Senegal and tho Eg formed Tijaniyya in
28Higeria was met with tho hostility of the ruling elite in both countries* 
Since the organization of the brotherhoods does not form part of the 
official structure of tho state# it cannot directly be controlled by 
legal or economic sanctions* If the central government doe3 react strongly 
against tho brotherhoods, it may lead to a heightened sense of opposition 
and exclusiveness on tho part of the members of the Various religious 
groups* This situation is particularly acute when tho formal political 
structure maintains a precarious hold on the loyalty of its citizens#
20
The social role of the brotherhoods evolves as political and 
economic conditions evolve with the result that the external features 
defining the group may vary according to the particular structural con­
ditions that affect it at any given time*2^ Consequently* in order to 
discover how informal groups manage to adapt to changing circumstances.
It is necessary to examine their development over a period of time in 
order to avoid a typology based on a synchronic analysis of a single 
crisis situation* For this reason, it is inaccurate to describe the 
Muslim brotherhoods as anti-colonial movements since their membership 
and influence have increased in certain areas since independence . In 
fact, decolonization has brought about a host of new factors to which 
the brotherhoods havo responded*
Despite the introduction of parliamentary forms of government, the
i
majority of Kausa and Wolof peasants still focus their loyalty on local
l e a d e r s T h e r e  is little opportunity for the average citizen to
participate in tho administrative process due to his lack of educational
background* In addition, the absence of strong political opposition
parties, coupled with a dearth of secondary structures such as labour
unions, clubs, and business organizations renders the situation more
acute* Tho povorty of alternative organizational responses to the facts
of modernization has enabled the brotherhoods to fill the vacuum in the
31formal political arena by creating a f para-political structure •*
The aim of this thesis will be to examine the role of the brother­
hoods in articulating and safeguarding the political and economic interests
20 lri~ ~  ' "”r 1 " 111 n " r ’T "1 T " 11 T " i r n  1 
See B* Bastide, "Hessianism and Social and Economic Development,” in
I* Wallenstein ©d* Social Changes The Colonial Situation, 1966, p*472*
30
For the Hausa, see H*0. Smith, 1955, P*33> For the Wolof, see David Ames, 
”Wolof Cooperative Work Groups” in W* Bascom and H* Herskovits (eds*), 
Continuity and Change In African Cultures, p#226#
31 i£22lLeV2l .
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of their members during three periods of rapid social change* Tho 
general structure of the brotherhoods will be analysed under tho rubric
i
of voluntary informal organisations. Initially, tho purpose of these 
llmlnal organizations was the formation of what Turner calls communitas, 
that is# "a relationship bo tween concrete, historical, idiosyncratic 
individuals* In tho course of time, this spontaneous movement became 
normative because of the noed to mobilize and organize resources, and 
the necessity to exercise social control over the members of the group 
in the achievement of the goals of tho group* The development of 
concrete structure evolved from the Implementation of these norms and 
goals as a response to the political and social changes introduced by 
the formal administrative power* Tho three time periods have been 
chosen as a heuristic device to facilitate the description of the activity 
of the brotherhoods under changing conditions*
First Period t 1836-1903 • The Imposition of Colonial Rule
if ter the battle of Bekkile in 1886 all effective resistance to 
French rule in Senegal collapsed* The French proceeded to dismantle the 
traditional political system of the Wolof state 3 depriving many mobile 
clans and the warrior class {Wolof* Tyeddo) of their rank and status*
The peasants and slaves formerly tributary to the nobles and warriors, 
lacked any structural means to organize themselves as a group* it this 
critical Juncture Ihmadu Bamba, of prominent Tokolor clerical origin, 
retreated to his clan settlement in the village of Mbacke beyond the
32 1 1
^ttr33ey* on* cit** pp*96 and 127*
33^ Turner, op* cit*, 1969, p*132*
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zone of direct French influence * there he was joined by remnants of
the defeated nobles* warriors and peasants* This community became the
* ' - , 
nucleus of the Muridiyya brotherhood*
In 1903 the Caliph of Sokoto * Attahiru Ahmadu# was slain in the 
battle of Burmi bringing to an end the independent empire set tip by 
Uthman Dan Folio# But# unlike their French counterparts* the British 
did not attempt to altor tho political system of the Fulani Empire* 
Instead they confirmed it in power through the device of indirect rule# 
Consequently* the class distinction between Fulani overlords and Habe 
peasants was maintained and reinforced by the British presence# Since 
the Fulani Muslim leaders controlled taxes# agricultural policy# legal 
appointments# and land tenure under nominal British supervision# the 
gabe (Pi* of kado# •original inhabitant1) peasants and traders were 
enclosed by an extremely rigid social system# Long distance trade might 
be an outlet for energetic members of tho Talafcawa or commoner class# but 
the wealth gained by those enterprising merchants did not affect their 
rank* Ho matter how wealthy he might be# the merchant was still a kado# 
hence he could not aspire to high office in the Fulani system# It was 
in this situation that the Tijaniyya order began to make inroads among 
the Hausa* M* Last has pointed out that the end of the 19th century 
was a period of popular dissent manifested through the activity of the 
Tijaniyya and Hahdist*groups*^
34^ Murray Last# “Aspects of Administration and Dissent in Hausaland# 
1800-1960“# Africa* IL* 4 (1970)* 345 - 357*
*3
Second Period! 1920-1940 Economic Changes Wrought by the Colonial Powers 
In Senegal traditional Wolof agriculture was tied to the extended 
family* Land was not individually owned] the family as a whole cul­
tivated its fields* Portions of the fields were allocated by the local 
head of the family to its T&rious members* Two factors changed this 
system: (1) the loss of authority of the family heads due to the des­
truction of the Wolof political system which affected all levels of society, 
and (2) the cultivation of groundnuts for profit and the export trade which 
meant that little or no time was given to the common family field* Instead 
the Wolof farmers devoted their efforts to their small individual plots*
In addition to these ohanges on the local level, the disappearance 
of the Wolof kingdoms left large areas without ownership title* As 
a result the religious leaders attested to restore the fortunes of 
Wolof farmers by olaiming these vaoant lands for their followers* The 
marabouts began sending their diaoiples to clear and plant fields in 
areas convenient to market and shipping centres* Soon the whole struoture 
of the Muridiyya brotherhood beoame defined by this new role and it was 
not long before the Tijaniyya in Senegal followed suit* This frenetio 
drive to dear and cultivate new lands coincided with French aims in 
increasing the production of groundnuts* By the early 19301 a the 
government actively supported the brotherhoods thereby enhancing the 
power and prestige of the olerical leaders* As well as being a *holy 
man*, the marabout became a successful entrepreneur and exporter*
In Northern Nigeria the studies of P* Hill and M*G* Smith indicate
35that the oommunal aspect of agricultural production is waning*
^  M.G. Smith, 1955, op. clt.. pp.112-1141 P. Hill, Studies in Sural 
Capitalism in West Africa, 1970, oh* 7# passim*
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This seems to be a result of urban migration and the introduction of cash 
crops# As a result the Habo farmers, like their Wolof counterparts, 
have become involved in a wider economic network# But political 
development in Northern Nigeria did not match economic development# 
Administrative positions were largely filled by Fulani and their clients*
On the other hand, the shortage of trained staff required the importation 
of clerks, civil servants, postal and railway personnel from the south to 
fill the new vacancies in tho growing bureaucracy# This gave rise to 
feelings of resentment on the part of the Eausa who displayed their 
dissent by riots in Nano, Kaura Namoda and other trade centres where 
Eausa and Southern tribesmen confronted ono another in competition for jobs# 
In thi3 situation of tension the Tijaniyya order served to express 
Eausa Iiuslira grievances and it appears that Tijaniyya Halams were prominent 
in fomenting public expressions of dissatisfaction with the status quo# 
Whereas in Senegal the brother hoods Influence was encouraged by the 
French, in Nigeria on tho other hand, the influence of the Tijaniyya was 
viewed as a threat to the authority of the emirs and the whole system of 
Fulani dominance*
Third Periodi 1940-1965 Tho Biso of National Politics
In Senegal the Kuslim cloric3 did not themselves become the leaders 
of formal political parties because of their religious status# However 
they did support those leaders who wore most likely to protect or respect 
tho interests of the brotherhoods« As a result tho formal political 
structure remains independent of the marabouts despite the fact that 
some marabouts do hold local office# But the formal political structure 
of the Senegalese government needs the brotherhoods1 support if it is to 
stay in power* Because of the tight control exercised by the clerics 
over their followers, the brotherhoods remain the focus of primordial loyalty#
25
In Algeria the ruling elite of the Fulani, although they had 
originally justified their rule in religious terms, had developed into 
a caste-llke closed group* As a result they gradually gave up ritual 
association with the masses and in a sense became * secularized** With 
the end of British rule tho position of the emirs wag threatened by 
growing dissatisfaction on the part of the Habe Talakawa* To meet this 
threat the Sasrdauna of Sokoto attempted to mobilize public opinion by 
appealing to religious symbols and cultural patterns * This attempt
failed and one of the reasons for its failure was the fact that the 
Tijaniyya order had already won so many adherents in Algeria, including 
Sokoto Itself, thereby seriously undermining the claims of the Sokoto 
dynasty to represent the true traditions of Islam* By losing their 
"liminal" status, tho Fulani rulers, no matter how pious they were in 
their private observance of Islam, could no longer publicly problaim 
their religious status since they had become part and parcel of the 
formal political apparatus set up by the British*
By Investigating the activity of the Tijaniyya and the Muridiyya 
brotherhoods during three critical phases, the adaptive role of the 
brotherhood organization will be clarified* When the patterns of 
authority and the allocation of power roles were altered or disrupted, 
the Wolof of Senegal and the Eausa of Algeria were forced to discover 
new ways to adapt and modify custom in order to meet the new political 
situation* To meet this challenge, the brotherhoods with their 
elaborate system of symbols and rituals, formed a sub-systems which 
functioned as an informal or "para-political” organizations* The
*ijaaiyya na& tlurMl^Ta erected a network of pi-rjya^ dy y  (ooilootlw ■ 
fa rm }* mi fla»totb (uttaa ftrtomttonB) which embSod ita *  to  m intoln 
tboir d^tiactlTcaoos and in iko urtea end .nl^ 'X oontooto* Tho 
otifi hiomre?^* hasiod ia t&> toosossiaa of jtopte* booam an aut^orlto* 
tiro aotnrco of decisions. at extending ilia iaifdycm&a of tte brathe *w
hoods in m r i o m  ocononia o tA .politieai c&ctors*
CHAPTER II
THE 5TH0CTDHB OF THE BROTHERHOODS 
THE nJICTIOH OF LUillTALITT BT POLITICAL DE1TELOHCTT
The tarlgaa were Originally the outgrowths of the ascetical and.
mystical movement known as Sufism which spread throughout tho Hu slim
world during the middle ages* Orientalists and other scholars have
generally interpreted tho diffusion of sufi brotherhoods as a popular
reaction to the dry legalism propounded by the ’Qlama*, the scholar- 
¥
theologians who were the guardians of the Surma, the orthodox tradition -
2
derived from the life and teaching of the prophet Muhammad* This 
explanation of the popular appeal of Sufism tends to overlook the his­
torical and social circumstances which played a major role in shaping 
and directing tho new stylo of expressing devotion and religious 
affiliation*
It is apparent that the period which witnessed the final disintegra­
tion of the Abbasid Caliphato also witnessed a sudden rise in popular 
enthusiasm for the various brotherhoods which hitherto had been confined 
to rather esoteric groups given to gnostic and theosophio speculation#
In the late eleventh and early twelfth centuries the Islamic world 
experienced tremendous political upheavals culminating in the Mongol 
capture of Baghdad and the death of the last official Caliph in 1258*
This catastrophe deprived the Sunni community of its religious leader 
who was the successor of the prophet Huhammad and the ^Shadow of God on
1
See Triidngharo, The Sufi Orders in Islam (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1971) 
for a recent survey of Sufi orders*
2
See G-C Anawati and Louis Gardet, Mystique Husulman (Paris, I# Yrin, 
1961) for a discussion of the major doctrines of Sufism*
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Earth”« The severing of a direct link with tho prophet represented
by the politico-religious institution of the Caliphate raised a number
of legal and religious questions which exorcised tho minds of Huslim
theorists for several centuries* It is in this context that the isnad
or silsila.* a spiritual genealogy invented to link the chain of religious
authorities within a particular brotherhood to tho teaching of the
prophet * has particular relevance* Tho formal institutional link with
tho prophet was replaced by a spiritual# informal link. At this early
date | tho tarlqas became the major vehicles of preserving and extending
Islam when the central political structure suffered eclipse*
Later Sufism became tho object of severe strictures on the part of
the fulama* and orthodox theologians# These critics viewed the bizarre
rituals of tho orders and their toleration of folk beliefs as a perversion
of Islam* Indeed It is often asserted that sufism was a sign of the
\
decline of learning in Islam# Nevertheless * the sociological study of
Islam must accept with caution such concepts as "pure Islam” or "Orthodox
Islam”# For Islam cannot bo studied apart from its social context which
differs from area to area. Bichard intoun has already pointed out the
pitfall attached to the assumption that the "Pure Islam” of urban clerics
is the touchstone determining whether particular societies or groups are
Islamic or not.
It is precisely tho view hold by Abu-Zahra that has hindered 
meaningful social anthropological analysis in the Kiddle East.
The Great Religious Tradition# in this Instance Islam# is 
regarded aa something pure# something Isolated —  the focus of 
scholars and jurisprudents but not the proper subject of social
3
Aaawati and Gardet# op. cjt.» p.68) OfBrlen# op. cit** p.27f 
A.J* Arberry# Sufism* London# 1950# p.H5*
29
anthropologists studying peasant communities* for* as we 
all know* peasants are illiterate an! unknowing of the 
subtleties of law and doctrine *4
j
Islam for the ordinary believer is not an abstract system of beliefs#
It Is a way of life expressing* through common ritual* the community of
the faithful who are bound together by confessing belief In one God and
His messenger* the prophot Muhammad# At the same time this ritual
expression of belief differentiates the Muslim from the non-believer -
5
those who do not pray# Membership in a brotherhood is an additional
factor in this differentiation even though adherence to one or another
brotherhood involves little more than the adoption of a special prayer
formula (Ar« wlrd) which is attributed to the founder and is associated
with his mystical power (baraka)# What is of moment is the fact that
belief is jade concrete by prayer and ritual j Islam is a faith which is
seen and heard and not* for the ordinary believer in West Africa* a
private system of beliefs with a minimum of public expression#
Quite often the individual tarlqaa are so loosely organized that
there is no single hierarchical structure which exercises authority over
all the members# Bather it seems that the initiates (ir# pi# talaba*
s# talib) gravitated around local saints and dignitaries who frequently
became the founders of their own brotherhoods when their personal
prestige and the number of their adherents warranted such a development»
In West Africa the tarlqas are represented by three groups whose
membership comprises the vast majority of those Muslims who claim affilia-
'^ Bichard T# Antoun* "Beply to Hadia Abu Zahra"* American Anthropologist* 
vol* 72 (1970)* 1068-1092*
^S#F# Hadel* Mape Religion (London* Boutledge and Kegan Baul* 1954) p*235# 
The definition of a Muslim is one who Ji salla, i#e# says the prescribed
prayers*
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to "a "brotherhood* The three groups are the Tijaniyya* the Qadiriyya* and 
the Muridiyya, The Qadiriyya Brotherhood Is the oldest and bio at widely 
dispersed of the three with centres scattered throughout the Muslim world* 
It takes its name from its founder Abd al-Qadir al Jilani who died in 
Baghdad in 1166* Although, it was a major factor in the islamlzatlon of 
West Africa in the la to eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries* the 
"various branches of the order maintain only tenuous relationships with 
one another* All strains of the Qadiriyya in the western Sudan trace 
their origin hack to the Kunta Arabs* a semi nomadic tribe whose territory 
was in the area of Timbuktu* Because of its prestige as a clerioal tribe 
and its proximity to the major trans-Saharan trade routes* the Kunta tribe
has exerted considerable influence upon the Sudanese traders who plied
\
their wares in tho markets of Timbuktu and other towns along the upper 
Niger To this day tho loading shaikhs of tho Qadiriyya are found in 
Mauretania and Northern Mali*
*
The Tijaniyya Brotherhood is of much more recent origin and its 
disciples are found mainly in the Maghreb and tho Western Sudan* The 
founder of the Brotherhood* Ahmad b* Muhammad b* al-Mukhtar al~Tijani 
was bora in 1737 at Ain Kadi near Laghouat in Algeria* However since 
his tomb is at Fez where he died in 1815* the Moroccan Zawiya (Ar* lodge* 
content) has become the major Tijani centre and object of pilgrimage* 
According to Andre* the Zawiya at Fez had been hostile to French
^ Trimingham* 1962* op* cit* p*159> 0*Brien* op. cit* p*26*
^ M* Cardairo* Contribution a l*etude de lfIslam nojr (Yaounde i I#F*A*N#*
1949)* P*60
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influence , while the descendants of Ahmad al-Tijani still resident at
8Aim Uadi were regarded as francophile3* This partly explains the
strained relations existing between the two Tijani centres*
A recent monograph on the Tijaniyya maintains that Tijani cooperation 
with the French in Algeria was due to the fact that the brotherhood was 
of very recent origin and could therefore adjust more easily to the 
colonial impact than the older established orders# Secondly, the Tijanis 
hoped to set Up a Tijaniyya state with the aid of the French* However, 
this policy resulted in the enmity of the Amir Abd al-Qadir, leader of 
the resistance to the French and a member of the Qadiriyya* In 1827 
the con and heir of Ahmad al-Tijani was killed by clients of Abd al-Qadir* 
This hostility between the two brotherhoods was exacerbated when Abd al~ 
Qadir captured Ain Kadi after a six month siege# This opposition 
between tho Qadiriyya and the Tijaniyya is a recurrent theme in the 
history of tho relationship between the two orders#
The third brotherhood selected for analysis is the Muridiyya whose 
membership is confined almost exclusively to the Wolof of Senegal*
The Muridiyya tarlqa came into being at the end of tho nineteenth century 
when a Senegalese marabout, Ahmadu Bamba began to attract disciples to 
his village of Mbacke where ha taught them a new ritual formula* ; This 
initiation through the use of a new prayer ritual signified tho new
brotherhood’s independence of tho Qadiriyya to which Bamba had previously
75----------------------------------------------- - -------------------
Andre, op* clt», p*I72»
^ Abun-ffasr* op» cit*, pp*6^-651 P* Slimar, "A Uote on the Socio-Economlc 
and Cultural Hole of Sufi Brotherhoods and Haraboutism in the Modern 
Maghreb”, Proceedings of the First International Congress of Africanists, 
1962, mime0 document 38, p*S*
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beea affiliated.10
The West African Brotherhoods are outgrowths of the Sufi movement
which has a renerable history# Originally the sufi was an ascetic
who lived a retired life in voluntary poverty meditating on the Qur'an.
Massignon views this mystic calling as M* « • the result of an inner
rehellion of the conscience against social injustices, not only those
of others but primarily and particularly against onefs own faults with
11an intense desire after inner purification to find God at any price*M
Because of the sufi emphasis on the inner judgement of conscience* the
professional canonists (Ulama1) saw in the movement a derogation of the
Shari*a» the canon law, which was concerned with the external fulfillment
of the religious obligations of Islam#
These sufi ascetics gradually gathered around themselves permanent
disciples who preserved and disseminated the teaching of their saintly
guide and master# However tho attachment to the founder was duo ant
only to the appeal of his moral teaching* but also to his possession of
baraka, a divine power residing in his person and transmitted to his
spiritual descendants* Thus in a very real sense the authority of the
saint rested on his disciples devotion to his person and to the normative
12patterns of activity revealed or ordained by him*
Although Sufi Orders spread throughout the Islamic world* it was in 
Berth Africa that they achieved their apogee of power and influence# 
However the lack of a coordinated authority structure has been responsible 
for a widespread fragmentation resulting in dozens of localized brother-
0*Brienf op* cit** p*42*
11
Art* "Taaavwuf" by & « Hassignon in Shorter Encyclopedia of Islam* 
H#A*R* Gibb and JVB* Kramers* eds* (London* Xiuaac, l^Sl) p.586*
12 E# Vestcrmarck, Bjtual and Belief in Horoccoy vol# X (Hew Hyde Bark* 
H*T*i University Books, 1970* reprint of l$2$ ed#) p*35*
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hoods in tho Maghreb* It seems likely that this localisation is rooted
in the historical division between the central government (al-Makhzan)
of the plains# and the mountain tribes who remained outside government
control in what was termed the "Land of Insolence1* (Ar* bilad al-Siba*j
the literal meaning of •siba* is "childish behaviour")# According to
Gellner the saints of the brotherhoods In the Moroccan Atlas express the
11
boundaries between tribal groups* This "diacritical" role of the 
brotherhoods seems to be oonfined to Jforth Africa since the two leading 
brotherhoods# the Qadiriyya and Tijaniyya# appear to have retained a 
nominally united membership in the Western Sudan* The Tijaniyya however 
has given rise to a number of splinter groups but oven these offshoots 
still maintain that they are members of the parent body*
A major factor contributing to a lack of sectarian segmentation in 
the West African Brotherhoods is the close connection between trade and 
the spread of Islam in West Africa* The network of trade routes used 
by Muslim merchants also served as a means of communication among the 
various local brotherhood centres* The fact that the brotherhoods were 
largely propagated by wandering clerics tended to Bet up religious bonds 
between otherwise disparate groups* I*M* Lewis has pointed out that 
this mercantile activity was favoured by the universal ethos of Islam# 
a common ritual# and the use of Arabic as the Vehicle of communication 
and contract**^
The Muslim merchants together with their religious advisors soon
^  E* Qe liner# Saints of the Atlas (Londoni Weidenfeld and Micolson# 19^9) 
p*301*
^  I*K* Lewis# "Introduction" in I*M# Lewis# ed*, Islam in Tropical Africa# 
International African Institute# (Londoni Oxford University Press# 1966)
p*20*
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formed a quasi class called Dyula (Maude for "trader")* They were 
extremely mobile and when settled in villages# thoir agricultural needs 
were met by the work of thoir slaves purchased through trading activities* 
Although tho Dyula fitted into the framework of the local socioty# they 
preserved their Islamic characteristics and remained apart from inter­
village warfare and local religious rites that were incompatible with 
Muslim belief* Gradually a network of Muslim trading settlements became 
superimposed on various# often mutually hostile pagan settled agri­
culturalists • But because they were a minority# the Muslim merchants 
could not actively proselytize among tho pagans* nevertheless# their 
religious influence was felt in other# more traditional ways* Because 
of their book learning, rudimentary though it may have been# the Muslims 
were considered to havo access to magical char m3 and formulas which were
useful in treating diseases# divining# and protecting against witchcraft 
15and sorcery*
This power of invoicing mystical aids in dealing with problems involv­
ing supra-human agencies became one of the defining characteristics of 
the Muslim trader-turned holy man* In this manner the Dyula trader 
became endowed with baraka whioh became a potent weapon in many circum­
stances fraught with fear and uncertainty* Hence many traders quite 
readily affiliated themselves to a tariqa in order to share in the super­
natural gifts promised to its members* Aa airesult# the Muslim merchants 
often were middle men in both the spiritual and material realms*
Abun-Hasr describes how this function of mediator operated in the
^  Trimingham# 19^2* op* cit*, p*143*
3i
Saharan trades
Xa an area where supernatural powers were presumed to play 
an Important part in the life of human beings, it was 
natural for its inhabitants to appeal to those powers for 
the protection which the temporal authorities could not 
provide* The marabouts, who were considered capable of 
invoking these powers and of using them were also con­
sidered immune from the attack of outlaws in distant 
lands* Holy men thus travelled in desolate areas loaded 
with valuable goods without fear of robbers* This partly 
explains the association of commerce with religion in such 
areas as the Sahara *3-o
The period preceding the French and British occupation of the Western 
Sudan was marked by political fragmentation* Even the newly-established 
Fulani Empire of Sokoto suffered periodic raids from Hausa successor 
states along its northern borders* In this context the Muslim trader 
came to fill the role of "resident stranger11 and, aa such, served as 
a channel of communication between warring factions* Because of his 
"limlnal status’’, to borrow Tumer,s terminology, tho resident stranger 
is, in many respects, not bound by the codes and customs of the society 
in which he lives* In the case of the Muslim trade, his religious 
status, gave him certain privileges denied to his pagan hosts* Finally 
he became a true "middle man” by taking on necessary economic functions 
forbidden to or despised by members of the local society* Hanning 
Hash makes the following remarks concerning the economic role of such 
middle menf
The role of money-lender, merchant, middleman, and labour- 
gang boss are roles ideally open to "resident strangers” 
who are not constrained by the social and cultural con­
stitution of a given society (Chinese, Jews, Lebanese,
Indians)* They are lubricating factors in the economy 
and arrange the institutions for developing factor markets *3*7
16 *
Abuh-Hasr, op* cit*, p*7*
^  Hanning Hash, Primitive and Feasant Economic Systems* (Sah Francisco* 
Chandler Press, 1966), p#25*
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In their mediating role as teachers* traders* and healers* Muslims
soon began to exercise influence as advisers to local rulers who
remained pagans hut assumed some of tho external trappings of a Muslim
ruler* Levtzion maintains that these chiefs rarely ha came good
l8Muslims because of the ritual obligations of chieftancy* Nevertheless*
when a chief did become a Muslin and openly proclaimed the fact* his
authority then became subject to Muslim laws governing the conduct of
rulers# In addition his territory technically became dar-al-Ialam
In
supposedly making it immune from attack by other Muslim rulers m 7
As a Muslim the chief was faced with the task of adapting his ritual 
role to his new status* To prove the sinoerity of his*faith* the chief 
had to give up those rites and praotices which conflicted with the 
Muslim way of lifa. In this "reformation” of the court religion* the 
Muslim holy men and advisers played a vital role* Nadel has pointed 
out that in Nupe* the rituals of general popular appeal which recurred 
at set intervals ware abandoned while those rituals concerned with local* 
temporally undetermined crises were retained* Thus the solemn general­
ized rites concerned with well-being and prosperity could be easily 
subsumed under the Muslim Salla* The specific rituals concerned with
20ordeals* smallpox* and expulsion of evil influences remained operative*
It was precisely in these specific rituals that the Muslim holy man 
came to play a dominant role. Thus the traditional ritual functions of
^  lehemia Levtzion* Muslims and Chiefs in West Africa* (Oxford*
Clarendon Press* 19^8) * p.191*
^  For the Fulani undorstanding of this principle see Muhammad Bello* 
Infaku*! Malsuri* ed# C.J. Whitting (London* 1951) p#l84f also 
Ivor Wilks* The Northern Factor in Ashanti History (Institute of 
African Studies* University College of Ghana* I96I) * p*14*
20 ladel, 1954* Qp. cit.. p.98.
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tho ohief noro considerably reduced while tho ritual functions and
authority of tho holy men was enhanced#
In  Senegal, the Muslim holy non developed in to  an autonomous
social category whose influence hocame a counterpoise to the authority
21
of the Chieftains# Similarly, in Northern Nigeria, Muslim olerioa 
belonging to the Torobe caste assisted in tho administration of the
Hausa states whose rulers in many instances practiced a eyncretistic
22form of Islam# Under such conditions, tho relationship between
syneretist rulers and devout clerics could only be tense and unstable#
Often the Muslims would move some distance apart from their pagan
hosts or relatives in order to practice a purer form of their religion#
Peter Hammond has described this prooess on the village level where
Islam has affected lineage solidarity among the Moss I.*
A recent addition to the traditional pattern of village 
organisation described above is the independent households 
of socially ambitious individuals who have chosen to 
separate themselves from the residences of their lineages 
in order to profit from their own economic or religious 
enteiprises# Many have become independently wealthy
through successful commercial venturesf others, as a result 
of conversion to Islam have gained prestige through 
religious authority and wealth through the tuition and 
servloes provided by the Koranio students# Often these 
people are much younger than their lineage elders, not in 
line for the inheritance of political or religious authority 
through traditional channels, and unwilling either to aoeept 
the authority of their seniors or to share economically with 
the less prosperous members of their lineagea#23
^  Michael Crowder, The Story o f N igeria, (Londoni Faber A Faber, 1966) p#92*
22
P e lis a ie r. Paul. Lea Pavsans du Senegal (SainW frieux# Imprimsrie 
Fabregue, 1966), p Ip#fi3 - E C
25^ Peter Hammond, "Economic Change and Moasi Acculturation" in  W« Basoom 
and M# Hershovits ads# Continuity and Change in  African Cultures 
(Chicagoa U niversity Press, 19o2),p#245#
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Often these clan and family' groups “became the defenders of the 
peasantry in the face of unjustified exactions demanded hy the chiefs 
as tribute* Thus in Senegal there were several uprisings of the 
peasants led by a coalition of marabouts against the Darnel (king) of 
Kayor#2^ Violent manifestations of discontent soon became a regular 
feature of West ifrican history immediately preceding the colonial era# 
During this sequence of events there are Indications that the Muslim 
communities within traditional societies were undergoing a fundamental 
change in their religious outlook sparked by the increasing activity 
of clerics belonging to one or another brotherhood#
$y the end of the eighteenth century Islam had developed a new 
clerical aristocracy as a counterpoise to the old traditional aristo­
cracy of chiefs and clan loaders* This new aristocraoy was baged on 
Quranic learning and purity of religious observance which called for 
religious endogamy in order to avoid "mixing*1 with pagans or syncretist 
Muslims# Due to thoir association with long-distance trade these 
zealous Muslims built a network of religious experts scattered through­
out the Western Sudan who kept in contact with one another through the
25activity of wandering clerics belonging to the Qadiriyya order# 
Membership in an order provided a common identifying label and a ritual 
link which cut across tribal and local loyalties* A cleric or trader 
would find a ready welcome in a zawiya (rest house# or local religious 
establishment) belonging to the brotherhood when his merchant or 
teaching activity took him away from home*
2 A ^ See Pelisaier# ibid,, p*114*
25 Trimingham, 1962, p.160 - 162.
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The leaders of this religions revitalization movement were f for the
most part, members of a clerical caste called Torobe (Fulani* "Those
26who pray to God11)* Under the leadership of torobe clerics Jihad 
movements were launched against pagan and semi-pagan rulers in Futa 
Fallon and Futa Toro in 1725 and 1776 respectively* Another Jihad 
resulted in the fall of the Bambara kingdom of Massiroa whose capitulation 
brought the entrepot cities of Feme and Timbuktu under clerical rule*
The most famous Fulani Jihad launched by torobe clerics m s  that of 
Shaikh Uthraan Dan Fodio which resulted in the establishment of a Fulani 
State in most of the territory formerly ruled by the Hausa city-states*
The last widespread Jihad engineered by a Muslim cleric of Fulani origin 
was the movement led by the Tokolor leader Umar Saidu Tall, known as 
al-HaJJ Umar,2^
The rise and fall of Fulani states, formed under the aegis of
torobe clerics, cannot be ascribed to incipient nationalism since in
most of the cases mentioned abovf the reforming Muslims fought against
other Fulani* In addition their followers were enlisted from a number
of different ethnio groups*
On the other hand, the activity of the clerics in the cycle of
Jihads points to the formation of a liminal group of religious zealots
2dD.F* Stexming, Savannah Uomada, (London* International African Institute, 
Oxford University Press, 1959)» p*22j Another name for these clerics 
waa Moodibbo pi* ttoodibbe which means a wandering beggar (Ar* Faq.ir)» 
Today Moodibbo is equivalent to Eausa aalam and in Wolof it Is rendered 
as serin*
27'Trimingham, 1962, op* cit* pp*160-162* The distinction between Tokolor 
and Fulani is rather difficult to define* It seems that the Tokolor are 
originally those inhabitants of Tekrur who speak the Fulani language and 
practiced Islam* Uthman dan Fodio is sometimes called Turudl which is 
the Arabic transcription of Toroddo the singular of Torobe (Tazyin al 
Waraqat by Abdullah b* Muhammad, ed* H* Hiskett,Ibadan, 1963, pp.5 and 25) 
indicating his origin in Futa Toro which is the modem equivalent of the 
ancient Tekrur, in Senegal*
Mwhich appealed to the Sharing and the Qurfan to vindicate its claims 
to leadership# This confrontation between the marginal clerical caste 
and hereditary pagan or semi-pagan rulers developed along the following 
lines t
(1) The symbiotic phases Muslim traders settle among pagan groups# 
This period is marked by an absence of proselytism due to numerical 
weakness# The Muslims take wives from their pagan neighbors*
(2) Administrative phase t In the larger towns and capitals , 
literate Muslims are co-opted into the administrative bureaucracy of the 
local polity# This literate class forms a cohesive body since literacy 
in Arabic was generally achieved at the hands of clerics belonging to a 
brotherhood who initiated their pupils into the order in the course of 
their teaching#
(3) Hjtual Phase i As court ceremonial takes on an Islamic appear-
/
ance, Muslim clerics begin to enter the ceremonial and ritual life of 
the community at large# The cleric dispenses Qur*anic amulets as a 
protection against sorcery* He may also divine tho course of future 
events or the causa of illness# If his knowledge is sufficient, he may
teach the Qurran outside court circles and officiate at name-giving
*
ceremonies, Weddings and funerals thus displacing the traditional pagan 
functionaries# This phase marks the Islamizatlon of the "universal" 
rites of tho community abd the assumption,on the part of the cleric, of
OA
the "specific" ritual roles mentioned by Kadel#
(4) Phase of cleavage and hostilityt The tension between the 
clerical class and tho hereditary ruling class is manifested by public
28
tfadel, 1954, P*235| P«22*
1*2
denunciation# This phase is marked by hijra* when the clerics and their
followers move apart from the community and form thoir own separate
community of believers# Tho hljra is a symbolic imitation of the example
of Huhammad who "migrated" to Medina because of the hostility of the
Meccan ruling class* This action of emigration marks a definite break
29with the pagan or semi-Muslim rulers#
(5) Jihad i The clerics declare the ruler unfit to ride and appeal 
to Islamic norms to vindicate their assertions# The cleric mobilizes 
his followers to overthrow the regime# Upon successful completion of 
the .jihad* the clerical leaders and their allies assume the rale Vacated 
by the defeated ruling class*
This process of the formation of theocratic states by clerical 
groups belonging to one or another brotherhood seems to be characteristic 
of Islam in tho Western Sudan* Tho recurring cycle of Jihads directed 
first against pagan rulers and later against Muslim rulers who accommodated 
themselves to local custom* illustrates the precariousness of strict 
theocratic rule in an area where syncretism was customary#
29For the hljra of Dan Fodio see Trimingham, 1962* p*198$ for the 
Khalwa and hijra of Eajj Umar see Trimingham* p#l8l and also J*R*
Willis* A1 Ha.U Umar# |[Thcsis Ph.D# University of London} p*136#
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The hljra (Ar* emigration) is rooted in Islamic tradition and symbolizes 
the separation of the Muslims from unbelievers* An allied concept is 
that of khalwa (ir* seclusion* retreat) in which tho reformer or holy 
man spends a period in solitude and prayer in order to receive divine 
confirmation of his role as leader of a .llhad or similar reform move- 
ment# Khalwa is a feature of the jihad movements begun by the Tijani 
reformers Eajj Umar* Ma Ba Jlakbu* and Muhammad al-Amin* the Soninke *
See H#J* Fisher* "The Early Life and Pilgrimage of al-Hajj Muhammad 
al-Amin the Soninke"* Journal of African History, xi9 1* (1970)* pp*51-69* 
Hijra and khalwa are liainal phases in the process of becoming a 
religious leader# "If liminality is regarded as a time and place of 
withdrawal from normal modes of social action* it can be seen as poten­
tially a period of scrutirization of the central values and axioms of 
the culture in which it occurs*" Turner 1 1969* p#l67#
to
The Fulani proverbi "The olerio begets a chief and the chief begets an 
unbeliever"* aptly illustrates the predicament of the Muslim reformers 
once they have installed themselves as a formal governing body whose 
legitimacy rests on theooratio principles#
To preserve their hegemony over their subjects, the new Muslim 
rulers evolved social barriers and myths which emphasised their own
exclusive nature# Thus among the Fulani rulers of the Hausa states*
30a complex ceremonial etiquette delineates rulers and ruled# Ini
Adamawa this differentiation reached its most extreme expression#
Lacroix mentions that the Fulani chiefs have become almost divine beings* 
reputed to possess a whole range of supernatural powers# As a result 
Islam has become identified with the Fulani political and social system# 
Not surprisingly the power of the brotherhoods has been almost non­
existent in this eastern province of Nigeria* since the Fulani rulers 
would not tolerate any potential criticism of their style of rule.
However* dissent has manifested Itself in outbreaks of Mandlsm which
31at times has been a threat to the oppressive Fulani regime#
Despite periodio outbreaks of dissent* the Fulani system in Northern
Nigeria managed to consolidate itself until the advent of the British#
The introduction of indirect rule* far from causing & breakdown in the
32structure* actually confirmed the power of the ruling Fulani elite#^
30 M.G. Smith, X954, op. cit.. p.93.
31 P#F# Lacroix* "LfIslam Peul de l1 Adamawa" in I#M# Lewis ed«
Islam in Tropical Africa, p.406.
32
Lacroix* p#403*
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In Senegal, on the other hand* the process of formation of Muslim 
theocracies was still-born. The jihad movements inaugurated by the 
Tijani olerios Al-Hajj Umar, Ma Ba, and Muhammad al-Amin coincided with 
the French military penetration of the interior* A second factor 
preventing the survival of the jihadist states was the bitter rivalry 
between the Tijani leaders who were mostly Tokolor, and the Qadiri 
clerics led by Ahmad al-Bakka*i, the Shaikh of the Kunta Arabs* The 
latter was the most prestigious Qadiri leader in the Western Sudan and 
bitterly attacked al-Hajj Umar for his aggressive policies against 
certain Muslim leaders* Matters came to a climax when Ahmad al-Bakka'i 
gathered support from the Qadiri Fulani of Masslna and besieged al-Hajj 
Umar in his headquarters at Hamdallahi in 1864* Although Umar managed 
to escape, he was subsequently killed in the course of his flight from
ti
Hamdallahi* Nevertheless, it was mainly through the policies of Haj j 
Umar that the Tijaniyya became the dominant brotherhood in West Afrloa* 
But by 1893 the last Tijani state, Segu, fell to the French and its 
ruler, Ahmadu, the son of Kajj Umar, fled to Sokoto*
The transformation of the liminal holy man into a warrior is 
symptomatic of the social changes which swept across West African Muslim 
populations in the period which saw the increasing presence of the 
European powers in the area*
The opening up Of commercial relations with Europeans on a large 
scale meant that the Muslim clerics had to look for new resources in 
order to safeguard their traditional role as mediators and guardians of 
the true faith which was now threatened by the European infidel* Simply
^  Trimingham, 1962, op, cit*, p*l84, 186*
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preaching and teaching Qur*anio lore was not enough to blunt the impact 
of European domination as was amply illustrated by the French subjection 
of North Africa* In this situation the clerics exchanged their educational 
and ritual roles for a military role* thereby supplanting looal tribal and 
ethnic warlords*^ Even though the militant policy of Hajj Umar contained 
aspects of Tokolor ethnio aggression against the Bambara, the establish­
ment of Muslim theocracies cannot be explained on ethnio grounds alone*
On the contrary, the religious revolution represented by the jihads was 
an attempt to set up an inter-ethnic political unit based on a common 
religious link* In the case of Hajj Umar that link was the Tijaniyya 
order* Last has pointed out that the semi-nomadic taaohlng clerics who 
travelled widely throughout the Sudan avoided being Identified with the 
administrative policy of this or that state*^
This freedom from being Identified with any one particular ethnio 
or political group enabled the olerics to exercise their religious 
influence in bringing about a more universal Islamic sentiment*
Originally, tTfchman Dan Fodio, Hajj Wmar, and Muhammad al-Amin were 
religious teachers moving from court to court and seeing with their own 
eyes how the "official" religion practiced by the elite had yielded to 
expedience in the day-to-day administration of a peasant population largely 
ignorant of the finer prescriptions of the Shari*a* But once the crusad­
ing clerics installed themselves as heads of state, they, or their 
descendants, gradually assumed the policies of their predecessors* Thus 
the Fulani in Nigeria curtained their attendance at publio prayers and 
3k T* Hodgkin, "Islam and National Movements in West AffcLoa", Journal of
African History* 3, (1962), pp.323 - 327*
Ttr
Iff. Last, The Sokoto Caliphate. (Londons Longmans, 1967) pJraxx-.
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rituals since such public occasions were often used to express dissatis­
faction with the religious policy of the government* While still 
maintaining the outward appearance of theocracy, the ruling class more or 
less gave up their original role as expounders of the Qur'an and the
Shari'a* • In this way the rulers progressively insulated themselves from 
36their subjects* The onetime leaders of an lnfoxmal religious movement
had transformed themselves into the ruling elite within a formal political
system* The wandering holy man surrounded himself with the panoply of
the deposed Hausa Emirs*
When the British policy of Xndireot Buie was used to buttress the
rule of the Fulani Emirs in Nigeria, it rendered any expression of dissent,
even though couched in a religious idiom, a threat both to the Emirs and
the colonial government* The French in Senegal, on the other hand,
established a system of direct rule which largely eliminated the native
political apparatus* As a resuit^the Muslim leaders in Senegal became
the focus of new loyalties which were articulated in a religious idiom*
So long as this religious loyalty did not conflict with the aims of the
colonial regime it was allowed to exist as an informal Interest group*
Hence the power and influenoe of the Brotherhoods in Senegal is direotly
related to the faot that the French have removed any traditional political
struoture, whether religious or secular, which might Interfere with the
Brotherhoods9 oapturing popular loyalty*
In Nigeria, however, the dual nature of indirect rule rendered the
situation ambiguous so that Muslim expressions of dissent aimed at the
British would also jeopardise the privileged position of the Fulani Emirs*
^ JI*&* Smith, 1954, op* olt** p*92j M. Last, "Aspects of Administration 
and Dissent in Northern Nigeria", 1970, op* cit*. p*354*
til
Since the Emirs represented, at least theoretically, the pure traditions
of the Shari1 a* an expression of disobedience or dissatisfaction would
have been a betrayal of Islam* Hence the Muslim Brotherhoods in Nigeria
never attained the prestige and influence which they enjoyed in Senegal
so long as the Emirate system continued intact* M*&* Smith sums up the
Fulani position}
For, as the descendants or disciples of Shehu dan Fodio,
Fulani Emirs regard themselves as the champions of Islam 
against both external pressure and internal defection, 
and as the process of assimilation proceeds, not only is 
more and more weight attached to the myth which sanctions 
the present regime in the eyes of the rulers, but those 
old pre-Fulani rituals which survived as aocretions of the 
main Mahommedan (sic) ceremonies, and so served to bridge 
the gap between rulers and ruled, gradually lose their 
significance, are regarded as wasa (play), and are often 
forbidden in the name of Islam* On the other hand, Hausa 
regard obedience to their superiors and loyalty to their 
ohief as one of the doctrines of Islam * • • • 37
In this religiously sanctioned formal political system with its cult
of obedience, the scope of the reform-minded holy man or Malam is severely
reduced* For ai^ r overt activity designed to purify Islam is bound to
focus eventually on the policy and life style of the Emirs# Hence the
ruling elite did their best to absorb Hausa and Fulani Malams into the
administration and thereby convert the cleric into a bureauorat* .
In an administrative structure with a theocratic ideology, disobedience
meant not merely political dissent, but, what was far more serious,
religious apostasy* This dilemma was the major factor inhibiting the
development of an Informal religious organization which might act as a
”  1!»G, Smith, 1954, p.93*
^ Last, "Aspects of Administration", 1970, p«348»
39
"  Crowder, op* oit** p.213*
mcounterweight to the formal political system of the Sokoto Caliphate* 
Mary Muslims did belong to the Tijaniyya brotherhood which was regarded 
with some suspicion by the Fulani rulers, most of whom belonged to the 
Qadiriyya, but their activity was unobtrusive for the most part*
In the French territories, on the other hand, the struotural con­
ditions were such that the elimination of native rulers, Muslim and 
pagan, resulted in a political vacuum* The defeats suffered by al-
p
Hajj Umar and Lat Dior, the Darnel (king) of Kayor, were viewed by the 
Senegalese Wolof as the inevitable results of religious neglect# In 
this context, the clerical leaders of the brotherhoods emerged to 
reconstruct Muslim society which had been shaken by the political 
upheavals in the wake of French conquest# Tho religious heirs of the
t .
warrior clerics of the mid-nineteenth century became the focus of an 
aotive faith and ethical reform under the unifying aegis of the Muslim 
tariqas* The charismatic authority of the Tijaniyya and Muridiyya 
leaders brought about the formation of informal groupings which stood 
outside the fonaal "secular" French colonial regime* As "liminal* 
organisations they could claim immunity from direct political control 
since their aims were ostensibly religious* At the same time they 
afforded the Wolof peasants the means of integrating themselves as an 
ethnic group* For this reason Marty considered the adherence of the 
Wolof to the brotherhoods as a type of passive resistance to French
* . . 40
domination, In this sense they manifest a "revolutionary* character 
which aroused government opposition*^
^  P* Marty, Etudes sur I'islaa au Senegal, I* (Paris, 1917), p*251*
11
^  Cardaire, op* cit** 1949, pp* 75 - 76*
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But the process whereby oertaln religious leaders such as the
Murid leader Ahmadu Bamba, or the Tijani leader Melik Sy, became
the focal points of immensely powerful informal groups illustrates
42
the function cf llmlnality in the total political context* As 
liminal entities, the clerics (marabouts) Y/olofs Serin) ere esteemed 
for "the blend they offer of lowliness and sacredness, of homogeneity 
and comrade ship For the community of adherents is not organized,
at least ideally, in terms of oaste, class, rank hierarchies, or 
segmentary oppositions* In the ritual hadra (prayer seance) the 
brotherhood member enters a face to face relationship with a community 
blessed by the spiritual presence of the prophet and saints of the
44
order* Thus the brotherhoods serve as a means of communion with 
the prophet or, in the case of the Muridiyya, with Ahamdu Samba. This 
possibility of communion is open to even the lowest disciple (Ar. Talib)*
In this sense the ritual of the brotherhoods manifests many of the
45
oharaotexistios of a revitalization movement*
The mediating or liminal role of the marabouts builds up a new 
revitalized community which seeks to preserve its identity through a 
network of relationships between experts and disciples* In the 
Senegalese situation economic factors lent additional support to the 
prestige of the brotherhoods. The mystical power of baraka was
^  Liminality is used here in a slightly different sense from Turner’s 
use. For Turner liminality is transitional, while the usage in this 
thesis gives liminality a status aspect which perdures through time.
^  See Abun-Nasr, pp. eit*. 1965, pp*50 ff* for a description of 
Tijaniyya ritual.
^  L.C. Behrman, 1970, op. oit*. p*24*
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rendered concrete in the involvment of the brotherhoods in the 
production and exportation of groundnuts*
However, once the religious role of the marabouts has economic 
ramifications, it is Inevitable that the marabouts themselves will 
become implicated in the policies of the central government thereby 
surrendering to some extent their liminal status* By avoiding political 
office, the marabouts have preserved their informal status, while at the 
same time exercising indirect influence on the economic policies of 
the central government* Such a compromise is consonant with the 
political realities of present-day Senegal*
In a political system which embraces a population whose allegiance 
is regulated mostly by kinship ties, local loyalties, and religious 
affiliation, the power base or the oentral government is limited* 
Theoretically the Senegalese Constitution is secular and democratic 
which renders the central government neutral as far as ethnic and 
religious loyalties are concerned# Hence, in order to mobilize aotive 
public support, officials have to rely on tha indirect aid of the 
brotherhood leaders* This explains the symbiotic relationship of the 
Brotherhoods and the central government which has persisted even after 
the granting of independence*
Northern Nigeria makes an interesting contrast with the Senegalese 
situation* Unlike French policy in Senegal, the British policy of 
Indirect Rule strengthened the political system originally created by 
the jihad of Uthman Ban Fodio* The withdrawal of the British at the 
advent of independence meant that Northern Nigeria would face the
^  Behrman, 1970* p*138
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prospect of a new democratic, federal constitution which threatened 
to undermine the privileged theocratio position of the Fulani Emirs#
The mass of the Hausa peasants would be exposed more systematically to 
a new political system which, outwardly at least, had the appearance 
of a parliamentary democracy# In such a situation the Emirs who 
ruled as hereditary heirs of religious reformers, could no longer 
maintain their monopoly of political and religious loyalty since under 
the new system the way was open for those outside the Fulani ruling 
class to compete for power# Expressions of dissent could be voloed 
in an Islamic idiom without branding their proponents as traitors of 
the faith# The Intense activity of the Tijaniyya order in the period 
preceding independence can be Interpreted as a popular manifestation 
of religious equality opposed to the rigidly stratified Fulani system 
of rank and class symbolised by the religious pretensions of the 
Sokoto Caliph# At the same time the brotherhoods were a means of 
expressing Islamic exclusiveness in the face of southern Nigerian 
attempts to gain political and economic influence in the Northern 
leg ion# Thus at one and the same time, a religious movement may bo 
used either to reinforoe differences (Hausa vs, Fulani; Northerners 
vs# Southerners) or to emphasise similarities (mobilization of peasants 
and ethnic groups)#^
In both Senegal and Nigeria the brotherhoods served to integrate 
local groups into a more universal!stio organization in the wake of 
the upheavals caused by the imposition of colonial rule and its 
subsequent withdrawal# In both areas the struggle for power could
^  J* Paden, "The Influenoe of Religious Elites on Political Culture 
and Community Integration in Kano Nigeria" (Ph#D# thesis; Harvard, 
1968) p#U7#
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not be expressed formally since the constitutions of Nigeria and Senegal 
were secular# Hence the Kualims turned to the informal idiom of the 
brotherhood#
A recent thesis has examined this informal mechanism as it 
operated within the Emirate of Kano* The author describes the pro­
cess whereby political leadership in the public forum is profoundly 
affected by the substratum of informal religious interest groups;
The establishment of trans-ethnic loyalties on the part 
of reformed brotherhoods has created a precedent which is 
in direct conflict with the nature of communal groupings*
< The principles necessary to justify such a reorientation
of loyalties has required a shift from legalistic definitions 
of community | to sufistio definitions of community# In 
particular! this has entailed a shift of loyalty from 
"traditional" authority to charismatic authority *48
This shift to charismatic authority was facilitated by the liminal
nature of the role of Tijani halams in Nigeria# The same process
had occurred in Senegal where the liminal-non political stance of
Ahmadu Bamba and Halik Sy enabled the two leaders in question to
become the gravitational points of powerful religious organizations*
The time lag in Nigeria is explained by the fact that tho theocratic
Fulani system did not allow brotherhoods to publicly engage in
criticism of the Islamic observance or non-observance of the Emirs#
When the Emirs1 power was weakened# then the activity of the Tijaniyya
began to manifest open hostility to the Fulani system symbolized by
the Sokoto Caliphate*
" Tho brotherhoods carry within their structure a host of symbolic
Paden# op# cit*# 1968# p*424*
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activities such a3 shrine visiting# chant sessions# particular ascetic 
practices# and prayer formulas# Particular symbols and the activities 
and sentiments they generate become publicly operative under certain 
social conditions# These conditions are generally crisis situations 
in which the brotherhoods seek to preserve or defend Islamic values 
and ideals* As long as these values and the leaders who exemplify 
them have a liminal quality# a "betwixt and between" character# they 
remain potent agents Of mobilization* When, however# the religious 
group develops into the nucleus of a formal political system# this 
liminal character becomes obscure or lest entirely* As the group 
assumes the reins of direct political power# its role becomes more 
rigidly defined* When religious leaders become heads of state# they 
must willy-nilly rely on the coercive power of law and administration 
and so negate tho pristine virtues they once exemplified. Qualities 
associated with charismatic leadership such as ascetic withdrawal# 
simplicity# comradeship# poverty# and humility are rarely consonant 
with the pragmatic demands of power politics* To retain their 
position# the new political elite must resort to religiously dubious 
policies and methods of administrative # otherwise they face the grow­
ing possibility of revolt in the name of the very values they once 
embodied* This was tho fate of the Sanuslyya rulers in Libya who 
were overthrown by purltannical army officers who resented the auto­
cratic privileges of the Grand Sanusi and his family#
Hie following chapter will analyse the first stage in the process 
whereby the informal brotherhood organization in Senegal filled the
•vacuum created "by the elimination of the traditional political 
leaders during the imposition of French rule in the period 1886 - 
1903*
CHAPTER III
MARABOUTS AND CHIEFS, THE TRANSFORMATION 
OF AUTHORITY IN SENEGAL. 1886-1905*
The tension between the obligations of religious piety and the 
realities of political power is a reourrent theme in the history of Islamic 
states. The following anecdote aptly illustrates the dilemma faced by 
pious Muslimsi "One of the saints saw in a dream a king in Paradise and 
a holy man in Hell. He asked, * What is the cause of this man's degrada-
i’
tion and that man's exaltation? For men believed the oontrary of this.'
A voice oame, 'The king is come to Paradise because he had a love for 
Dervishes, the holy man to Hell beoause he sought the favor of kings#'
In nineteenth century Senegal the relationship between pagan or 
semi-Muslim ehiefa and their Muslim subjects was particularly difficult. 
However the oommon threat represented by the growing power of the French 
in the area brought about an alliance, the remnants of the pagan 
aristooraoy with their erstwhile enemies, the marabouts of the Muslim 
brotherhoods. This period of oooperation between rulers and holy men 
had a profound and lasting effeot on the future development of Senegalese 
society. For once the French had effectively defeated the army of Lat 
Dior, the Darnel of Kayor, they set about replacing the traditional 
leaders with petty chiefs who were entirely subordinate to the oolonial 
administration. In addition the political re-organization of the 
defeated kingdoms Into small territorial units aimed at preventing a 
resurgenoe of co-ordinated military resistance. In this situation the 
Muslim marabouts, who had allied themselves with the popular leaders such
^ A.J# Arberry, Kings and Beggars? The First Two Chapters of Sadi's 
Gullatan (London, 1945), pp#81-82.
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as X*at Dior, found themselves as the representatives of the Wolof people 
in their fight against the French* The marabout had succeeded to the 
position vacated by the old Wolof aristocracy* This new function of 
the Muslim leaders had important social and economic consequences for 
the future development of Senegal*
The three major ethnic groups of Senegal are the Wolof, the Serer, 
and the Tokolor-Fulani* All three speak related languages and trace 
their origins back to northern Senegal and southern Mauretania* Various 
dates have been proposed for the separation of the Y/olof from the Serer,
2
but the exact relationship of the Wolof to the Tokolor is still unoertain. 
Despite the paucity of historical evidence, it seems probable that the 
Wolof became a distinot ethnio group when tho state of Jolof was founded 
in northeast Senegal* In 1^66 this state divided into a number of 
smaller states which retained in varying degrees the administrative 
structure of the parent state# The manner of succession to the office 
of ruler was not the same for all the kingdoms* Jolof had a strictly 
patrilineal system, Walo, Kayor, and Baol had mixed systems, while Sine 
and Saloum were matrilineal* Towards the end of the eighteenth eentury 
the state of Kayor began to exercise some form of Jurisdiction over Baol 
to the southeast*
The social structure of these states was substantially a pyramidal 
organization of ranks and classes* At the base oi1 the structure were 
the slaves (jam) and the occupational castes (nyeiryo) * The rest of the 
population were called jambour or gser, i*e*, free men* This category
2
Montoil, Esquisses Senegalaises, p.175 Yaya Jane, Lea Toucouleurs du
Fouta Toro* pp*35-36.
Behrman, p*22; O’Brien, p.16.
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was subdivided into peasants (badolo) and nobles (gorni) • At the 
summit was the ruler whose title differed from state to state* that 
of Kajfar was called Pamela that of Walo, Barak* that of Baol, Teem 
the rulers Of Sine,Saloum, and Jolof all had the title of Bur*
An important distinction was made between ordinary slaves and 
crown slaves* The latter, called tyeddo, were the property of the 
ruler end the more powerful nobles and were used as instruments to 
exact tribute from the politically impotent peasants* The tyeddo also 
served as armed soldiers in the wars which were a constant feature of 
Senegalese society* Hence the tyeddo foncd a type of janissary corps 
at the disposal of the ruling nobility* Ike constant depredations 
which the peasants suffered at the hands of the tyeddo forced many Wolof 
to migrate southward in order to secure land which would be safe from 
incursion* As a result of this pressure end consequent migration the 
Wolof did not become attached to their land nor did they try to Improve 
it through the use of fertiliser or crop rotation* The Serer, on the 
other hand, were the first to migrate from tho north and settled in the 
vicinity of Dakar and in the provinces of Sine and Saloum where they 
created stable agricultural communities which were able to resist foreign 
intruders* As a result the Serer began to practice more efficient 
means of production using fertiliser and crop rotation* Hence as one 
moves from north to south in Senegal communities become more stable and 
agrioulture becomes more efficient* Similarly ethnic faotors become 
more accentuated since the Serer who wero tho first to migrate from the 
north are also the most resistant to Islam wliich was introduced by
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Tokolor or Wolof marabouts. It was the Serer who defeated and killed 
the Tijani marabout Ha Ba Uakhu in 1867 when the latter attempted to 
set up a Tijani state in south-central Senegal#**’
This process of migratory drift from north to south has been the 
major factor in ethnic differentiation of Tokolor, Wolof and Serer* 
Because of their geographically central position the Wolof managed to 
achieve a position of dominance in Senegal by the middle of the 
nineteenth century# As a result, the Wolof began to expand at the 
expense of the other ethnio groups and began to acquire more and more 
land# Here again the Wolof system of land tenure and exploitation 
has continued to influence the pattern of settlement in present day 
Senegal#
Among the Wolof, the occupation and use of land was technically 
under the control of the monarch, who in turn delegated his powers to 
local chiefs called lam ana# The lamans allotted large areas of land 
to their clients by granting them the right to clear speoified forested 
traots# This right of clearance was known as the "right of fire" 
(borom day®)# These tracts were then parcelled out to the peasants 
who planted the land* This right was called the "right of axe" (borom 
n^adio) and gave the peasant hereditary possession of the area which 
he cultivated*
During the nineteenth century the monarohs of the Wolof states 
gave large tracts of virgin land to the marabouts under the title of 
the "right of fire"# The marabouts in turn distributed their lands
^ See M. Klein, Islam and Imperialism In Senegal (Stanford, Stanford 
University Press, 1968)*
® Pelissier, p#l26#
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to the peasants who had become Muslim and gave them the "tight of
axe". Thus, the marabouts could reward their followers by giving
them grants of land, a factor which greatly increased their social
standing and, in effect, made them equivalent to the nobles in rank*
Nevertheless, the relationship between nobles and marabouts became
strained when the incessant conflicts between the different Wolof
states forced the rulers to begin confiscating large tracts of land
belonging to the lamans in order to raise supplies for their armies
in the field* In order to satisfy the demands of the Darnel or the
Bur, the lamans began themselves to increase the amount of tribute
levied on the peasants* The agents used in collecting the tribute
were the tyeddo who frequently helped themselves to the supplies
destined for the Darnel or the local ruler*
The great mass of the Wolof peasants who actually cultivated the
land found themselves more and more pressed by the exactions of their
landlords who used the tyeddo to pillage and terrorize the peasant
population whenever the latter proved refractory* In this situation
the reformist marabouts who belonged mainly to the Tijaniyya order
began to find a ready audience for their religious message* Even
those Muslims who had been given the title of laman began to feel
restive when the Darnel of Kayor began to confiscate their estates*
Gradually a wedge was driven into Wolof society cutting off the Darnel
and his immediate entourage of nobles with their tyeddo from the great
mass of peasants who more and more began to gravitate to the marabouts
$
for leadership and protection* In this way the social and economic
^ Tidi&ne Sy, op* oit** pp*80-81.
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cleavage between peasant badolo and nobles (gormi) became relnforoed
by religious affiliation* The peasants became Muslim while the nobles
remained attached to the traditional cult* Indeed some authors have
viewed the political structure of Senegal in this period as a prime
example of class warfare* Robert Amaud wrote in 1912 that conversion
to Islam constituted a genuine social revolution for the Wolof and
mobilized the proletarian class against the aristocracy* By converting
en masse to Islam the peasants formed a bloc against the aristocracy
which remained fetishistio* Before long the peasants began to resist
the incursions of the tyeddo which soon found themselves in open eon-
7fliot with the marabouts*
The leaders of this wave of resistance were the torobe clerics 
whose activities have been discussed in the preceding chapter* Not 
only did the torobe encourage resistance in the village settlements but 
they also led bands of Muslims southwards to escape the tyeddo troops*
Thus, the touthward expansion of the Wolof became closely entwined with 
the islamization process begun by the torobe who formed a new class of 
leaders over and against the traditional nobles* This aptitude for 
leadership on the part of the torobe had already resulted in the establish­
ment of Muslim states in Nigeria and Mali and apparently the same process 
was at work in Senegal*
The prominence of the torobe clerics in the formation of Islamic 
states is due in large measure to the fact that they constitute a type 
of fluid "open caste"* The term "open caste" is used by Taya Wane to 
denominate a pattern of group oohesion which is defined in terms of
7 .................
R* Arnaud, "L1Islam et la politique musulmane francaise en Afrique
Occidentale Francaise, "Afrique Francaise: Renseignements Coloniaux*
(janvier, 1912), p*9# cited in Monteil, op* cit** p*110*
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descent from Muslim saints* Because of their renown for piety, this 
group generally tends to restrict marriage of its members to those 
enjoying an equal reputation for religious purity* As a result*the , , 
torobe have become holy lineages originally formed from heterogeneous 
ethnic elements such &s Fulani, Soninke, wolof, and Moor* Group 
solidarity is maintained by their descent from one or more saintly 
ancestors*
According to Yfane, this pseudo-caste has four major fields of 
aotivityj (1) political leadership based on religious; (2) Islamic 
scholarship and asceticism; (3) commercial activity and long dis­
tance trade; (4) agriculture* It is obvious that such a wide spectrum 
of aotivity prevents the torobe from becoming lxi occupational caste*
Tot, despite differences in occupation, there are strong links between 
torobe and, whatever the social circumstances of an individual torobe 
may be, he always considers himself superior to a non-torobe* This 
sense of pride coupled with occupational flexibility has enabled the 
torobe to beoome the major agents of Islamic propaganda in West 
Afrioa* Indeed, the majority of the jihads of the nineteenth century 
were begun by torobe such as Ma Ba Jakhu in Senegal, Admadu Sheku,
Uthman Ban Fodio, and al-Hajj Umar Tall* Right down to the present
day, most of the Tljanlyya and Muridlyya leaders in Senegal trace their
Q
origin back to torobe ancestors*
The confrontation of Muslim torobe with the semi-pagan Wolof 
nobility was profoundly affected by the Ifench penetration of the 
8
V/ane, op* cit*. pp*3^ - 37*
9 F* Quesnot, wLes Cadres maraboutiques de 1'I slam Senegalaia* in 
Notes et etudes sur ltIslam Noir, (Recherches et Documents C*H*E*A*M. 
Paris, 1962), pp.131 - 194.
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Interior of Senegal in the latter half of the nineteenth century*
In the face of the French threat, the Muslims and the Wolof nobles
formed an alliance aimed at expelling the French or, failing that,
reducing their influence in the area* The principals in this alliance
were hat Dyor, the last independent Darnel of Kayor, and two prominent
Muslim holy men, the Tijani Ma Ba Jakhu, and ihmadu Bamba, the
founder of the Huridiyya Brotherhood.
Kayor was the most strategically situated of the Wolof States.
It extended 120 kilometers from north to south along the Senegalese
littoral and included the two major French settlements Saint Louis in
the north and Dakar in the south. The ruler or Darnel was chosen from
one of seven noble matrilineages who competed with one another over
the succession to the throne. Muslim influence was already strong
in Kayor and many of the oourtiers (dak) professed Islam. The ritual
associated with the installation of the Darnel seems to have been the
responsibility of Muslim marabouts and the degree of Muslim influence
corresponded to the third phase of symbiosis mentioned in Chapter
10
Two (of. pp.3i - 34)*
On the local level, Muslim holy men became village chiefs and 
the religious title serin (At . Shaikh; Ful* Tver no) was added to the 
Wolof hierarchy of administrative functionaries. According to Monteil 
the serins soon began to enjoy a dominant role in the social structure 
Of K«yor when the relationship between the tyeddo and the badolo became 
more and more strained* The peasant badolo lacked any effective 
leadership with which to defend themselves against the raids of the 
10 See Monteil, op. cit*» p*75 for a summary of Muslim influence at 
the court of the Darnel*
&or own slaves. These raids were marked by terrible violence and often
peasants were carried off to be sold as slaves in order that the
tyeddo might procure horses, money, grain, and the local alcoholic
beverage palled sangara. The addiction of the tyeddo to alcohol
sometimes induced them to pawn their rifles in order to obtain the 
11.potent liqueur.
In this context, submission to a marabout was more than a change 
of religious affiliation. By submitting to a Muslim holy man, the 
oonvert ipso facto joined the ranks of a tariqa which implied a net­
work of believers united in a structured religious system* Tidiane 
Sy writes that affiliation to a tariqa was actually a form of protest 
against the existing social system.
nThe peasants who joined the communities led by marabouts 
were actually revolting against the traditional institu­
tions of Kayor sooiety. The marabouts, by attacking the 
traditional aristooraoy, not only revolted against the 
impiety of the latter, but also responded to the popular 
sentiment of the victims of the political system. For 
this reason, the religious communities created in the 
seoond half of the nineteenth oentury must be viewed not 
merely as nuclei of cultural change, but rather as aotive 
fomentors of political agitation.w ^2
As a result of the cleavage between peasants and rulers, the 
Darnel and the other Wolof kings could no longer rely On peasant support 
for their military campaigns against one another or even against the 
French. Hence the Wolof rulers were forced to rely more and more on 
the tyeddo to buttress the tottering political system, so much so
11 Tidiane Sy, op. cit.. p.80.
12 /  ^z
La Confrerle Sene'galaise des Mourides. p.87.
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that even though the tyeddo were technically crown slaves, they began
to maintain a growing ascendancy over their so-called master* It was
difficult to decide whether the slaves belonged to the master or the
13master to the slaves*
Despite the antagonism within Wolof society, the threat of a 
common enemy brought the Darnel and the marabouts into sn alliance*
This partnership greatly enhanced the social position of the Muslims 
who were exhorted by their marabouts to fight against the unbelievers*
In return for this support, the Darnel and many of his courtiers sub­
mitted to the religious authority of the marabouts* In effect, this 
meant the Islamization ©f the ruling class* However, after the 
defeat of the Wolof resistance movement, the nobles were deprived of 
their traditional offices and replaced by appointees of the colonial 
administration* The marabouts on the other hand, did not rely on 
secular office for their authority, but justified their claims in terms 
of the mystical power of bar aka* Hence, the marabouts were not for­
mally political figures and therefore they could not be deposed from 
political office which they did not fill* The colonial administration 
oould remove the traditional leaders from their posts, but they were 
unable to strip the marabouts of their spiritual power* In this way 
the torobe clerics cam© to form an informal aristocracy whose olaims 
to privilege and authority were based on religious principles* Religious 
solidarity under tho leadership of the marabouts became an effective 
means of integrating Wolof society once military resistance was no longer 
possible* In this new situation, the Uuslin clerics became the heirs
^  Monteil, op* oit., p*88*
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of the traditional nobility including Lat Dior, the national hero 
and symbol of ivolof aspirations#
Today, in the villages of Senegal, the ^riots or local bards, 
recite the epio deeds of the heroio Darnel, Lat Dior, who died defend­
ing his people against the French# In the city of Dakar, the principle 
arny oamp bears his name. A play, written by the Senegalese dramatist 
ibnadou Cisse, entitled "The Last Days of Lat Dior” was,enthusiastically 
received by local audiences# Lat Dior has become the symbol of 
Senegalese aspirations and patriotism despite the fact that, as Darnel 
of Kayor, he represented a political system vhich systematically 
oppressed the peasant population# The manner in which this oppressor 
of the peasants became transformed into a semi-religious symbol of 
patriotic fervor reveals the prime role of the Muslim leaders in 
rebuilding a sense of ethnic pride and cohesion in the wake of the
v
French conquest#
Lat Dior became Darnel of Kayor in 1862 after seizing the throne 
from the incumbent Ma-Dyoda# Kayor at that time was the only Wolof 
state which had refused to sign a treaty of cooperation with the French 
who were oonfined to trading posts along the coast, notably at Goree 
and St# Louis* In 1854, the Governor, Faidherbe, initiated an expan­
sionary policy by exploiting the rivalries existing between Muslims 
and anaimists, hoping to eliminate any concerted effort to resist 
French penetration of the interior# Depending on circumstances, the
administration would support the marabouts, or when it suited them,
14they would use the chiefs against the marabouts# Thus, the French
^  0#Brien, op# cit## p*32*
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viewed the jihad of Ha Ba Jakhu as a means of eliminating the tyeddo
party in southern Senegal which would then be opened to French
mercantile interests. This strategy was in accord with general
policy regarding the Muslim brotherhoods later formulated by Dupont 
15and Coppolani.
In I864 a French military agent wrote to Governor Faidherbe 
informing him that the French troops would move against Ma Ba as soon
16
as the latter had destroyed the power of the tyeddo in Sine and Saloum.
French plans were implemented sooner than expected due to the sudden
alliance of Lat Dior with Ma Ba. Indeed the French feared that this
alliance presaged the creation of a "Tijani League" which would unite
the various military leaders under the banner of the Tijani brother- 
17
hood.
i
When the young Darnel of Kayor manifested military designs aiming 
eventually at the elimination of the French, Faidherbe took steps to 
have him deposed. In pursuit of this objective a French column 
invaded Kayor and drove Lat Dior out of the kingdom. The ex-Damel 
fled south where he joined foroes with Ma Ba after formally renouncing 
idolatry &ni openly professing Islam* Together the two leaders pro­
claimed their intention of exterminating or converting all the unbelievers
of Sine, Baol, Wfalo, Kayor, and Jolof thereby insuring the triumph of
18
the Quran in those lands. Thus Lat Dior saw in Ma Ba a potent ally 
not only for winning back Kayor hut also for the establishment of a
^ 0. Dupont and X. Coppolani, Les Confreries religieuses musulmanes. 
Algiers, 1897# pp.287 - 289*
16 O'Brien, ibid., p.32.
17 — —
O'Brien, op. pit.. p#32j on the Tijani League see M. Klein, Islam and 
Imperialism in Senegal, p.130 ff •
18 Papiers Ballot, no.19# cited by Monteil, op. pit., p.102.
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naif led Wolof state* Tho instrument of this policy m s  tho jihad 
declare by Ha Pa*
Ha Ba apparently attempted to make M s  nowly-*convertcd disciple 
a marabout but Lat Dior balked at taking such a stop* Apparently 
Lai Dior's religious convictions vero not deop enough for him to
19
assume tho mnt2& of a mflo&dam of tho Xijaniyyn brotherhood# *
In any case lat Dior bcdai&j tho principal lieutenant Of Ha Ba and 
together they campaigned in jblcf, Bip, and Dine* This cooperation 
was brought to an end uhon Ite Ba was killed in battle by tho Goror 
in 1866* Despite this setback, Lat Dior continued tho jihad and 
his letters rovoal that ho assumed the title of "Commander of the 
Faithful"* the same title assumed by tfthman Dan Fodio earlier in the 
century#2^
After the death of Ha Ba, Lat Dior allied himself with another
renowned marabout, fLamxc Anta Sally, who belonged to a torobe family
renowned for learning and baroka* Interestingly enough, although
Komar#fl father had boon a Tijani, ttomv himself belonged to tho
21Oadiriyya brotherhood* As a sign of M s  favor, tho Darnel presented
tho marabout with one of his niece a in marriage* Later this marital
alliance with the mobility was strengthened when, after the death of
Lat Dior, liomar married one of tho Darnel's ex-wives# In 1871 tho
Darnel was reinstated as ruior of Kayor by the French and Momar Anta
Sally followed M s  patron back to M s  former kingdom* While in
^  ArcMves duOdurerneraont d« Senegal k. Dakar, carton 13 Cf 271 cited 
by Honteil, p*103i
20 Bamba Diop, "Lat Dior et Is problems musulman11, Bull* M  XOTII, 
ear* B {l?65) p*5U*
21
O'Brien, op* clt*§ p*39*
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Kayor Momar founded the village of Hbacke which was to become a cehtre
of Islamic learning and henceforth became the name of Anta Sally's
descendants* So influential did this village become that the Darnel 
decided to fix his residence in its immediate vicinity*
Thus# in the critical period when French Influence began to menace 
the political independence of the Wolof leaders# the mutual support 
that Muslims and traditional chiefs rendered each other gradually 
transformed the institution of chief ship itself* Legitimacy based 
merely on descent from royal lineages was no longer sufficient to 
insure the support of the badolo who were disaffected by the actions 
of the tyeddo and as a re stilt had turned more and more to the marabouts 
for protection* By submitting to the Muslim holy men# the rulers of
the Wolof not only shared in their baraka but also won over their
peasant followers* By the latter part of the nineteenth century# 
the royal lineages had become Muslim and the authority of the traditional 
rulers was considerably enhanced in the eyes of their Muslim subjects#
In this way the profession of Islam became one of the criteria for 
tho legitimate exercise of authority by tho Wolof ruling class#
However# tho tyeddo still remained a source of friction between 
Muslim peasants and traditional leaders* On the other hand# the 
rulers of the Wolof states were unwilling to lose the mainstay of 
thoir armies# while on the other hand# the life style of the tyeddo 
was an insurmountable barrier to their conversion to Islam* However 
this obstacle standing in the way of a complete fusion of the role 
of marabout with that of traditional chief would be eliminated by tho 
French conquest of Senegal which dismantled the indigenous political 
system*
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In 1879 0 the Frehch decided to erect a eye tern of railways in 
order to tap the natural resources of tho interior of Sudanese Hin­
terland* Lat Dior realised that the railway across his territory 
would in effect deprive him of a considerable amount of his sovereignity 
since French troops would bo used to garrison the stations on the route* 
On 10 September 1879 the Darnel had given his consent for the cession 
of the right of way for tho railway lilies* But when workers began 
to be recruited from among the peasants# the Darnel refused to allow
22work to be continued and once more he led his tyeddo in open rebellion* 
The Wolof leader attempted to enlist the aid of the Bur of Jolof and 
the Almamy of Futa Toro but these two leaders were wary of Lat Diorfs 
political ambitions which envisaged the establishment of a unified 
Wolof state under his own domination* Realizing that help was not 
forthcoming from that Quarter, the Darnel fled to Baol where he encount­
ered Ahmadu Bamba# tho son of Momar Anta Sally* Bamba urged Lat Dior 
to use other means to combat the French and suggested that the Darnel
should devote himself entiroly to religious observance and prayer in
21order to obtain Godfs help* This suggestion seems to imply that 
Lat Dior was encouraged to become a marabout, in this case a member 
of the Qadiriyya brotherhood of which Bamba was a member* But Lat 
Dior refused this advice just as he had refused the identical proposal 
made several years earlier by the Tijani marabout Ma Ba* For the 
reception of the wird, or ritual investiture from either Ma Ba or 
Bamba would in effect imply that the Darnel was subject to the authority
22........^ ....... ' ............................................................  ' " " .......  7 ...........    1 r ■ r - r - r - m  .............
°?* clt«t p.99*
A*H* Samb#. Cadior Demb* Dakar# 19^4f P*54$ cited by Sy# op* clt»*
of tho marabout a* Despite the desperato situation In which he 
found himself# tho Darnel was tmwilling to assent to a diminution of 
his royal prerogatives#
The French at t'-Is tto realised that the entlro political system 
of the Uolof states had to Txs radically altered if a stable peace was 
to bo maintained § The final encounter between Lat Dior and the 
French took place at Dyadic (also spelled Bekkilo or Deafchle) in 
1886 which ended with the death of tho by now legon&ary Dolof loader# 
By 1890 French and British pressure had eliminated many of tho able 
Muslin loaders and It appeared that tho Fulani empire of boko to 
represented the last hope of pious Muslims* However oven this hop© 
proved abortive when the battle of Burai in 1903 brought tho last 
independent theocratic otato in tho western Eulan under European rule# 
The period which witnossod the final disintegration of the Wolof 
monarchic 3 and the installation of colonial rule was also marked by 
a resurgence of popular religious feeling* Between 1330 and 1903 
mentor ship in tho religious brotherhoods became synonymous with the 
profession of Islam in lost Africa* One of the factors responsible 
for this phenomenon was tho dominant role played by the marabouts In 
mobilizing and directing this mass religious movement into a coherent 
religious organisation* An caaminltion of the relationship of 
Abmadu Bamba* the founder of tho Huridiyya brotherhood# and Lat Dior 
will elucidate the process whereby tho Muslim marabouts succeeded to 
the positions vacated by the folof noble a after their defeat at the 
hands of tho French# This process of the transformation of the Wolof 
political system resulted'in the creation of paro-rjolitical structure
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based on the hierarchical organisation of the Muslim brotherhoods*
Indeed, the Murldiyya brotherhood not only initiated this transformation, 
but in the process, it altered the structure of the other brotherhoods 
as well. All three major brotherhoods became parapolitical organisa­
tions whose activity had enormous consequences in the eoonomio develop-
« 2 Lment of the colony. ^
On the eve of the battle of Dyaqla, lat Dior went to the village of
Mbaoke in Kayor to implore the blessing of the marabout Muhammad ben
Habib Allah, popularly known as Ahmadu Bamba. Although the marabout
' ' 1
was only about thirty years old, his reputation as a saint and scholar 
was second to none in Kayor# His father, Llomar Anta Sally, had been 
Closely associated with the jihad of Ma Ba, and so it was not surprising 
that Lat Dior should seek counsel from the son of his one-time associate*
The religious background of Bamba is worthy of note. Soon after 
his father's death, he went to Mauretania to the zawiya of the great 
Qadiri Shaikh Sldia Baba where he was Instructed In theology and in the
oc
principles of Maliki jurisprudence. At the end of this period of
instruction, Shaikh Sidia appointed Bamba Khalifa (Sidla* a deputy) of
26
the Qadiriyya among the Wolof.
Aocording to popular accounts, Lat Dior had had a premonition of his
death and decided to pay one last visit to the Muslim holy man.
Their meeting was along one, in which Lat Dior told the 
marabout that he had come to say farewell forever, because,
ojv
P. Quesnot, *L*Influence du Mouridism sur le Tidjaniame", Doo. C.H.E«A«M., 
Ho.3016, 30 Jan. 1959) this report is also included in Notes et Etudes 
sur lfIslam en Afrique Noire, Reoherohes et Documents C.H.E.A.M. 1962. 
eds. Bourlon.' Quesnot et. al. 19^2.
^ Sy, p.108. \
^  See M. Casenave "Les Mourides du Senegal”, Doc# C.H.B.A.M., No.1741 (1950)*
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he said, BI want to have done with the white men at all 
costs today, Ahzaadu Bamba promised to pray for him, so 
that peace might return# But lat Dior persisted, asking 
the marabout simply for God’s blessing* The marabout 
offered him a robe of peroale, then fspat1 some verses of 
the Koran into his hands before allowing him to depart. 27
In this account two aspects of Bamba1 s relationship with Lat Dior 
are illustrated. In the first place, it is evident that Bamba did not 
oommit himself to Lat 3>iorfs strategy of armed resistance. Indeed, at 
a previous encounter, Bamba stressed the primacy of religious activity 
in overcoming the French. Seoondly, Bamba1 s superiority over Lat Dior 
is also apparent since the latter appears as a suppliant before his 
master. Thus, Lat Dior1 a action, which was imitated by other Wolof 
leaders, indicated that the support of God1s servants, the marabouts, 
was naoessary for the continuation of Wolof society* But the preserva­
tion of Wolof Booiety oould not be achieved through overt military 
resistance. In order to re-integrate the .Wolof people, new forms of 
organisation had to be employed under tho aegis of God1s servants, the 
marabouts.
After the death of Lat Dior, Kayor was divided into a confederation 
of small oantons each with its own chief. The head of the confedera­
tion was Demba War Sail, a former tyeddo of Lat Dior, who had defected 
to the French, The new chief had very limited powers and his main task 
was to keep the population tranquil. This meant in effect that he did
not hesitate to oppress the peasants when they showed signs of restive- 
23
ness*
27 OfBrien, op. pit.# p.13» oiting A. Samb, Cadior Demb, p.54*
^  Sy, op. cit*. p,10l.
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This political re-organization of the Wolof kingdoms affected the 
entire social structure. With the elimination of the ruling matri- 
lineagea, the tyeddo and courtiers dependent on the rulers* patronage 
lost their function and status. The only alternative open to them was 
to become cultivators, an occupation which belonged to the despised 
badolo and for which the tyeddo had little liking and less aptitude.
The situation was rendered more acute by French insistence on convert­
ing the subsistence economy of the peasants to an export eoonony.
This meant that the production of different crops was to be replaced by 
groundnut cultivation since the European market required the byproducts 
of the groundnut. Tidiane Sy summarizes the situation in the follow­
ing words:
The Wolof farmer, subjected to the demands of the colonial 
economy —  a system of exchange which totally escaped his 
oontrol —  was in effeot obliged to cultivate the single 
produot which the administration desired: the groundnut.29
As a result of this rigid policy the economic revolution which
followed the political dismemberment of the ;Volof states deepened the
malaise of the Wolof of all classes and castes. In this situation,
the marabouts, whose ritual power had been acknowledged by the former
Wolof rulers, became the cornerstones for the reconstitution of the
Wolof Society. In effect they became "sacred" leaders whose liminal
status rendered them capable of exercising power within the new
30"secularized11 political system established by the French.
29 am*# p*io3.
See Georges Malecot, "Essai sur les structures politiques traditionelles
en Afrique noire francaise et leur evolution11, Doc. C.H.E.A.M. No>4235. 
Malecot shows how the ritual authority of native leaders is inoreased 
when they are deprived of political power by idle colonial government.
/
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While this n sacralization" of authority is a result of the colonial
intrusion, it cannot he explained merely as a negative response to an
external threat* The Muridiyya and Tijaniyya Brotherhoods must also
he considered as a positive attempt to fulfil the social expectations
of their members* Thus, the question must be raised as to why it came
about that the rituals and beliefs of Sufi Islam seemed to the Wolof,
in Geertz* words, "• * • not merely appropriate but inevitable, not
commendable opinions about an unknown reality which it was comforting
or prudential or honourable to hold, but authentic apprehensions of a
» 31
known one which it was impossible to deny • • • * The answer to this
question lies both in the nature of Wolof society itself, as well as in 
the conflict situations which the members of that society had to face*
The role end status achieved by the shaikhs and muqaddame of the brother­
hoods is due both to personal charismatic qualities and to a concatena­
tion of circumstances which transformed charism into concrete activity*
Mention has already been made of the close relationship of the Wolof, 
Barer, and Tokolor ethnic groups and the migratory process which resulted 
in the present ethnic situation in most of Senegal. Since the nineteenth 
century the Wolof have appeared to be more vigorous than the other two 
groups and have gradually absorbed numbers of Tokolor and Sorer. Several 
observers attribute Wolof adaptability and propensity to expand at the 
expense of their neighbours to their loss of their kinship structure 
which has weakened their attachment to the land and looal family ties.
Thus the Serer are true peasants in^the sense that they cling to ancestral 
farmsteads whereas the Wolof have become more involved in trading and 
marketing groundnuts which demand a certain mobility and freedom.
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Secondly, unlike the Serer, the Wolof have retained little of their
traditional religion which remains largely conjectural* Hence the
fluid, open state of Wolof sooial structure made it receptive to the
religious and economio changes which resulted from the colonial 
32
experience. This adaptive tendency was reinforced by the administra­
tive reorganisation of the Wolof states which had as its professed aim 
the destruction of the native feudality in order that the peasants 
might be freed from the control of their native rulers*
The chiefly families and their tyeddo clients adjusted to the new 
situation with much more difficulty. The tyeddo t fonaerly feared by 
the peasants, were completely discredited and reduced to penury* The 
members of the chiefly families wore either removed from office or 
absorbed into the colonial bureaucracy as salaried local guardians of 
the peace. Appointments were made in consideration of thoir modern 
skills such as literacy in french, or their loyalty and sxibmissiveness 
to the colonial government. Consequently their authority depended on 
the coercive power of the french rather than upon traditional criteria
of legitimacy. finally their role as tax collectors for the adminirfcra-
33
tion confirmed their unpopularity in the eyes of their wards.
Within a few years the Wolof had become a politically acephalous 
society. Yet such a state of affairs could not continue since Wolof 
social structure was highly stratified* In this anomalous situation,
^  See J. Fouquet, "la Traite des arachides dans le pays de Kaolack et ses 
©onsequencos economiques, sociales et Juridiquea, "Etudes Senegalaises. 
(Centr8 I.F.A.N*, St. Louis du SrfnC'gal, 1958) p*31* On Wolof religion, 
see A. Diop, "La Culture Wolof j Traditions et Changements", Notes 
Afrlcaines. No.l21 (l.f.A.N. Janvier, 1969), pp.l - 7*
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with & rigidly organised series of ranks and castes lacking a central 
organizing principle, it was only natural that the Wolof community 
turned to the liminal leaders, the marabouts, whose power and authority 
could not he challenged by the infidel French since that power and 
authority did not rest on formal political criteria. Thus submission 
to the shaikhs of the brotherhoods would resurrect the Wolof social 
order as an informal structure under the integrating banner of Islam.
Soon after the battle of Dyaqle, groups of tyeddo and dispossessed 
peasants began to migrate to the village of Mbacke in Baol, the 
residence of Ahmadu Barnba* Because of their poverty and ignorance 
of Islam, the orthodox villagers raised objections to these new 
disciples settling in their midst. As a result, Bamba was forced to 
leave KYbacke and moved to a new site nearby which was given the name 
of Darou Salam. While there the Sufi leader had a revelation concern­
ing the future of his new group of disciples and a new religious centre 
which would be the headquarters of the movement. This centre was to 
be called Touba (Ar. "happiness") and would one day become the Mecca 
of Senegal.
This exodus to Darou Salam caused considerable anxiety to the French 
administration who were wary of anything that smacked of native dlsgatis* 
faction with the colonial system* In 1391 Bamba went to the then 
capital of Senegal, St. Louis, to declare hid loyalty but this did 
little to allay French suspicions of his followers who had only recently 
been implacable enemies of the new order* That same year a French 
detachment invaded Darou Salam and dispersed Bamba1* followers. How­
ever they soon regrouped and their numbers increased when the followers
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of the expelled Bur of Jolof* Al Buri N*diaye, decided to submit to
Bamba. The french saw this action as a direct threat to their policy
and did all they could to limit access to Darou Salam. As a result
of this harassment Bamba moved northeast to the province of Jolof which
still enjoyed a relative freedom from french supervision because of its
remoteness. However when the Bur of Jolof himself became a disciple
of Bamba* french suspicions were aroused once more. Despite the
marabout18 protests that his movement was purely spiritual, it became
apparent to the colonial administration that the greater part of his
followers consisted of the remnants of the armies of Kayor* Baol, and
Jolof. Indeed Bomba*a move to Jolof was significant since Jolof had
been the original home of the Wolof people.
A french army marched into Jolof and took both Bamba and the Bur
captive in 1895* After a trial during which most of the evidence
against Bamba was supplied by the newly-appointed chiefs, the marabout
was sentenced to exile in Gabon. This period of exile which was to
last seven years* only served to increase the authority of the shaikh
34
who now became a martyr for Islam.
finally* through the intercession of Shaikh Sijya Baba, the leader 
of the Qadiriyya in Mauretania* Bamba was allowed to return to Senegal* , 
his sanctity and prestige higher than ever. However his sojourn in 
Senegal was brief since the french sent him to the gawiya of Shaikh 
Sidya at Souet al Ma In Mauretania. Apparently the administration 
wished Bamba to follow the example of Sidya and several other tarioa 
leaders in their discountenance of violence and Mahdism and their
^  Sy* op. cit.. p. 114* Most of Bamba*s Arabic writings were 
composed during this period.
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cooperation with french policy* This policy succeeded among the 
Tijaniyya and Qadiriyya leaders, and it appears that Bamba himself 
had no objections to such a course of action* The difficulty lay 
in the fact that the Murids (disciples) of Bamba consisted of many 
es-tyeddo whose knowledge of Islam was slight and whose susceptibility 
to jiha&ist or mahdist propaganda resulted from their own violent 
background*
Interestingly enough, it was during this period of exile that
Bamba adopted a new ritual formula or wlrd which, in effect, marked off
his disciples from the ordinary members of the Qadiriyya brotherhood*
However this ritual separation did not entail a break in relatione
with the parent order since Monteil mentions the presence of Mauretanian
Qadiris at Touba and quotes the late Khalifa of the MuridLiyya, falilou
Mbaoke , to the effect that "Mourides and the people of Shaikh Sidya 
36are the same,"
The period 1886 - 1903 marks the first stage in the development Of
the Muridiyya brotherhood which arose as part of a long political and
religious process which transformed Senegalese society. Indeed the
colonial intrusion confirmed and, in certain respects, hastened the
process of Isl&misation which was at the same time a Wolofisation of
hitherto disparate groups. The person of Ahmadu Bamba symbolises this
transformation and amalgamation. Although a member of the torobe caste
of the Tokolor ethnic group, hi a religious role not only transformed his
37family into rtolof but also did the same for his followers.
^  Sy, op. cit*» p.119* 
^  Monteil, op. cit.. pp.1?2f and 189*
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This chapter has so far been concerned with the religious and 
social changes in Senegal from 1886 to 1903* Unfortunately material 
relative to the process of Islamization and social change in Hausaland 
is insufficient to warrant analysis. Most of the studies of the Hausa* 
Fulani state are concerned with the administrative structure and 
bureaucratic apparatus of the Sokoto empire and only incidentally refer 
to the social and economic circumstances of the population. The recent 
attempts to deal with traditional Hausa society and religion have 
relied on conjectural reoonstruotioiu But despite this paucity of 
material, there are several elements of similarity between the oase of 
Senegal and that of Nigeria since torobe clerics were at work in both 
areas* The significant difference between the two regions was the 
success of the jihad initiated in 1904 by Uthman Dan Fodio which resulted 
in the subjection of the Hausa states to the Fulani torobe under the 
suzerainty of Sokoto*
As a result of the Jihad, the allocation of offioes beoame the 
prerogative of the descendants of the Fulani jihadists and their clients 
who comprised the sarakuna or ituling class. This meant that the 
religious leaders beoame founders of political dynasties which developed 
a sense of ethnic distinotiveness in order to vindicate their claim to 
legitimacy and to prevent the subject Hausa from gaining access to 
polltioal power. In Senegal, on the other hand, the torobe manifested 
an extraordinary aptitude in assimilating themselves to Wolof social
v O
See the controversy between M.6. Smith and E.R* Yeld where Smith denies 
the validity of Yeld1* attempt to use Kebbi as a model of Hausa society 
before the Fulani conquest* E.R. Yeld, "Islam and Social Stratification 
in Northern Nigeria", British Journal of Sociology, vol. XI, No*2 (1960), 
112-128] M.G-. Smith, "Xebbi and Hausa Stratification" British Journal 
of Sociology. HI, No.1 (1961) 32-641 M.G-. Smith, "The Hausa System of 
Sooial Status", Africa. XXIX, No.3 (i959)» 239-232.
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norms and thus did not develop a sense of ethnic superiority* Thus 
in Senegal the torobe gave up their Fulani language and Identified 
themselves with the Wolof* In Nigeria, even though the Fulani rulers 
gave up their own language for that of the Hausa, they still Jealously 
guarded their own ethnic superiority by maintaining a social system 
quite similar to that which sharply distinguished gormi (nobles) from 
badolo (peasants) in Senegal*
The fact that the sarakuna class professed a very rigorous form of 
Islam tended to prevent dissent from being manifested in a religious 
idiom* This fact explains the lack of overt religious activity on 
the part of the Muslim brotherhoods in Nigeria until relatively recent 
times*
A decisive faotor in the evolution of the two societies was the 
different nature of the colonial administrations which were imposed on 
the two countries* After the battle of Burmi in 19®3, the British 
assumed control of the greater part of the Fulani Empire in Hausaland* 
Unlike the French, the British did not tamper with the Fulani administra­
tive machinery but left It practically intact in order to administer
the huge area through the native rulers and institutions* This is the
39essence of the much discussed policy of "Indirect Rule*"
One of the most significant ohanges which the British did implement 
in the newly conquered territory was the abolition of the slave trade 
which affeoted the Fulani practice of compulsory unpaid labour and the 
obligation of military servioe* A second result of this reform was the
^  See K* Hiskett, "A Critical Introduction" in C*L* Temple, Native
Races and Their Rulers (London, Frank Cass, 2nd Edition, 19&3) p* xxir.
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radical alteration of the eandu which was the fundamental unit of 
the domestic economy* Before the advent of the British, the gandu 
was a farming compound whose operation depended on slave labour and 
not merely on the gandu head and his family* Throughout the Fulani 
emirates there existed communities of slave cultivators (Hausa* rinji* 
rindswa* Fulani* rumada) whose Fulani masters received a share of 
all orops harvested* With the abolition of slavery, the gandu could 
no longer rely on a relatively large labour source but of necessity 
had to depend on a work force drawn from the extended family* But 
as M*G. Smith notes, the introduction of cash crops for export and 
trade has given rise to disputes within the extended family which has 
caused a further disintegration of the gandu* Greenberg also shows 
how the Hausa system of land tenure was so altered by the Fulani that 
the patrilineal exogamous clans had to surrender their local autonony 
to the Fulani District Heads* This, both the British and the Fulani 
in their own way weakened local agricultural Institutions which were 
dependent on colleotivities in order to cultivate large traots of land* 
As a result, large numbers of peasant cultivators were forced to seek 
employment in the urban centres or turn to long distance trade which 
is a well known metier of the Hausa commoners *
On the local level it would appear that the situation in Nigeria 
and in Senegal was similar during the initial period of colonial rule*
40
The Economy of the Hausa Communities of Zaria* Colonial Research 
Studies* No,16 (Colonial Office, London 1955) PP«20 and 1027 
See also J* Greenberg, "Islam and Clan Organization among the Hausa* 
Southwestern Journal of Anthropology* vol. Ill, No.1 (1947), 195*211} 
P. Hill, Studies in Rural Capitalism in i/est Africa, ch*7 "Farms and 
Farmers in a Hausa Village", (Canibridge, 1970)*
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Both areas were encouraged to develop cash crops for the export trade. 
Because of climatic similarities the cash crops suitable for cultiva­
tion were the same in both instances, although the French soon 
encouraged the cultivation of the groundnut to the exclusion of other 
crops in Senegal, But because of the difference in administration 
the development of the two colonies diverged widely. In Senegal the 
old aristocracy had been eliminated and only minor administrative 
posts were given to native leaders. As a result, religious brother­
hoods became an alternative means by which popular religious figures 
could exercise authority outside the framework imposed by the French,
As heirs of the displaced ruling class with whom they had been allied 
through marriage they were able to organize the peasants and the tveddo 
as well into cohesive groupings which had wide popular appeal.
This fusion of religious and traditional leadership criteria was 
impossible in Nigeria since the ruling Fulani vindicated their legitimacy 
by appealing to religious values. Hence an alternative religious 
system such as that represented by the brotherhoods was viewed as a 
threat to the Fulani hegemony. This explains why mahdism and similar 
expressions of religious dissent were quickly suppressed by the Fulani 
Emirs, However when tension developed between the various emirs or 
between an individual Emir and the British authorities, an intensifica­
tion of brothexhood activity was encouraged in order to win popular support 
for the local ruler in his quest for a larger measure of local autonosy*
The oircumstanoes attending the succession crisis in the emirate of 
Zaria in 1920 illustrate the role of religious affiliation in demarcating 
factions within the Fulani ruling class* The Emir of Zaria, Aliyu, was
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suspected of anti-British activity* As a result, at the request of 
the British, the Emir of Sokoto deposed Aliyu* Aliyu* s successor, 
Ibrahim, was enthroned without Sokoto being consulted which was an 
overt violation of the prerogatives of the Emir of Sokoto who was 
sovereign of all the Fulani emirates* In addition, there ware other 
* peculiarities in Ibrahim* s appointment* He was promoted from a 
minor office and his accession departed from the rotating system by 
which the four major Fulani clan3 in Zaria took turns in administering 
the emirate* Significantly this period marks a heightening of 
Tijaniyya activity in Zaria which resulted in both Aliyu and Ibrahim 
becoming members of the brotherhood* By joining the Tijaniyya tarlqa 
Aliyu and Ibrahim not only signified their personal adherence to a 
Muslim reform movement but their action symbolized the political tension 
with Sokoto since the Emir of Sokoto was khalifa of the Qadiriyya order* 
Hence Zaria*s encouragement of the Tijaniyya expressed the estrangement
L1
of the two emirates on the political level. The British were forced 
to aot since conflicts between the various emirates would weaken the 
system of indirect rule.
Because of the nature of indirect rule in Nigeria, the emirs were 
confirmed as sole legitimate rulers and guardians of the social order. 
Religious leaders, or malams, were relegated to secondary positions as 
advisors to the emirs and higher dignitaries. In effect, they were 
clients of the ©airs and as such their influence was restricted since 
their role consisted in the clarification of scholarly theological and .
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judicial thsorias. As a result the scholar-malama lost contuot with
in
the mass of the peasant population* Popular manifestation of dissent
was expressed by the mahdist movement and the growth of the Tijaniyya
tariqa which began to penetrate Northern Nigeria in the late nineteenth
oentury, a period marked by social upheaval ufoieh rendered the lot of
the gentry and free farmers particularly arduous* The comparative
prosperity of the towns at this time only Served to exacerbate the
4 3oleavage between peasant cultivators and town dwellers*
In general, it appears that the rural Hausa were slowly adding a
religious note to their feeling of discontent under their Fulani masters*
This sense of injustico was sharpened by the development of cash crop
farming, principally the production of groundnuts and cotton which have
become the major souroes of revenue for Northern Nigeria. In a recent
study, evidence was presented to show that the Tijaniyya order was found
mainly among those farmers who were involved in groundnut production
44-in the Kano emirate* French investigators also mention the oonneo-
45tion between agricultural production and the Tijaniyya brotherhood.
Thus, on the local level, the social and religious changes that 
took place in rural Senegal and Nigeria were similar in several respects* 
Both societies had been in contact with Islam for centuries but Muslim
influence began to penetrate rural areas only during the colonial period
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when the shaikhs of the brotherhoods began to exercise influence in 
the more remote rural areas of Y/est Africa. At the same time their 
services were frequently employed by chiefs and leaders who saw in 
t*16 Laraka of the holy men a potent medicine to cure their illnesses 
and to ensure the success of crops and military ventures. In this 
way the Muslim holy men served as a bridge between rulers and peasants 
which gave them a limlnal status within a particular society.
Due to the different policies pursued by the British and the 
French colonial governments, the religious and political roles of the 
holy men diverged considerably in the two regions* In Senegal, the 
Muslim leaders filled a vacuum left by the destruction of the trad­
itional political order. In Nigeria, the traditional political 
system, buttressed by the religious claims of the Fulani, received 
the added support of the colonial power through the implementation of the 
policy of indirect rule. Hence, the Muslim holy mem, especially if 
they were Hausa, did not have access to political office. Furthermore, 
excessive religious activity on a popular level risked incurring the 
suspicions of the Fulani ruling class. For the Fulani were well 
aware of the emotive force of ritual and its revolutionary potential 
since they themselves had achieved power through the jihad waged by 
Uthman dan Fodio against the lax Ilausa rulers. AS a result, religious 
activity on the part of the brotherhoods, while remaining clandestine, 
nevertheless continued to gain adherents among the peasants. Finally, 
the prospect of national Independence and the end of Indirect rule 
threatened to upset the unchallenged political monopoly enjoyed by the 
Fulani. Thus, in the late I940fs and early 1950** frhe Tijaniyya order
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began to publicly agitate against the status quo especially in Kano 
Province, where the emir had been engaged in a long-standing 
political vendetta with the Sokoto dynasty personified by the Sardauna 
of Sokoto* (see Chapter VI)*
The opposition between Sokoto and Kano was symbolised by the 
rivalry between the Tijaniyya and Qadiriyya orders in Nigeria*
The Sokoto Califate became the objeot of criticism by religious 
reformers who viewed the panoply and pomp surrounding the emirs as 
a betrayal of the principles of the jihad waged by dan Fodio* M.G.Smith 
has shown how the Fulani rulers tiy to limit criticism of their life
i c
style by discouraging a wide distribution of the writings of Uthman*
In addition the emira and their Qadiri clients seldom participate in 
communal ritual assemblies (hadra) which is a mark of tariqa aotivity.
Thia laok of ritual activity on the part of the Fulani is due to the 
fact that popular religious assemblies are frequently the scenes of 
violent disputes and protests against the local political or religious 
authority.^
Thus, S&'adi's anecdote concerning the relation of kings and 
dervishes (holy men or Sufis) can be applied to the situation in
i a
northern Nigeria# The Fulani rulers, although descended from reli­
gious reformers had been transformed into kings whose power and authority 
depended more and more on the coeroive force at their disposal. This 
coercive force was given added strength by the British colonial regime*
if6
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In Senegal the role of the marabouts was exempt from such ambiguities* 
The leading marabouts of Senegal had remained outside the sphere of 
colonial government and remained religious leaders* At the same time 
their connection with the defeated aristocracy enabled them to assume 
the mantle of the traditional ftolof leaders and thereby re-integrate 
hblof society through the tariqa organisation* The religious move­
ment Inaugurated by the Kuridiyya and Tijaniyya in Senegal had a 
practical ethic which immersed their members in agricultural produc­
tion. This ethical aspect of the tariqa crgardzation coincided 
with the colonial administration’s desire to encourage the export 
of groundnuts* Hence tb© work ethic of the tariqas in Senegal made 
them essential to the economic well-being of the state*
CHAPTER IV
From A Religious Movement To An Agricultural Monopoly! The Brotherhoods
And The Economy Of Senegal - 1927-1940*
An administrative report dealing with the commercial activity of
the Hurid brotherhood viewed with considerable misgiving the involvement
of the marabouts in the groundnut trade# The report indicates that the
French were fearful that the profit accruing to the marabouts would
enable them to buy arms for their followers* P.J* Andre wrote in
February 1923 that Ahmadu Bamba was not above suspicion in this regard*
MA trustworthy informant indicates that the houses which have 
purchased groundnuts have not benefitted by the sale of 
manufactured products nor by the money which is given to the 
people* A substantial part of tho money is, in effect, sent 
to Ahmadu Bamba who uses it to store up stocks of gunpowder*”
The report goes on to eayi
"The soldiers of the 4th division at Dakar, disciples of 
Ahmadu Bamba, allego that the marabout is aware of events in 
Dahomey* They have been talking about the*Wolof Nation**
It is imperative that we Imow precisely what the real aims of 
Ahmadu Bamba are*” ^
This report concerning the activity of certain disciples of Ahmadu 
Bamba reflects the opinion of certain administrative circles which 
viewed the Nuridiyya as a hostile organization which embodied the 
latent nationalism of the Wolof ethnic group* Nevertheless the tes­
timony of other authorities indioat os that the focus of this movement 
was the person of Bamba himself who showed a complete disinterest in 
exercising authority over his religious subjects* The Governor of 
Senegal, William Ponty, maintained that Bamba*© writings did not reveal
^ Report of P*J* Andre, February 1923 In Archives Senegalalaeat cited 
^  op. clt*, p*ll8*
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any of the subversive Ideas attributed to him and the marabout* s
personal conduct did not manifest hostility to the administration.^
Gradually the French realised that Bamba wa3 not a dangerous
fanatic bent on waging a jihad against the infidels. As a result,
the attitude of the colonial government shifted to a more accurate
assessment of the Muridiyya in the light of the economio priorities
of the export trade. The Muridiyya brotherhood with its tightly
knit authority structure and its practical emphasis on the ethical and
religious value of work, beoame an important factor in the development
of the Senegalese eeonony. This changed policy had already scoured
results during the First World War when Muridiyya marabouts delivered
hundreds of talibes to the recruiting stations at the behest of the
government. For this oo-operation, Bamba was awarded the Cross of
3
the Legion of Honour.
One of the Ironies in this change of administration policy was 
that the railway project, which had been the Catalyst in Lat Dior’s 
rebellion and eventual downfall, now beoame a vehicle of Murid expan­
sion. In 1923 the rail link from Dakar to Kayes (in present day 
Mali) was completed opening up the Senegalese hinterland to rapid 
commercial and agricultural expansion. In 1929 groundnut production 
had beoome the major crop and exports that year reached a reoord 400,000 
tons* A comparison between annual exports of groundnuts and the 
2
Letter of August 1909, Archives Senegalaises. cited by Sy p.122.
' O’Brien, op. cit.« p.46.
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rise in Murid membership reveals the correspondence between ground* 
nut production and the activity of the Brotherhood#
Groundnut Exports 
Year Tons
Murid Membership 
Year No.of disciples
1885 45*061
1900 140*000
1914 280,000
1938 600,000
1965 984*677
1886 About 30
1915 65,000
1927 100,000
1953 400,000
1962 423|273
(Figures based or information in Peterec, The Port of Dakar and 
West African Development (New York, 1 9 6 7 QfBrion, passim)
From 1912 to 1927, the year of Bamba* s death, the Mur ids broke
the semi-arid Ferlo district. This area had lacked permanent settlers 
and consequently was ideal for the carving out of large estates which 
could be devoted to groundnut cultivation. By moving eastward the 
Murid leaders could offer thsir disciples greater prosperity and 
relative security. The remoteness of these new settlements rendered 
them more difficult to control and hence they were ready refuges for 
those Senegalese who wished to avoid conscription, forced labour, or 
taxation* A further result was that the Murid expansion also involved 
the expansion of the Wolof ethnic group since the vast majority of the 
rank and file of the brotherhood were Wolof
During this period of expansion, the administration began to 
encourage the marabouts to open up the new lands. The slogan of the 
brotherhood "Work ia Part of Religion” indicated the economic advantages 
inherent in a policy which favored the expansion of the group* Although 
examples of Muslim holy non forming agricultural settlements are not rare 
in West Africa, tho hierarchic structure of the brotherhood and the
out of the cercles of Baol and Mayor and began to move eastward towards
A
See P. Marty, Lea Hour ides d*Amadou Bamba, (Paris, Leroux, 1913),
pp.144 - 160.
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collective devotion to the founder moulded the group into a coherent 
organization which could be more effectively utilised in furthering 
the designs of the government* Secondly* the marabouts could be 
effective agents in keeping the population quiescent* if their 
energies'were taken up by agricultural production* So successful 
was this policy* that the Tijaniyya and Qadiriyya marabouts began to 
imitate the example of their Huridiyya counterparts by also encourag­
ing their disciples to work for them on large agricultural estates#
The Tijaniyya marabouts had, on the whole* confined themselves to
religious and moral teaching and their religious centre at Tivouane
r ■ * 5has been called by one observer Uune veritable universite po pula ire •"
Of the 1*385 marabouts in Senegal who were engaged in teaching in the
Qur’an schools* 963 were Tijanis* This scholastic activity of the
Tijaniyya was well suited to the relatively stable, free peasant
population (badolo) which constituted the majority of the membership
of the order* But in tho competition which developed over the
acquisition of new land the Huridiyya prove to be more successful and
efficient than the Tijaniyya* As a result* in 1925 the leaders of
the two Tijani branches in Senegal* Abu Bakr Sy and Seydou Bourou Tall*
protested to the lieutenant Governor about the activity of the
Huridlyya*
This tension between the two brotherhoods was soon resolved when 
the Tijaniyya leaders adopted the Huridiyya practice of forming large
communities of disciples who worked the fields for their respective
5  r  1 ~   ~  ~r ........................... ■ ..................... ..  .................  T 11
* Quesnot, crp* cit*f 1962, p*117*
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shaikhs* Within a few years the doctrine of sanctification through 
work became a general feature of Islam in Senegal* As a result the 
brotherhoods were transformed from religious co-operatives anchored 
in the economic life of the colony* In this way tho process of 
adaptation and re-integration of Wolof society after the destruction 
of the traditional authority system was aided and abotted by the 
economic imperatives of the groundnut trade which was essential to 
the well-being of the colory. The charisma of the original religious 
leaders was routinized when their descendants became managers of a 
vast agricultural enterprise* Indeed it was only after the deaths 
of Malik Sy* the Tijani leader and saint* and Ahmadu Bamba that the 
organizational structures of tho two brotherhoods were elaborated and 
stabilized through the covert support of the Administration* Thus the 
Administration intervened when disputes in both brotherhoods arose 
about the succession to tho office of Khalifa. General* This inter­
vention assured that succession to the Calif ate was to be decided in 
terms of genealogical descent rather than in terms of roligious sanctity 
or learning* In this way tho baraka of the original founder has become 
institutionalized* Wobcr’s description of this process is apposite 
in this contexti
In the case of hereditary charism* recognition is no longer 
paid to the charismatic qualities of the individual* but to 
the legitimacy of the position he has acquired by hereditary 
succession* This m y  lead in the direction either of 
traditionalization or legalization. The concept of "divine 
right11 is fundamentally altered and now comes to mean 
authority by virtue of a personal right which is not depend­
ent on the recognition of those subject to authority*^
'I-------------------------:----------------------;-------------------------------
Max Weber* The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, trana*
A.M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons* (Glencoe 111. Free Press* 1947) 
p.365.
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The routinization of the charisma of Muslim leaders such as 
Ahmadu Bamba can only be understood in terms of the political and 
social milieu in which that same charisma operated* While the appeal 
of the Muridiyya and the Tijaniyya in Senegal can be seen as a 
defensive response to colonial domination, their long term success 
is due to the fact that the brotherhood elites adapted themselves to 
the prevailing pattern of Wolof social organization by giving the 
customary system of ranks a religious raison d*etre» Thus the badolo 
or free peasants grouped themselves under the leadership of the Sy 
family in order to preserve their land rights* The tyeddo and dis­
possessed nobility tended to gravitate to the Muridiyya because of 
Ahmadu Bamba1 s close association with the Lat Dior* In addition 
the lenient attitude of the Muridiyya with respect to Islamic obser­
vance and scholarship has enabled many tyeddo and gorml (nobles) to 
join the order with a minimal grasp of the essentials of Islamic 
belief*
The maintenance of the power structure of the brotherhoods in 
Sen©|£il is due to three factors! w  the development of the marabouts 
into a distinctive ruling elite whose solidarity is maintained by 
endogamy* (2) The institution of agricultural settlements called 
dara (ir* house) which serve as collectivities for indoctrination, 
colonization of new lands, and economic co-operatives* (3) The more 
recent institution of tho da ♦Ira (Ar* agency) which is the uxbnn 
analogue of the dara* Tha da*Ira Is primarily an association of 
urban disciples (talibes) who meet at regular intervals to engage in
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communal ritual and to collect funds for the support of the shaikhs 
and other leaders of the two brotherhoods* Thus by endogamy among 
the elite and institutional adaptation in the rural and urban context 
the brotherhoods have managed to maintain their influence in Senegal 
despite the changes which have occurred both during the colonial period 
and after* Each of these factors will be examined in turn in order 
to discover the process whereby the brotherhoods have 11 Woloflzed" Islam 
In Senegal and, in so doing have made the Wolof the dominant ethnic 
group in the country*
The Religious Elites*
The list of the leading marabouts of the throe brotherhoods in 
Senegal reveals a definite tendency for certain families to monopolize 
the more pretigious religious offices within the groups* The leader­
ship of the Qadiriyya order is restricted to throe Mauretanian families 
with the result that the Qadiriyya shaikhs havo not been as active in 
the economic and social movements which have occupied their confreres 
in the Tijaniyya and Muridiyya brotherhoods *^
The Tijaniyya marabouts are grouped around several families who 
axercise enormous influence in Senegal* The By family has a monopoly 
of the office of Khalifa-General of the Tijaniyya in West Africa*
The Tall family, who represent the Tokolor ethnic group, derives its 
prestige from the illustrious Hajj tfmar Tall, the Jihad leader of the 
nineteenth century* The grandson of:’ the latter, Seydou Mourou, has 
been given the title of "Grand Marabout de l*Afrique Occidentale11 which
7 ..........  ".‘ ",nr T1" "r' ■ ■ r ......... 1.....   1.
• See Quesnot, ”les Cadres maraboutiques", op* cit*, p*171 - 180*
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is the second highest religious rank in Senegal* Seydou Hourou has 
recognized tho Khalifa General as hia religious superior in Senegal*
Other leading Tijaniyya families are the Kiaas of Kaolakh, the Kane, 
and tho ^Dieguena * These families are all related by marriage and, 
with the exception of the Hiass/ they all trace their ancestry to 
torobe leaders•
The Muridiyya represent an even greater concentration of authority
within the Mbacke clan* Indeed Qttesnot maintains that high offices in
the Muridiyya aro an exclusive prerogative of the Mbacke clan, all of
8whom are descendants of Ahmadu Bamba* Thus, the rank of shaikh is 
almost exclusively hereditary* Indeed , this attachment to the here- 
ditary principle is so strong that certain talibes (disciples) may 
recognise a woman as tholr leader if the male line is extinct* Thus, 
Kamo Say© Diop succeeded her father in 1943 and is still active in 
brotherhood affairs* This tolerance of women holding an office usually 
reserved to men i3 most unusual in Muslim brotherhoods* The Ta»ua or 
genealogical tree representing tho transmission of baraka in the Kbaoko 
family pictures nine women who are considered important enough to bo 
classed with the groat leaders of the o r d e r T h i s  praotice is a 
remnant of the earlier Wolof matrilineal system*
Among the Muridiyya the baraka of Ahmadu Bamba has become an 
attribute of the Mbacke clan thereby making the clan a hereditary ©lit©* 
As a consequence, it is almost impossible for new shaikhs to be
designated unless they can prove descent from Bamba or his close rela-
y  -—  -------------  — ......—  ... ■. — - - -------- -—
Quesnot, 19^2, p«13S*
^ 0*Brien, p*109j Monteil, 1966t p*193*
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tires* The ultimate criterion for the attainment of the rank of 
shaikh is recognition by tallbes* This means that there is no ritual 
"consecration” of a religious leader* When a descendant of the Mbacke 
inherits his father1 a talibes, he is automatically a shaikh* This 
practice contrasts markedly with the ritual designation of a muqaddam 
or shaikh among the Qadiriyya and Tijaniyya where the religious aspect
j
of the rank is paramount# O’Brien explains this paucity of ritual 
induction in the Muridiyya in terms of the early history of the brother­
hood*
The absence of ritual among the Mouride a, the choice of the 
elite ’from below1 was probably the consequence of the 
extremely rapid expansion of the brotherhood in its early 
days, which was difficult to control or direct, particularly 
during the long periods of exile or forced isolation of the 
founder* The brotherhood was at this time an explosively 
expanding mass movement, whose growth was too rapid and too 
spontaneous to bo effectively controlled by any formally 
established hierarchy; then indeed the people’s voice had 
become the voice of God*10
However, this period of relative equality has long passed and today 
the social distance between talib and shaikh is very marked* Sub­
mission to one*a spiritual mentor is, of course, a feature of Sufi 
ideology and the traditional teaching of the Tijaniyya emphasises
11
unquestioned and exclusive loyalty to the successors of Ahmad Al Tijani#
This attachment to the person of the shaikh has been reinforced by
traditional beliefs in the magical prowess of holy men against the
12onslaughts of witches and evil spirits*
10 O'Brien, p.lo8,
11
Abun Hasr, op* cit** p*166*
12 See Greenborg, "The Influence of Islam on a Sudanese Religion*
(Hew York, 1946), passim*
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While there appear a to he little or no ritual attached to the
installation of a shaikh of the Muridiyya * the submission of a talih
is done through a stylised ritual act* Whether or not the Tijaniyya
muqaddam undergoes an elaborate ritual initiation is not clear* Some
muqaddams need only acquire a written ijaza (letter of authorization)
33from their superior to exercise the rank of ritual leader* This 
act of submission (Wolof t njebbel) is an essential prerequisite to 
membership in the brotherhoodf be it Tijaniyya* Qadiriyya* or Muridiyya* 
But among the Muridiyya the terms of the submission are more absolute 
than among the other two orders.
Normally the act of submission to a Murid shaikh is made in late 
adolescence but it may bo done by an adult relative on behalf of a 
child. If the shaikh dies* the njebbel must bo renewed before the
shaikhfa successor* normally his brother or eldest son. The wording
of the formula depends on the degree of relationship of the suooeasor 
to the deceased shaikh. When the new shaikh is not a close relative
of the deceased shaikh* the full formula must be pronounced* other­
wise the talib need only say **I attach myself to you*1* This distinction 
indicates the importance of kinship relations among the marabou tic 
families.
The ritual associated with the njebbel indicates the extent of 
the shaikh *s authority over his talibes. The candidate kneels before 
the shaikh and recites the complete formula of submission* MI submit 
By body and soul to you. 1 will do everything you order me and abstain 
from anything you forbid me11* The shaikh pronounces a formula of
13
See Abun Nasr* The Tijaniyya* (^Brlen* op* cit»* p.103*
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benediction and spits into the hands of the tallb f who then rubs his 
hands over his face* This action symbolizes the fact that the 
initiate is in the hands of the shaikh Just as a corps© is in the hands 
of the person preparing it for burial* The shaikh then accepts the 
submission* urging tho initiate to obey his orders* A small offering 
to the shaikh concludes the ceremony*^
The njebbel is the basis of the organizational structure of the 
brotherhood* Its emphasis on absolute obedience to the shaikh marks 
off the Muridiyya from the Qadiriyya* In the njebbel of the Qadiriyya* 
the initiate is primarily concerned with a profession of faith and a 
willingness to observe the precepts of Islam* Only after this pro­
fession is made* does the initiate make a vague promise to obey the 
shaikh* The Tijaniyya* in contrast to the Muridiyya and the Qadiriyya* 
do not have a formal rito of Initiation# On© becomes a Tijani by 
receiving permission to perform the wird or prayer ritual of the 
brotherhood*^
Thus* it appears that tho Muridiyya order differs from the Tijaniyya 
and the Qadiriyya in two major respects* The Tijaniyya and Qadiriyya 
religious leaders aro inducted into their religious offices through a 
specific ritual formula* while the Muridiyya shaikhs receive their rank 
through hereditary succession# Thus* one who inherits talibes* ipso 
facto* is accorded tha title of shaikh* Since almost all Muridiyya 
shaikhs have become clustered around a few families associated with or 
descended from Ahmadu Bamba* it follows that no talib can become a 
shaikh unless he is a member of on© of these core families* On the
^  Monteil* op, cit** p*199r 0*Brien* op* clt»t p*85« 
^  OfBrien* p*86*
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other baud, high religious office is theoretically open to all members
of the other two brotherhoods sinco the office of muqaddam is achieved
through religious criteria and not through genealogical descent#
Hence it is possible for a Tijani or Qadiri to attain eminence within
the Qa&iriyya or Tijaniyya* provided ha is endowed with the necessary
spiritual and scholarly qualifications# Actually in faot the highest
ranks are reserved to the descendants of the major families whose
founders arc considered saints and whose baraka has become tied to
physical rather than spiritual descent#
Since the death of Ahmadu Bamba, the recruitment of Murid elites
has been standardized so that shaikhs are almost all directly descended
from those followers of Bamba who were designated shaikhs during the
founder*s lifetime* But as the descendants of these shaikhs become
more and more numerous» the problem of determining the inheritance of
disciples becomes more difficult* Currently there have been a number
of disputes concerning the adherence of talibea to one or other of a
dead marabout*s heirs# Thus some disciples may choose the dead man’s
16
eldest son while others may prefer the brother of the deceased#
Usually the shaikh will entrust his son with the children of his 
own tallbes thereby indicating that the talibea are to prefer the son 
to any other claimant after the shaikh*s death* Thus in the first 
generation it is the eldest son who succeeds in a majority of cases#
It present the first generation of shaikhs is rapidly dying off and
the second generation, i*e#, the grandsons of Bamba and his associates
Tg-~  -----1-----------------------------   1----- - --
O’Brien* op* clt#, p#10f^  ** 110*
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are now succeeding to the leadership of the brotherhood* This second
generation of succession is determined by seniority beginning with the
sons of the founder’s eldest son, followed by the sons of the next
17eldest brother# and so on* 1
Obviously such a system begins to break down when# in the third
» i
generation# the numbers of possible candidates become enormous* The
weakness of such a system of succession is already apparent in the
fact that the shaikh’s landed property is inherited direotly from
father to son thereby leaving the brothers of the dead shaikh without
a share* As a result the disciples tend more and more to follow the
eldest son rather than the brother of the dead shaikh despite the fact
that the brother is the Khalifa of the family group* A nephew who has
inherited a large estate may refuso to recognize his uncle as Khalifa
and start a new branch with himself as the head*
Thus within the brotherhood the tendency has been to increase the
patrilineal aspect of succession in order to avoid segmentary opposition
within the elite group* However competition between sons and brothers
of a lineage head is mitigated by the frequent intermarriage of
maraboutic families so that a caste-like solidarity may overcome inheri­
ng
taaee disputes* As a result# marriages with women from the traditional 
aristocracy are no longer in vogue while women of lower class origin may 
become the concubines of a shaikh but they rarely attain the status of 
a legal wife* Thus# the daughters of marabouts are much sought after
^  O'Brien, op. cl£., p.112.
13 O'Brien, p,H7.
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as marriage partners of the shaikhs in order that the prestige of a
lineage he increased. Of the eleven daughters of Ahmadu Bamba# eight
married Murid shaikhs and three married marabouts of other brotherhoods;
of the thirteen daughters of Abdurahman Lo, all but two married shaikhs
of the Mbacke family; of the nine daughters of Muhammad Bouaso* seven v
married shaikhs* The latter two families are closely connected with
19the inner circle of the Mbacke family at Touba*
This practice of endogamy has given rise to a sense of corporate 
identity which stabilizes the hierarchical structure of the brotherhood* 
The Khalifa-General. Abdou Lahatte Mbacke* a son of Ahmadu Bamba* 
presides over an imposing religious organization with a tightly co­
ordinated subordinate elite. Directly under the Khalifa are the Khalifas 
of the major lineages descended from the close associates of Ahmadu 
Bamba. Each of these lineages has a number of shaikhs who direot groups 
talibea who ere the rank and file of the order# Out of a total
membership of some 400*000 initiates* the constituents of the order can
20
be divided into the following categories i
(Figures based on a population estimate made in 1959)*
Below the rank of shaikh, there is an indeterminate category of religious 
functionaries which includes all those who perform a public role such 
as Imam of a mosque* Qadi* or Kuessln as well as those who indulge in
Marabouts
Civil Servants ......
Merchants  ....
Peasants and Artisans
.05 %
1.5
3.5  
94.5
 ^ O'Brien, on. o lt . .  p .120. 
Sy, on. o lt . .  p .171.
less reputable activities such as the preparation of amulets and the 
distribution of magic formulas designed to prevent disaster or to insure 
success in the round of daily living. This rather comprehensive group 
makes up the olas3 of serins (Woloft holy man* equals Arabic wall) and 
includes those descendants of the maraboutio families who have not 
inherited talibes. If a serin has talibes. he beoomts a shaikh but 
uruch an event is rare.21
While the shaikh’s power over his talibes is very nearly absolute* 
it does happen on rare occasions that disciples will cancel their 
allegiance to one shaikh to join another. However the disciples 
generally remain attached to their shaikh despite the letter’s lapses 
from striot Islamic rules of conduot. The shaikh’s association with 
Ahmadu Bamba is sufficient to offset any misgivings on the part of the 
disciples regarding his probity. An anecdote illustrating the Hurid 
propensity to rationalise lapses on the part of the shaikh! is told of 
a marabout of the Mbacke family. This individual frequently appeared 
in public in an intoxicated state. His followers however stoutly deolared
that the shaikh had so much baraka that strong liquor transformed Itself
22
Into milk when it reached his stomach.
In addition to the spiritual ties between shaikh and talib. there 
are certain finanoial and material obligations incumbent upon the murid. 
These Obligations entail labour servioes and money payments which are 
placed at the disposal of the shaikh. Co-operative labour was a feature 
of Wolof society* but under the Muridiyya it has been made part of the 
religious practice. Although the brotherhood’s emphasis on production
21 O'Brien, p.107
22 O'Brien, p.8?.
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reveals a certain similarity to the so-called Protestant Ethnic* there 
is a significant difference in the fact that work is meritorious only 
if it is performed for a shaikh* There is no merit in work for its 
own sake*
The transformation of the M'Backe family into a dynastic monopoly 
of the office of Khalifa-General is symbolized by the ceremonial 
institution of the Magal* The magal is a pilgrimage to the tomb of 
Bamba in the Great Mosque of Touba* Originally the magal was 
instituted to commemorate the death of the founder* later it became 
the means of collecting funds for the construction of the Great Mosque 
. which is the central shrine of the Muridiyya movement# as well as the 
symbol of the Mbacke clan's hegemony of the order* For the average 
member of the brotherhood* the annual visit to Touba is a ready sub­
stitute for the expensive and time-consuming pilgrimage to Mecca*
Since all the talibes are Invited to go to Touba on the 18th of the 
month of Safar, the numbers of the participants are veiy large (200*000 
in 1967). The presence of government officials and dignitaries from
23the other brotherhoods highlights the importance of this annual event*
In addition there are other magala sponsored by important shaikhs of the 
order to commemorate important events in the life of Ahmadu Bamba but 
these do not nearly approach the ceremonial significance of the magal of 
Touba*
The visible manifestation of Murid power and prestige is the 
imposing mosque which houses the tomb of Bamba* The central minaret of
24
this vast structure is the highest in Africa (86 metres* almost 300 feet)*
^  Descriptions of the Magal can be found in Behrman* Sy* and O'Brien*
1Ci4
The appearance of this edifice with its five ninareta and fourteen 
domes on the horizon of the flat plain of Baol only serves to accentuate 
its splendour# After forty years of construction at an estimated cost 
of £ 1,000,000, the shrine is nov substantially complete# Although the 
Senegalese government has provided financial help, the brunt of the 
building effort was borne by the largely unremunerated labout of the 
Murid disciples# Such a monumental achievement is ample proof of the 
personal devotion and financial generosity of the rank and file* This 
complicated network of monetary collections and disbursements reinforces 
the oohesion Of the brotherhood and tends to root the authority of the 
marabouts in the day-to-day transactions which affect the well-being 
of the members#
The contributions given by the talibea to their shaikhs are divided 
into four categories# The asaaka (Ar# cakat) is an obligatory alms 
tax, prescribed by Muslim law, which was levied on various kinds of 
property and distributed to the poor* Among the Mur ids, this form of 
payment is minimal and most talibes make occasional small donations to 
the poor on their own initiative {sadaqa) * A second type of gift is 
made to the shaikh at the beginning and end of Ramadan* The two offer*
ings are oailed respectively umkte and murun kor and are made in the
25tom of small portions of millet* The most iiqportant contribution 
common to all Senegalese brotherhoods is the hadiva (Ar# gift) which is 
given to the shaikh at the initiation ceremony (njebbel) and thereafter 
on the occasion of ceremonial visits of the shaikh (slyara). In the 
Bengalese context, the sufi practice of giyara has become elaborated
25 O'Brien, p.92.
105
into the solemn assemblies sailed magal by the llurids and gamou by the 
Tijanis.26
In 1947* the Khalifa-General of the Muridiyya Instituted a form 
of compulsory hadiya. called the sas* which was to he used for the 
completion of the Great Mosque of Touba* Nevertheless, despite the 
faot that the mosque has been consisted, the hadiya, is still in foroe* 
Needless to say, many Hurids have resoted quite strongly to this 
imposition of religious taxation and some religious leaders refuse to 
oolleet it from their followers* Others fear that the funds collected 
are not used for the purpose stated by the Khalifa-General,
Another payment is the njottuk bop (Wolof: "redemption of the head)
which, unlike the sas* is a fixed sum payable by all Muxida* This 
payment of 140 francs a head originated during the lifetime of Ahmadu 
Bamba in order to finance the mosque of Touba* However it fell into 
oblivion after the founder's death only to be reinstated in 1947 along 
with the sas**^
In contrast with the Muridiyya, the Qadiriyya and Tijaniyya brother­
hoods do not have obligatory payments such as the sas and njottuk bop* 
but rely on voluntaxy payments made by the faithful* As a result the 
financial administration of the two brotherhoods lacks the centralised 
structure of the Murldiyya and depends more or less on the personal 
initiative of individual shaikhs* However, in recent years the Tijani 
marabouts have become increasingly Involved in the groundnut trade which 
has given rise to ooxporate financial ventures in order to regulate and
The kings of Walo used to receive tribute at a ceremony oalled gamou*
See Monteil, op* oit** p*24*
^  O’Brien, p*94*
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sid
invest the sums Involved* As a result, the marabouts have become
the dispensers of large sums of money which are used to build up the
cooperative enterprises which function under the auspices of the major
maraboutic families*
However, not all the income received is re-invested* The religious
leaders redistribute part of their wealth to their followers* The old
and infirm are regular recipients of food and other necessities* The
shaikhs, through their business connections, help their followers to
find employment and in times of financial distress, they lend money at
interest rates much lower than those offered by the Lebanese traders*
Through such activities, the brotherhoods in Senegal have become a form
of insurance against mundane disaster as well as guarantors of celestial
rewards. As directors of the brotherhoods* agricultural enterprises,
the maraboutic families have become a managerial elite* As a result,
the practice of endogamy among the leading families not only limits the
extension of baraka, but also Insures that the control of the commercial
29ventures remains in the hands of the religious elite*
The Para
The most effective institution utilised by the brotherhoods to 
develop a sense of community spirit and loyalty in the rural environment 
is the dara which is a type of religious collective farm* At various 
periods and in different areas the sufi orders have sponsored small 
settlements of ascetics who wished to spend some time in scholarly 
pursuits and meditation* These foundations are known as gawiya or
2a
See Quesnot, op* cit«* p.123*
29
0fBrien, op* oit** p*120*
10?
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Mi&fifl&h* The dara is a development of the gawiya and Hke the 
latter it originally designated a community engaged in religious 
education* The pupils and ascetics supported themselves and their 
shaikh by cultivating nearby fields and tending the flooks belonging 
to the shaikh* Even though work in tlie fields occupied a large part
of the daily schedule, the purpose of the institution was essentially 
religious education*
The Muridiyya have developed the dara into an agricultural co­
operative under the supervision of a shaikh or his delegate* Although 
there are some Muridiyya daras which do attempt to give their members 
training in law, Arabic grammar, and Qua?1 an recitation, the amount of 
manual labour done by the pupils ia substantially greater than that 
performed by members of the Qadiriyya or the Tijaniyya daras. This 
emphasis on communal labour has its roots in traditional patterns of 
Y/olof land exploitation* Prior to tho colonial era, land was distri­
buted by the Wolof kings to their subordinate chief3, the laaans who 
controlled extensive areas which were inherited from father to son. 
Sections of this land were in turn given to the free peasants (badolo) 
to cultivate under a grant oalled the "right to axe". This system was 
abrogated by a decree voiding the power of the kings to grant land 
rights and a second decree which eliminated the title of the l«m*ms to 
grant land to their peasant clients/^
30 _ ’" ' " ' ■
See Evans-Prttchard, The Sanusi of Cyrenaioa for the situation in
Libya; I.M* Lewis has described the terica settlements in Somaliland
where they are known as jama1 ai see A Pastoral Lemocraoy. pp.95-100*
31
Pelissier, op. cit*. p.122-147*
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On the village level* among both the Y/olof and the Serer, the
cultivation of village fields was implemented through communal work
32groups palled xamba or kompln which were based on age groups.'
Thus the dara combines features of the sufi zawiya and the ^olof
kompin. OfBrien points out however* that the kompin exists only on
an occasional basis whereas the dara members spend many years in the
35seryioe of their shaikh#
The development of the dara during the years following Bambaf s 
death is the major innovative feature of the Muridiyya movement and 
its most effective means of territorial expansion. Unlike many co­
operative agricultural institutions and work groups which have died out 
in West Afrioa the dara system has spread from the Muridiyya to the 
Tijaniyya and Qadiriyya in Senegal.^1,
The individual responsible for the proliferation of the working 
dara was shaikh Ibra Fall* an early associate of Ahmadu Bamba. Of 
Tyeddo descent, Ibra Fall seems to fit the role of the organizer of a
prophetic movementJ an eminence grise who shapes the ideals of the
35oharismatlo leader into concrete rules for action. It was Ibra Fall 
who persuaded many tyeddo to become followers of Bamba by setting himself 
up as the model talib. Aocording to tradition, the first encounter 
between Bamba and Fall was a dramatio one. Fall removed his olothes 
as a sign of humility in the presence of his master and crept on his
32
' See Ames, op. olt.. pp.224-227.
^  OfBricn* p.165*
C. Meillassoux* Anthropologic economique des Gouro de Cote d*Ivoire. 
pp*175~185> Meillassoux shows how communal work is dying out among the
Gouro.
* See P. Worseley, The Trumpet Shall Sound, 2nd ed. Bondon, 1968# 
pp.xvi-xvii*
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knees before Bamba and pronounced the formula of njebbel which has
since become part of the ritual of initiation? UI submit myself to
you, in this life and the next* I will do everything that you order
36
me* I will abstain from anything you forbid me** Ibra Fall then
informed Bamba that he had not come to seek education but to serve a 
marabout who would be his guide*
The service which the new disciple performed for the marabout was 
hard physical labour which, in the context, was also service of God* 
Consequently, formal religious duties were no longer necessary since 
Ibra Fall* s activity constituted a religious act* Before long a group 
of like-minded disciples joined Ibra Fall and formed the model of the 
working dara* This group of zealots devoted almost all their time to 
practical work for Ahmadu Bamba, surrendering to him the results of 
their labour* Despite a certain amount of opposition to the eccentric 
behaviour of Ibra Fall, it was apparent that Bamba had fully aocepted 
the new group* Indeed the Bay Fall, as the group came to be called, 
were olosely associated with the vision Bamba had concerning the erection 
of the Great Mosque of the Muridiyya* Ibra Fall cleared the ground for 
the shrine at Touba and his followers have custodial prerogatives at 
the mosque itself*
The growth of the Bay Fall manifests several interesting features 
indicating the resumption of certain Wolof traditional roles and ranks* 
Ibra Fall was given the title of jawrin Thich originally designated a 
subordinate chief under the Darnel* Fallfs followers were called jam* 
•slaves" of the marabout# Thus the members of the working dara had
3 O'Brien, p .143
tto
the seme status as the defunct class of tyeddo who had been slaves of 
37the Darnel♦ However* the changed social situation In Senegal rendered
the life of the initiate in the dara an arduous experience. The young
men who flocked to the new working daras depended entirely on the suecess
of the harvests and the generosity of their shaikh for their livelihood.
Due to their penurious state, the initiates were called takder in
reference to the belt which they wore to keep their ragged clothing in 
38
place. All in all, the dara quickly became a refuge for the landless
tyeddo. young men fleeing conscription or forced labour under the French.
The dara also functioned as an institution for the socialization
of young adepts. Here again the role of custom is paramount. It appears
that the ordinary Wolof work groups were highly competitive and after the
French takeover, physical labour replaced the militazy expeditions vhioh
were designed to prove one’s valour and manhood* Thus, the ceremoi^ r
called wango, which formerly preceded a battle, now heralds the beginning
of work contests in which the men vie with one another in clearing and 
39planting fields.
Thus, in the colonial period, when warfare and inter-ethnic strife
was forbidden, the dara» like its seoular counterpart the kompin, provided
a means of proving onefs physical prowess. Hence the life of the Takder
was especially attractive to the tyeddo class who had previously been
engaged in military exploits and pillaging raids. The dara served as
an introduction to agricultural production, thereby providing the tyeddo
40
with a new livelihood* These eager recruits were the vanguard of the
*7 ' .................
$7* QP* pit.. p.l4l*
^  O’Brien, p.165.
^  Ames, op. clt.. p.231.
^  Felissier, p.Ul*
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Murid penetration of the interior and the dara system came into force 
during the rush to the "New Lands" caused by the opening of the rail 
lines to Kayes in 192$ and to Linguere in Jolof in 1931* During the 
years 1930-1945# Murid shaikhs built landings along the rail lines to 
facilitate the Shipment of groundnuts in accordance with the French policy 
of basing the Senegalese economy on groundnut exports* In this way the 
Murlds gained access to the railway and thus they were able to ship their 
stooks more cheaply than if they had to convey their produce from great 
distances*
The dara has become the basio groundnut production unit in the 
Senegalese economy* The daras themselves form groups or clusters on the 
estates of the shaikhs and each dara in the cluster is directed by the 
.1 awrin (Wolofs "deputy") who is appointed by the shaikh* This individual 
is usually the oldest person in the dara* Of the eleven daras studied 
by 0*Brian only three of the jawrins were married and two of the latter 
were over forty years of age*^ Each cluster of daras is supervised by 
another representative of the shaikh called the borom dara*
The siee of the individual daras in Obrien’s sample ranged from 
five to sixteen members* The largest duster was that of the Khalifa- 
General at Touba Bogo which comprised twenty-two daras* The number of 
daras under a shaikh* s control is an indication of his importance in the 
Hurid hierarchy* Henoe it is only to be expected that the -Mbacke 
family would control a large number of daras* Of the thirteen leading 
shaikhs selected by O'Brien# ten belonged to the Mbacke family and two 
to the Fall family* The family allegiance of the thirteenth# Shaikh
W  O'Brien, p.170.
/
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in
Eodou Khabane, was not apparent from his name*
The decision to live in a dara is left to the talib who may or 
may not enter a dara after his aot of submission* Ihen the reomuit 
is very young however, the decision rests with the parents or guardians*
i
From 0*Brien* s sample, it would seem that more than half Of the recruits
43do not exercise free choice when they enlist in the dara* In this 
latter case, the parents look upon the dara as a period of schooling 
during which the child learns the basic elements of his religion as well 
as the techniques of fanning* In addition, the fact that the ohild will 
receive food and lodging in return for his labour alleviates the family1 s 
financial burden* Finally, the resulting relationship with a shaikh 
can be a valuable social asset*
Those disciples who enter the dara voluntarily are, of course, older 
than the preoeding group and hence they can perform the more demanding 
tasks connected with clearing and planting the fields* For this group 
the educational benefits of the dara are minimal aside from memorizing 
verses from the Qur’an and the qasa’id (religious poetry) of Ahmadu Bamba* 
The material seourity afforded by the dara is also a factor in 
recruiting new members from youths who have little prospect of inheriting 
or buying land. In addition, the communal solidarity and corporate 
spirit manifested by the dara community also attracts new reoruits* 
Finally, the takder* if they have worked for a long period in the dara* 
can expect the shaikh to provide them with a bride prioe, when they decide 
to leave the dara in order to get married* But even in this oaae the 
shaikh usually ohooses the takder* s wife from among the daughters of one
^  O’Brien, p*167 
^  O’Brien, p*1?1*
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of his talibes*
After leaving the dara* the ex-takder may settle in one of the 
villages settled by talibes of the shaikh who usually gives him a plot 
of land* However, most of the ex-takder return to their native 
villages where they are treated with great respect because of the merit 
they have gained from working for a shaikh*
The dara is fundamentally an Institution which functions as a 
socialising medium through which the religious and ethical ideals of 
the brotherhood are imparted to the unmarried youths who make up the 
group* In order to render the talibes more dependent on the shaikh and 
his deputy (.lawrinl* the daras were generally set up in more remote areas 
isolated from Wolof villages* Consequently the daras beoame pioneer 
settlements which opened up vast tracts to subsequent settlement* At 
the age of about twenty-five the monastio life of the dara was given up 
by the talib who then married and began to form the nucleus of a Muridiyya 
village with his confreres in the vioinity of the dara* Thus, maqy of 
the villages in the Ferlo region of central Senegal are outgrowths of 
the dara system*
The working schedule of the dara is a rigorous one, beginning at
1. K
five in the morning and ending In the evening with Qur’an readings*
In only one of the daras studied by O’Brien was time allotted for a 
holiday period* In the other daras* the takder were granted permission 
to leave the dara only to attend the funeral of a close relative* Other­
wise, the takder may see his relatives only if they visit the shaikh*
If the dara is geographioally remote, even these occasional visits may be
^  For a description of the work day in the dara, see Tidiane Sy, op* oit»* 
passim* especially pp. 141-12+4*
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Impossible* There are cases of talibes who had worked in the dara 
for ten or fifteen years without onoe being allowed to visit their 
relatives* Despite this rigorous regimen the dara still renews
I g l x
itself from the sons and brothers of ex-takder* v
Under the watchful eyes of the jawrin and the borom dara, the 
takder are taught respect for the authority of the shaikh and of those 
dignitaries whomake up the entourage of the Khalifa-General* The 
shaikhs also see to it that strong bonds between potentially trouble­
some members of the dara are discouraged since such bonds might lead 
to the group’s challenging the policy or authority of the shaikh.
To avoid such a possibility the shaikhs try to preserve a fairly wide
i c
age distribution within each Individual dara*
The ex-takder frequently serve as intermediaries between the 
majority of peasant Murids and the shaikhs. The very fact that a talib 
has endured the arduous service of the dara* sets him on a pedestal 
above his fellows who have not devoted themselves so single-mindedly to 
their shaikh* These latter are termed takko by the ex-takder* This 
was the Wolof term used for a wife who had not yet come to live with 
her husband*^ As a result of his association with the shaikh, the takder 
tend to be regarded as religious experts and looal representatives of 
the shaikh’s authority* However, even despite his looal prestige, the 
takder does not attain to the rank of shaikh since the title of shaikh 
depends on desoent*
O’Brien, p*182-184*
Sy, op. eit.. p.174-175.
47 O'Brien, p.181.
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Inevitably the arduous conditions and isolation which characterized
the early daras have been softened somewhat* As more and more daras
are transformed into villages, the possibility of initiating new daras
has diminished due to the lack of available land* The government has
also set aside large areas of forest preserves which puts further
limits to Hurid expansion.
An added is^etus to find new land springs from the nature of
Wolof agricultural practice* The lolof are a mobile population which
has expanded territorially in a south-easterly direction at the expense
of the neighbouring Serer and Fulani. According to Pelissier, the
transformation of the majority of Y/olof into landed peasants is relatively 
48
recent* As a result, the Wolof have not learned to utilise fertilizers
or crop rotation to increase yields and maintain the fertility of the
soil. Crop rotation is disoouraged by the marabouts since the major
agricultural effort is aimed at cash income from groundnuts. Organic
fertilizers are Beldom used sinoe the Wolof do not, as a rule, possess
livestock. Hence after a few years, the fields become exhausted and
the cultivators are forced to find new lands.^
The Serer, on the other hand, have more highly developed farming
techniques which permit them to raise a diversity of crops as well as
livestock. For this reason the Serer are more sedentary than the Wolof
50and have been more resistant to brotherhood influence.
The eastward expansion of the Wolof has had serious consequences
j' R
Pelissier, op. cit*. pp. 17^178.
49 Ibid.. p.178.
50
J. Fouquet, "La traite dee ar a chides dans le pays de Kaolack et sea 
consequences economiques,_socialea et juridiques." Etudes Sdhegalaises. 
No.8, Centre I.F.A.N* 1958, p.31.  Q------
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for the sesd-nomadlo Fulani pastor&lists of Ferlo* In 1937* at Touba
Fall, fifty people were injured in a battle between Kurida and Fulani
over land rights* When the case was brourht to the courts, the Fulani
won but their victory was ephemeral* The Murlds returned and uprooted
the crops planted by the Fulani and replaced them w ith groundnuts* In
the face of such determination the Fulani moved from the area. In any
event, the vagueness of Fulani land right3 rendered their plight more
difficult especially since the Murids considered Fulani grazing areas 
51as virgin land*
Gradually the shaikhs assumed a right of eminent domain over areas
where iiurid settlers built daras and villages in the former Fulani
distriots* Despite the fact that the Damans* right to distribute and
allocate land had been abolished by administrative decree in 1906,
nothing prevented the shaikhs from exercising an equivalent right vis a
vis their disciples in the newlyoleared areas. Eventually this right
of the marabouts was abolished by another decree in 1964, but this
52
latter decree has remained inoperative* Alongside this right of 
eminent domain, there are proprietary rights belonging to the shaikhs 
which give them complete control over certain acreages within the village 
areas* These are the so-called Wednesday fields*
The Wednesday field was an acreage cultivated for the marabout by 
adult talibea while they reoeived religious instruction* Since family 
obligations prevented these individuals from entering the dara* they 
recompensed the marabout by working one or two days in a field set aside 
for the purpose* Nowadays the Wednesday field is merely a fallow area
51 O'Brien, p.198.
52 O'Brien, p.201.
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sat aside for the shaikh by his talibes* When this field is cultivated
all the produce goes to the shaikh* This method of making an offering
to the shaikh has become general among the brotherhoods and Wednesday
fields are cultivated for Tijani marabouts as well* The supervision
of these fields is entrusted to the senior talib in the village who is
given the title of .lawrin* The jawrin’a task is to recruit labour for
sowing, cultivating and harvesting, all of which may consume only four
or five days in the year depending on the seal and efficiency of the
workers* This form of voluntary gift does not require any initial
outlay on the part of the marabouts since the implements and seed are
provided by the villagers* All the marabout does is collect the
proceeds from the jawrin after the harvest*
The sisa of these fields varies considerably with most fields
ranging between five and ten acres* The total number of such fields
is difficult to estimate sinoe the shaikhs are sometimes unaware of the
number themselves* The Khalifa-General had a Wednesday field in almost
every Murid village in Senegal as well as several in the Ivozy Coast
53and in Mali which were farmed by Wolof migrants*
It is important to note that most of these land rights are customaxy 
and are not confirmed by civil law* A law passed in 1964 did make 
provision for certain "developed” lands to be registered as private 
property* As a result, many shaikhs have applied for registration and 
if the government aoeepts their claims, it oould conceivably alter the 
religious relationship between shaikh and talib into one between landlord
pi
and client with all the legal coercion such a relationship implies*
53 o’ Brien, p.212*
54 Ibia.. p.213*
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From this surrey of the various types of land exploitation 
practiced by the Muridiyya brotherhood and, to a lesser extent by their 
Tijaniyya counterparts, it appears that the marabouts have some to 
exercise the function traditionally belonging to the Damans. The 
talibes working on the dara have combined certain features of the 
Pamel-Tyeddo relationship with aspects of the Wolof communal work groups 
called kompin. The process in which the daras have been transformed 
into village settlements has enabled the Murids to anchor themselves in 
the new territories at the expense of the Fulani* To the south, the 
Serer ethnic group has until relatively recently resisted the impaot of 
the brotherhoods but even they are rapidly being infiltrated by Wolof 
settlers. Indeed when a Serer beoomes a Murid he automatically gives
cc
up his Serer Identity and beoomes Wolof. Thus the vitality and 
dynamism of the Wolof is aided by the religious network of brotherhood 
loyalties. The daras and Wednesday fields serve to retain the links 
between the Talibes and the shaikhs. The Jawrlna beoome the go- 
betweens in the complex social and finanoial transactions whioh define 
the roles of shaikhs and disciples.
The Urban Da’ira
The third pillar of the Murid ideological system is the urban 
association of talibea called da*Ira (Arabic: "agency")• This institu­
tion is not original with the Muridiyya since it is a development of
the communal chant sessions associated with the dhikr ritual common to
56all Muslim brotherhoods. The growth and influence of the dLa’irag is
55 gee Klein, Islam and Imperialism in Senegal, p.viiij O’Brien, p.242.
56 * See Behzman, op. clt., p. 197*
”119
I
mainly a post-war phenomenon following from the migration of many 
rural fanners to Dakar and other urban centres. The analysis of 
tk* da’ira must take aocount of the development of Senegalese society 
in the years preceding independence. Hence the following lhapter
will consider the reaction of the brotherhoods to the conditions
. 1
brought about urban migration during the period 1945-1965* )
CHAPTER FITE
FROM RURAL PLANTATIONS TO URBAN FEDERATIONS t 
THE BROTHERHOODS AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS 
IN SENEGAL 1945-1965
At the Kurid Magal in 1963, Leopold Senior, President of 
Senegal, outlined his view of the relationship between the Muridiyya 
brotherhood and the government of Senegal!
Although a certain infantile leftism tries to present 
the religious chiefs as ’counterrevolutionaries1..... 
it pleases me to give Justice to these lies.
Again what is Socialism if not essentially the economic- 
social system which give primlity and priority to 
work? Who has done this better than Ahmad Bamba and his 
successors. • • « People talk to me of rational organised 
/ work. And you (tho Khalifa-General) have always, in
this sense,-supported the effort of the Party and the 
Government.
The close co-operation between Senghor’s regime and the 
brotherhood is, of course, the sequel to the policy fostered by 
the French in the years following Bambafs death. Nevertheless, 
the altered social and political situation of Senegal has brought 
about corresponding changes in the authority structure of the 
brotherhoods as a whole* The rapid growth of metropolitan centres 
such as Dakar has challenged the rural-agricultural orientation of 
the shaikhs* As a result, the brotherhoods not only have had to 
adapt themselves to the new breed of indigenous political leaders, 
but they also had to develop means whereby the religious elite could 
maintain contact with the increasing numbers of talibes who began 
flocking to the cities of Dakar, St* Louis, Kaolakh, and Thies*
1 Cited in Be hr man, Muslim Brotherhoods and Politics in 
Senegal, p. 118*
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This urban migration has been accelerated by the progressive
degradation of the soil in the groundnut zone due to inefficient
methods of horticulture • Government attempts to regulate land
tenure a«d preserve forested areas have prevented further expansion
to the arid regions of eastern Senegal* The Lol sur 1© domains
national of I964 has officially abolished the proprietary ri^its
2
of those who do not actually work the land they claim* In 1965, 
a decree setting up government sponsored rural councils further 
threatened the hegemony of the rural marabouts* It was evident 
that if the marabouts wished to preserve their role they would have 
to take into consideration the fact of urbanisation* The great 
wave of agrarian colonisation had petered out*
In the urban context the formation of local associations 
called da’ira (in Wolof t dahira) has enabled the brotherhoods to 
adapt themselves to the new order* The da’ira is, in effect, the 
urban counterpart of the rural dara and, like the dara* it has 
developed from the communal prayer meetings and reading sessions 
associated with the sufi tariqas* Like many of the ethnic and religious 
societies that have sprung up throughout Africa, the da’ira serves 
as a mutual aid association for urban members of the brotherhoods*
The popularity of these associations has made the Tijaniyya and 
Muridiyya da’lraa a prominent feature of the urban landscape ia 
Senegal*
Apart from maintaining links between the tariqa leaders and 
their disciples, the da’iras are also a major source of financial aid*
2 O’Brien, p* 212*
3 Sy, p*260*
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Indeed their primary function is to provide funds for the economic 
and welfare activities of the religious leaders* The major means 
of collecting funds is through community chant sessions which often 
last into the small hours of the morning# ,
In general the da’iras of the Qadiriyya and Tijaniyya are 
loosely organised groups whose main purpose is to edify and inspire 
their members through chants which praise God and extoll the virtues 
of the saints of the two orders* However when the Muridiyya began 
to organize da’iras for the urban talibes § they gave these 
associations strong economic orientations* The Muridiyya emphasis 
on service to the shaikh shaped the structure of the da’ira by 
retaining its association with the shaikhs and ultimately with the 
Khalifa-General * Gradually this hierarchic organization permeated 
the Tijaniyya da’iraa so that today the federation of da’iraa under 
the control of the Tijani shaikh Ibrahim Mass rivals the Muridiyya 
daUras in prestige and political influenced
The Muridiyya da’ira associations did not develop until urban 
migration began to increase after the Second World War* Before that 
time migration to the cities was only temporary, depending on the 
demand for seasonal workers called "navetanes” * After 1945, Murid 
quarters sprang up in the principle towns of Senegal and by the 
early 1950’s there were over 25,000 Kurids in Dakar, and 7,000 in
5
Thies* Unfortunately no reliable statistical study of the urban 
membership Is available* Censuses were made at Thies in 1953 and at
4 See J^oelich, Lea Musulmans d’Afrique Ho ire t pp. 237-238*
5 O’Brien, p* 242*
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Dakar in 1935 which divided the brotherhood membership into 
categories of age, sex* occupation* educational level* and ethnic 
origin# Although this survey Is over fifteen years old* it does 
provide some indication of the urban composition of the tariqas«
As far as age distribution is concerned* no significant 
variation distinguished the three brotherhoods (Qadiriyya* 
Tijaniyya, and Muridiyya) , On the other hand* the proportion of 
women to men was higher for the Muridiyya than for the other two 
brotherhoods# this difference corresponds to the higher ratio 
of women among the urban Wolof in comparison with other ethnic 
groups* Since the Muridiyya are almost all Wolof whereas the -
Qadiriyya and Tijaniyya comprise other ethnic groups* it follows
6that the Muridiyya would have a higher ratio of women to men.
The Muridiyya also had a higher rate of polygamy than the other 
brotherhoods# Usually a high rate of polygamy Is associated with 
pros tigs and wealth but in the Murid case* the opposite seems to be 
true # The urban Muriels are often members of nfyenyo or artisan 
castes and occupy the poorer quarters of Thies and Dakar# In 
general the Mur ids are considered socially inferior to the Qadlri 
and Tijjani adepts# On the other hand, the higher polygamy rate of
6 0‘Briea gives the following figure si Percentage of members of 
brotherhoods with more than one wife in Dakar t 
Murids#•#•#«*#..##««####** 20$
Tijanis.#,,.«•*,«••••*#,#• lBp 
Qadiris. ...#.#. .*.#.#.#.#* 1 #
Mumber of wives per married man in Thiesi (a sample of 633) 
Murids#####*############## 1,67 
T i j a n i s # . . . , , , 1.44 
Qadiris#*#.##*#*....   1.27
CMBrlen, op# cit#» p# 241
n h
the Mur ids Is to ho explained by the geographical proximity of some
Hurid villages to tha-urban coat re3 and also the fact that the major
population centres aro either in or near Wolof territory* Hence
Kurid urbanization patterns is directly connected tilth the Wolof
7predominance in the cities#1
From statistical surveys* it appears that Hurid membership is -
overwhelmingly Wolof * As a result* Hurid migration reinforces the
8pattern of Wolof predominance in urban areas* Other ethnic groups 
such as the Tokclor must travel long distances to obtain Tokolor 
wives in order to maintain ethnic identity* The 3erer# while living 
close to the urban centres of Dakar and Haolakh* have not been 
forced to migrate bo cause of their greater agricultural proficiency 
which enables them to maintain their rural way of life* The Woloff 
on the other hand* have tended to grow only groundnuts* thereby 
obliging themselves to import foodstuffs such as millet and rice*
The Wolof Inch of permanent attachment to the land* which has been 
previously mentioned* lias rendered the Wolof more ready to engage 
in other Occupations such as trade and commerce*^ Furthermore * 
iho almost feudal nature of Wolof farming techniques t which 13 a 
corollary of their tariqa adherence * has retarded the formation 
of email independent property holdings despite the efforts of 
the government to curtail the shaikhs monopoly over land tenure.
7 For details on the ethnic composition of the Brotherhoods in
Dakar and Thies see O’Brien p« 243*
8 Pelissier# Les Paysans du Senegal* op# clt#> pp 95^96*
9 See AMoulaye Bara Diop* ,fBa Culture Wolof" * Hotes Africaines#
no* 121 (l*F#A*W*p 1969) pp# 1-7*
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Thus Wolof predominance in the urban centres i3 a by-produot of 
a migratory process resulting from the exhaustion of available 
land due to the faulty roethods of agriculture currently encouraged 
by the shaikhs# This process can ultimately he traced to the
(
particular features of tho tariqa organisation among the Wolof
which encourages maximum returns from groundnut production for
the benefit of tho religious leaders while failing to take adequate
steps to maintain soil fertility* This short-sighted policy has
turned largo fertile tracts into desert wastes unfit for
cultivation#^
In the two censuses made in Dakar and This a the ethnic
composition of the Huridiyya is seen to ho mainly Wolof $ E>7$ of
the Hurids in Dakar were Wolof while 93 £ of those in Ihies were 
11
Wolcf# The fact that Wolof is the language of trade and
communication between the different linguistic groups means that
Wolof is expanding at the expense of other languages# The breakdown
of ethnic groups in terms of tarlqa affiliation reveals that a
majority cf Wolof are Tijani thus making Wolof the language of
many of the Tijani religious meetings# As a result many of the
Tokolor who are almost all Tijani have had to use Wolof when they
move to the urban areas# Thus both urban Tijaniyya and Kuridiyya
are agents of Woloficaticn* This tendency is especially pronounced
among the Mufidiyya# "if you become a Kurid* you become Wolof" is
12the general consensus of urban talibes# Today Wolof is the
10 Pelissier* p# 350
11 O’Brien# p# 243
12 O’Brien, p# 242
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language of itchy. of the urban da’Iras and of religious esprescion 
in general# ' ,
Since the shaikhs of the Hurids and# to a lesser degree* the
shaikhs of the Tijaniyya# live on their estates in the rural
districts# new forms of organization wore needed to maintain links 
with the swelling ranks of urban migrants* At first the shaikhs 
appointed jairrins to act as their delegates in tho towns and to 
report on the activities of the talltea * The Jatrrins were entrusted 
with the tacks of preserving religious loyalty and encouraging 
regular financial contributions to tho shaikhs# However the 
jaurirs coon ran into difficulties duo to the suspicions of the 
urban disciples who believed that their contributions were in fact 
lining the Javrins1 pockets instead of being remitted to the shaikhs. 
Many tallbea refused to deal with tho Jawrina and preferred instead 
to make their offerings to the shaikh in person#
Although tho traditional donations# hadlyya# gas, and njottuk 
bop are still maintained# tiro new modes of payment have been
instituted in the Urban contort# Theso contributions nro derived
from the "Wednesday Field" payment# the allarba» and from the 
collections made by the da’ira associations# Tho "Wednesday Field” 
has already been mentioned as vatered-down substitute for the dara 
service. In tho towns Its function has been formalised even further# 
Each Wednesday or Sunday# an official nominated by the shaikh# or 
elected by tho taliboa collects an unstipulated sum as a substitute 
for work in tho "Wednesday Field" * Alternatively the shaikh may 
possess land near the town which serves as a "Wednesday Field” and
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is CTAltivated by urban trtlibqg in their free time. Thus the Khalifa-
General of the liuridiyyn has two fields outside Dakar* several
13others near Dlourbel# end others as far away as Bathhurst.
Nevertheless, the time factor has limited the success of these
developments since urban' employment severely restricts the
opportunities of the talibos to work in the "Wednesday Fields" •
The da’ira, on the other hand# Is a much more successful
organisation and resembles the urban associations found elsewhere
in West Africa and which have been studies by Bant on# Little* and
Meillassoux*^* Essentially the da’Ira is an adult equivalent of the
teaching dara. Whereas the dara is chiefly concerned with the
rudiments of Islamic learning, the da’ira members interest themselves
in a broad spectrum of social and religious issues. For this reason,
the da* Ira is not only an institution which reinforces loyalty to
the religious elite but also powerful political force in the urban
scene*
The beginnings of Kurid da’ira activity can be traced back to the 
Bivan Mourijina Fi Amdahl Khaayril Moursalina (Association of tturida
m mm ^i— h f—  ii* i ■». « imwt m»m i m r ^ . n  ■ . m i  m  . ■ i * ■ — n  *.i ».» %
for the Praises of the Best of the Prophets) founded by Cheikh 
libacke in 1942* The aim of the association wa3 to improve knowledge 
of the Qur’an, to organize religious singing, and to provide 
assistance for those in need* This group comprised several thousand 
members In a number of towns and became a valuable support for
13 O’Brien, p. 249
14 See K. Banton, Vest African Citys A Study of Tribal Life in 
Freetown (London 1 9 5 7 Little, Urbanisationt A Study of Voluntary 
Associations in Social Change (Cambridge, I970J; C. Hoillassoux, 
Urbanisation of an African Communityi Voluntary Associations in 
Bamako (Seattle* 19&3V*
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Cheikh Hbacke's politioal adventures* In 1945# after the death of hie
father § Mamadu Mustara who was Khalifa-General of the Muridiyya,
Cheikh Mbacke*s succession to the office of Khalifa-General was
foiled by the French who suspected Mbacke* s association with Pan-
Arab and anti-colonial movements * As a re suit , Mamadu Mustafa was
succeeded by his brother Falilou Mbacke whose accession.was in
15accord with Wolof ouatom.
Beoause of Cheikh Mbaoke's personal ambitions, his diwan had
an overt political cast# After 1945# Opposition from both the
government and other Murid leaders reduced the activity of the
association* However other urban associations did have this
political aspect and confined themselves to weekly sessions of
religious singing and to collecting funds for their respective
patron-shaikhs# Gouma Lo Seok instituted a da1 ira for the Khalifa-
General in 1946 in order to sing the qasayid (religious poems) of
Ahm&du Bamba each Sunday after which a collection was taken*
Similarly, a veiy active da* Ira was founded at Kaolakh by Ale
Samba Gueye at the Khalifa-General1 s instigation, to raise funds
for the Great Mosque of Touba* In 1951* its collections for the
mosque exceeded & 1,000* This da*ira also began the praotioe of
16bringing the bodies of deceased members to Touba for burial*
Gradually the urban da* ira replaced the "Wednesday Field" and 
members were exempted from work on the mosque of Touba if they sent 
shipments of building materials* This development underlines the
15 See Behrnan, op. olt.. pp.46-47.
16 O'Brien, p.252.
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general centrallaiiv? and o'treamllniiv' of the da’ira structure. Eiuce 
there are relatively few tallbes of a given shaikh in any one urban 
concentration, the associations have affiliated themselves to the 
Khalifa-General at Touba to simplify the process of financial and 
other remittances. Tims the^aJLixa are organised on geographic 
lines with residents of the samo quarter or ward forming a local 
association with direct ties to the Khallfa-Gene ral even though tho 
individuals in the group are taljbes of various shaikhs in 
different parts of the country. As a result of this centralising 
tendency, tho response of many Kurid shaikhs to the .da’ira has been 
somewhat less than enthusiastic seeing that their urban disciples 
are progressively transferring thoir loyalty to the Khalifa-General# 
Only the disciples of Cheikh Hbaclca display a reluctance to join 
the Khalifa-General*a da’iraa.
Despite this centralisation, there is a certain degree of 
autonomy within tho local da jinn. Oinco rrnry urban talibes distrust 
the Jnwrlns sent from. Touba, the Khalifa has permitted local groups 
to elect their own officials who are, in fact, usually active 
supporters of the Khalifa. A president is chosen to direct the 
affairs of tho now group and it is his task to prepare a list of 
officials to expedtfo tho affairs of the da’ira* Like many similar 
societies, tho roster of officials is quite long with a number of 
imposing titles. While tho electoral process of choosing these 
officials seems democratic, usually only those who are literate 
or closely connected with the central administration of the 
brotherhood are chosen# Once elected, these officials seem to hawfc
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17long tenure despite annual elections* 1
Most da’iras meet once a week for organized singing# . These ■ 
meetings are usually held, in the evening and some times give rise to 
a considerable volume of noise which may attract proejxjetivo 
converts or arouse the ire of rival groups from the other 
brotherhoods# Gao such occasion when riotihg broke out was the 
meeting sponsored by shaikh Tidiano Gy who is an opponent of the 
Tijani Khalifa Abdul Aziz Gy# The Khalifa had tho government issue
i
an order forbidding Tidiano Sy from holding tho mooting# Tidiane
Gy broke the government ban and in the melee which broke out, he
was arrested and imprisoned* This event publicly revealed the extent
of intro-brotherhood rivalry among the Tijaniyya elite
Tho content of these meetings is quit© varied# In the Mur id
case it appears that only the qasa*Id of Ahmadu Banba are sung*
Bfehrman lists several meetings which presented different types of
programmes in addition to the qasa’id* One Mur id da * ira featured
a film on the Ma^al to Touba, while a Qadiri da1 Ira sponsored
19lectures on religious subjects* ThUs, it appears that tho content 
of tho da1 ira meetings is more flexible than the formulas used at 
the Friday dhikr*
Tho da’iras are the basic coll unit of tho tariaas in tho
— M *  II « n  .  I I * ...........
urban enviroment where they function as mutual aid societies in 
cases of domestic or financial distress* The da’iras also provide
17 O’Brien, p# 254#
18 See Ibrahim Harone, :fLe Tidjanisme au Senegal” * Documents C*5*E*A*M* , 
no# 3955 (i964) PP* 10-12 j Behrman, op# cit*, pp# 94-95«
19 Behrman# p* 198#
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job opportunities for newcomers end fox the unemployed* In 
cases of Illness or death* tho flaflra provides furdn and Bends a 
dilo^tion to oon^olo tha aids or bereaved# The cxpenso* of 
marriages* funerals* and o irc-uno is ion f aro also dofrajrsd by, ' 
tho &a*im associations §
Tho solidarities generated by tho da1 ira, have until recently, toon 
based on geographical proxLnity in a specific quart or of a city or 
town* However, there aro indications that in certain arena the 
da1 ira is gradually assuring the form of a guild of specialised 
craftsmen or an association of workers similar in function to a 
labour union* A factory in Dakar baa a da*3ra of Huriliyya employees*
There are alao d^lras for goldsmiths, fishenasn, and tailors and in Kaolakh 
there is a da1 Ira viioae members are recruited entirely fxom blind
s* A
people* ’ Thus it appears that this institution tends to recruit 
members in terms of occupation* At the m m  time this specialising 
tendency Introduces a degree of autonomy which weakens the bonds 
tying tho da*ira to the &\ilifa^floral* In the mx® way tho 
rivalry between the locally elected association president aai the 
jauria appointed by the Khalifa emphasises the friction between 
the urban talibes and the rm-al central hierarchy of the Hurid 
brotherhood*
The amount of money collected by the so organisations depends 
on the economic status of the members with women end youths paying 
less than the members of a craft association* The average contribution
A*»
per individual r&qgss from £2 to ±4 annually ^  The yearly total
23 O^isn# p*
H  o*Brien, p* 250#
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from each association is usually presented publicly to the Khalifa
at the great Hagai of Touba* Supplementary donations of labour and
produce also fill out the daTirays annual remittance* Thus a
da*ira may collectively cultivate a field or help in the groundnut
harvest* Some associations also provide specific services for the
Hagai? St* Louis da1iraa make prayer mats for.tho pilgrims, those - .
of Dakar send food and bedding, those of Touba build grandstands
and clean the. streets for the festival* Finally, some da * iraa
provide building materials for the Great iiosque and for the residences
belonging to .the Khalifa-General•
Since most of the urban dayiras are affiliated with the Khalifa*
General in Touba, the other Hurid leaders have lost control of their
urban tnlibes* The proliferation of these organisations has meant an
increase in tho influence of the Khalifa enabling him to sponsor a
reorganisation of the local associations in order to achieve greater
co-crdination* In 1939 the da1 Iras of Dakar formed a federation
called L1Union Federalo dec Dahiratou Falilou Hbacko which represented
22thirty-one member associations* Eventually many of the dafiraa
sponsored by other marabouts joined the Khalifat federation* These
included two Qadiriyyu da1 ire3 which .indicates tho close relationship
which still exists between tho two brotherhoods* Only two groups
have managed to remain outside the Khalifat federation, the group
headed by Cheikh Hbacke, the rival of Falilou Hbacho, and tho group
belonging to the Day Fall which represents the old tyeddo class
23
within the Kuridiyya*
22 3y, p. 193, O'Brien, p# 2y7
23 O'Brien, p# 151*
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This process of centralisation has not been entirely without 
difficulty* The fact that the elected leaders of the local 
associations enjoy a degree of independence has tended to create 
intense rivalries between the more politically oriented officials* 
Many of the rank and file distrust the aims of the association 
presidents and accusations of financial mismanagement are frequent* 
As a result, new competitive alliances are formed on the dafira 
level in order to gain control of the federation* Just as the 
religious leadership of the brotherhood became a prerogative of 
the Hbacke clan through endogamy, so now new clan factions are 
forming to compete for power within the da'ira sub-structure*
But whereas the prerogatives of the Hbacke family are based on the 
baraka transmitted to his descendants by Ahraadu Bamba, no such 
spiritual or religious justification is used to buttress the claims 
of the da*ira presidents* The electoral process has created new 
criteria for leadership which is achieved primarily in terms of 
political ability# Hence the "liminal" aspect of the role of 
da*lra president is almost non-existent* In this sense the 
informal organization has been gradually transformed into a formal 
interest group similar in function to a labour union or political 
reform society# Thus Muridiyya becomes more "secular" in the 
urban enviroment*
Paradoxically, the Increasing centralisation of the Muridiyya 
brotherhood has brought about a situation which threatens the unity 
of the group# In this context the ritual display of the unity at 
the Great Hagai to Touba and the constant appeal to the baraka of 
Ahmadu Bamba still perform a solidary function* But it is a moot
13h '
point whether the evocative power of the Magal will continue to 
exercise a restraining effect on the conflicts which threaten the 
cohesion of tha order as a wholo# Both 0*Brien and Behrman are 
inclined to view the power struggle of the urban brothers as tho . 
beginning of tho decline of tho power of tho marabouts * At least 
one author* however, takes the opposite view* 1*1# Markowitz 
considers the urban associations as preludes to the marabouts1 bid for 
formal political power* By using tha dayiraa an political pressure
Pvt
groups* tho marabouts will gain a foothold in the government itself * ^ 
The effect of the urban migration has had a considerable effect 
on the general relationship of the central government with the 
religious orders* In the pre-war period* the French favoured the 
brotherhoods because of tho colonial interest in encouraging 
groundnut production* At the same time* the colonial government 
intervened when internal squabbles within the brotherhoods 
threatened to disrupt the harmonious alliance of French officials 
and marabouts* Thus the French engineered the elections of Mamadou 
Hustafa and Falilou Hbacke to the office of Khalifa-General of 
the Murids. They also insured the succession of Bekkni Kunta* to 
the leadership of the Qodiriyya in Senegal*
After the ■ war the winds of change increased political activity 
on the popular level* Lamine Gueye had cultivated the friendship of 
the leading Tijanis such as Abdul Aziz Sy* Ibrahim Mas3, Mansur Sy*
24 I»L« Markowitz* "Traditional Social Structure * the Islamic
Brotherhoods* and Political Development in Senegal’^ Journal of 
Modem African Studio3, vol* 8* no# 1 (197®)* 73-96*
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and Abubacar Sy* the Khalif a~General of the Tijaniyya in Senegal*.
Gueye* as head of the S*F.I*0* (Seotlon Francaise de ^Internationale
Ouvriere) seemed to “be the unquestioned leader of Senegal and had the
support of “both the Tijaniyya and Huridiyya marabouts# However the
introduction of electoral reforms began to cloud Gueye *s political
future* Despite numerous efforts to ingratiate humself with the
marabouts through sponsored pilgrimages to Mecca* loans for mosques*
and agricultural subsidies* Gueye never recovered from Leopold
Senghor*© break with the Socialists* The reasons for Seniorfs
success lay primarily in his policy of enlisting the support of
the marabouts who could deliver large numbers of votes to the
splinter group headed by him* Before long Senghorfs party* the B.D.S,
(Bjoo Democratique Senegalais) began to overtake the S.F.I.O, This
process of political polarization was intimately connected with the
power struggles within the brotherhoods* J
Lamine Gueye fs friendship with Cheikh Mbacke and the brothers of
Abubacar Sy alienated both the Khalifa of the Tijaniyya and the
Khalifa of the Muridiyya# For Cheikh Mbacke bad opposed the election
of Falilou Mbacko as head of the Kurids while Abdul Aziz Sy and
KansUr Sy intrigued against their brother Abubacar who was Khalifa
of the Tijanis* Gueye*s alliance with these disaffected claimants
to the leadership of their respective orders coupled with the
socialist ideology of the S«F*I#0* boded ill for the economic
privileges of the brotherhood elites* The situation was further
25 See Behrman p# 73*
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complicated by the extension of the franchise which raised tho 
number of eligible voters from 200*000 in 1946 to 655*000 in 1951*
In effect this broadening of the electorate meant that a large 
part of the voters were rural tallbes under the influence of the 
marabouts# Hence any politician who wished to secure a national 
constituency had to consider the interests of tho marabouts in 
order to win rural backing# In this way the marabouts became 
willing intermediaries between politicians and rural voters#
When Senghor broke with Gueye his opposition movement had 
only minority support in the Territorial Assembly of Senegal in 
1948# The fact that he was a Serer Christian also limited his appeal 
to the Wolof Muslim majority* To overcome his initial handicap* . 
Senghor enlisted the aid of the Tijani leader of the Tokolor*
Seydou Hourou Tall and Falilou Hbacke* the newly elected Khalifa 
of the Huridiyya* Senghor promised to help Falilou in his quarrel 
with Cheikh Hbacke and* if elected* he promised government subsidies 
for the completion of the mosque of Touba* Tho socialists attempted 
to counteract the efforts of the B#D*S# but Gueyefs association with 
Cheikh Hbacke alienated most of the rank and file Hurids# Senior 
won over the Tijanis through a blunder committed by some socialist 
partisans
In 1951* a group of socialist supporters were on thoir way to 
hold a rally in Tivouane* the headquatrers of the Wolof Tijanis and 
the seat of the Sy family* As the S#F*I*0* members drove to the
26 See Beyries* "Les confreries relAgieuses Musulntmes" * 
Documents C.H«E»A*M. no* 1325, (1958).
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rally site, their vehicles were stoned by the Tijanis. In reprisal*
the S.F.I.Q* men Jumped from their, trucks and launched an attack on
the compound of Abubacar Sy, the Khalifa. As a result, tho S#F*I*0. was
discredited in the eyes of pious Tijanis and lost tho elections of
that year in Tivouane* The son of the Khalifa .Ti&lano Sy (not to
bo confused with the author bearing the same name) had already
displayed a penchant for political activity and began to campaign for Senghor
in Tijani areas. Thus, through his alliance with Seydou Hourou Tall
and with Abubacar Sy, Senghor won over the bulk of Tolcolor and Wolof
Tijanis to the banner of the B*D.S»
Mention has already boon made of the tension created in the 
upper echelons of tho Hui^diyya ranks because of tho conflict over 
the succession to the office of Khalifa-General» Wolof custom 
prescribes that succession to the rank of family head i3 from eldest 
brother to next eldest brother. When all male siblings have died, 
the succession passes to the eldoct son of tha eldest brother.
However, this custom was broken when the French urged the succession 
of Ahmadu Bamba*s son instead of his brother who was politically 
suspect* When Bamba1s son, Kamadou Mustafa, died, it was only 
natural that Haraadou^ son, Cheikh Hbacke, deemed himself eligible 
to succeed his father. However when, in fact, IIamdou,s brother,
Falilou was elected through French pressure, Cheikh Mbacke refused 
to acknowledge him a3 Khalifa and allied himself with the S.F.I.O* 
whose leader,Lamine Guoyo,had supported Cheikh Hbackeclaim. In 
this way the two political parties came to be identified with the 
two factions in the Muridiyya order* B.D.S. supported the Khalifa
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27while S.F.I.O. supported Cheikh Hbacke«
' Lamine Gueye*a support came mainly from the urban districts but
with the electoral reforms already mentioned the majority of the
electorate was to be found in the rural areas. Soon tho defeats suffered
by th© S.F.I.O* brought home the implications of Songhor*s "politics
of the Bush"* In 1952 the B.D.S. gained 41 seats in the Territorial
Assembly tilth 223,156 votes, while the S.F.I.O. ran a poor second
28with 9 seats and 95,202 votes. A prime factor in Senghor*^ triumph 
was hie promise, unde just before election day, to secure a higher 
price for groundnuts. In addition tho conduct of Cheikh Hbacke1 s 
disciples publicly embarrassed the S.F.I.O. In March, 1972, an 
assault launched by tho dissident loader*s talibes on the residence 
of the Khalifa at Touba required military assistance in order to be 
quelled. Falilou condensed not only the action of the talibea but 
also Cheikh Mbacko*3 association with tho S.F.I.O* Later, after 
the election, Falilou convened the leading Hurid shaikhs and had 
them ratify a document which determined that succession was to be 
collateral. This document,which was signed by tho leaders of the 
order, effectively excluded Cheikh Hbacke from ever becoming 
Khalifa since ho was older than th© youngest of tho Khalifa's 
brothers
Falilou*b sympathy for Sexsghor drove Gueye to express his 
backing for Cheikh Hbacke mors openly. But as the 1952 elections
27 See 0,Brien, p. 263 ff* 
23 See O'Brien, p. 263 
29 Ibid., p. 130
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were ample proof that Gueye * a association with tho dissident elements 
in the Murid hierarchy had a disastrous effect on the S.F.I.O., the 
socialist loader attempted to attack Senghor on religious grounds#
In an article written by.;a leading figure in the S.F.I.O#, Senghor was 
accused of attempting to give the Catholic minority more power by 
cleverly exploiting Muslin weakness• After bitter exchanges in the 
B.D.S. paper Condition humino, party stalwarts managed to unearth 
Gueye fs marriage certificate which recorded his marriage with a
Catholic* This discovery tarnished Gueye*s image as a Muslim
30champion* In any case the religious issue soon faded*
In the long run, Songhor's party triumphed because of his
alliance with tho tariqa loaders who commanded the greatest number
of followers* By winning tho support of Abubacar Sy, Sey&ou Mourou
Tail,and. Falilou Hbacke, Songhor not only won the allegiance of
their talibes but aIso broadened the ethnic appeal of the D.D.S*
Assured of Ssror support. Senior won over to his side tha Tokolor
by allying himself with HouroU Tall, mod the Wolof by supporting
Abubacar Sy and Falilou Hbacke * Lamine Guoye, on the other hand,
had as allies mainly Wolof dissident marabouts such as Cheikh Hbacke,
Abdul Aziz Sy, end Ibrahim ITiass* Although very influential, these
latter figures could not offset the authority of 3enghorfs partisans
who embraced ths three dominant ethnic groups in Senegal, the Wolof,
the Tokolor, and tha Serer*
By astute manipulation, Senghor managed to whittle away Gueye1 s
urban followers especially in Dakar* Songhorfa chief assistant In
30 See Behrman, p* 87
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the party had been Abbas Gueye who came from the Lebou tribe near 
31
Dakar# But since the Lebou are only a small minority in the Dakar 
region, Senghor decided to woo tho Tokolor who had been migrating to 
Dakar in large numbers* By promising to appoint a Tokolor as deputy 
leader of the party, Senghor won over the Tokolor union in Dakar, 
the U.G*Q«V*F# WhonMamadou Dia, a Tokolor, became deputy leader of 
tho 3.D#S* the alliance between the B#D#S* and the Tokolor was firmly 
ratified*"
In effect Senghor had made the B«D*S* a national party with no
one ethnic group appearing to dominate its policies* For this reason
the B*D*S# was able to absorb or defeat the small splinter parties
33which represented local ethnic interests* Once the B*D*S* had a 
monopoly of patronage and political power, those marabouts who 
opposed it began to realise tha necessity of laying aside their 
differences and coming to terms with tho changed situation*
Eventually even the Socialists merged with the B*D.3# and together 
the two groups formed tho Union Progressiste Gencgalaise (U#?*S.)* 
Finally when the left-wing P.K.A. (Parti do Regroupement Africain)
31 See G* Balandier and P* Kercier, Particularisms et Evolutions 
les Pocheura Lobou dn Donegal (l*F*A*ff*> 1952), p. 110 ff * The 
Lebou speak Wolof but maintain their own ethnic identity* They 
are largely engaged in fishing and in recant years a syncretic 
religious movement has won a number of converts from among them#
Tho movement was started when Limnmou Laye received the .gift of 
prophesy from a jizm which appeared to him in -the shape of a large 
fish# The sect is called Layenne after the name of tho prophet#
32 For the Tokolor in Dakar, see Abdoulaye Diop, Sociotc ioucouler et 
migration? snquete sur la migration toucouleur^&Dakar (Dakar§ I*F*A*H*, 
1965, pp. 225-227*
33 M* Happo, "L* Islam au Senegal dans le contexto politique",
Doc* C.H*E»A»M» no* 4146, (January 1967), p* 10*
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merged with the U.P.S, in 1966, Senegal became, in effeet, e one- 
party state* Opposition is now expressed through factions rather 
than through formal political parties* These intra-party factions 
are the means through which the marabouts can preserve their 
influence or, if necessary, jeopardise the careers of their opponents.
Two incidents will illustrate the political ramifications of 
disputes within a brotherhood or between two brotherhoods* Both 
incidents are concerned with the erection and management of two 
major cathedral mosques.
The first case concerns the mosque at Touba which had been the 
cause of friction among Murids on several previous occasions. Who­
ever controlled the mosque of Touba would be able to ©zeroise 
considerable influence during the great Mags! and on other festive 
oooasions* Although Falilou Mbacke had been elected Khalifa* his 
control over the shrine town of Touba was limited since Cheikh Mbacke 
as heir to his father* s property, possessed the plans for the oon- 
atruotion of the mosque as well as the lease for the land on whioh 
the edifice was being constructed. In 1947 Cheikh Mbacke announced 
that building would reoommenoe and launched an appeal for funds to 
finish the structure. These proposals were an obvious embarrassment 
to Falilou who entered into discussions with Senghor in order to gain 
possession of the plans for the mosque and to thwart Cheikh Mbacke*s 
fund-raising schemes. To solve the conflict, a committee of important 
members of the brotherhood was set up and given charge of the mosque.
This ploy enabled Falilou to prevent Cheikh Mbacke from gaining oontrol of 
the mosque area. In order to avoid the enmity of the other Murid
ll<2
loaders Cijoikij litoobs raado aver tbs jjlasa to l'ililou*
By 1957 after tho rtap;-roo!icno.ul between Den^kcr tad lrosira Guoye* 
Cheikh Kbacko made £& cfflaial visit to Falilou and tho friction
>A
between the two begun to disappear#"
Tho oeeond incident itrrolvod tha appointment or im Inaa For the 
liosqua of Dakar* Bocauoc or it a also axil Ita location in tha 
capital| the Dakar licoquo oymholiood the strength and por.ti^ of 
Islam in Senegal* i\b a consequence whoever hold tho office of ■
Ireaa va3 in a position to eanrciso a great deal of influenco within 
tha Ducllm fcom&ruaity of tho capital#
Although the nesquo was to ha under Tijani control oinoe the 
Tijaniyya was tho dominant tarlqa la Senegal# it trao also to ho a 
symbol OF unity £zv all Busline* Therefore- the coot of construction 
was net by all r»jor religious leaders and the Buri&o contributed 
large busis for the enioxqxrloo« Gonghor♦ a deputy* Bon.olou Bia* a 
Tokolor Tijani* proposed that the mosque should ho the largeot in 
Senegal and should have an institute of Kuslim studies thereby 
making It the centre of higher Islamic learning in the country#
This proposal van greeted with soma reluctance by Falilou Hbacke 
who say in the now mosque a rival of the great mosque of Touba*
Hove vox* * a much more controversial issue was the choice of X^asu 
Since 1941* the Xaam of Dakar had been A1 HaJ j Arpdou ta&no 
Dione* a discipla of Abubacar Sy, tho ffialifa-Genarol of tho 
Tijaniyya* % e &  Abubacar Gy died in 1957# he was succeeded by his
34 For the Touba Hosquo dispute see 01 Brian* pp# 129-130#
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"brother Abdul Aziz* The election of Abdul Aziz was contested by 
Tidiane sy* son of Abubacar and a partisan of Senghor* Shaikh 
Tidiane was a bitter opponent of his uncle Abdul Aziz who had been 
closely associated with Lamine Gueye* In the ensuing squabble*
Amadou Lamina Plena sided with Tidiana Sy and as a result he 
alienated the faction of Abdul Aziz* For this reason Abdul Aziz 
used the occasion of tho new mosque to depose Diene from his post 
as Imam of Dakar * Tho supporters of Abdul Aziz alleged that Diene 
was not well educated in Arabic or Qurfanic science and therefore 
unfit to preside over the new centre of Islamic studies* The 
storm that broke over the appointment involved all the major Tijani 
and Murid interests and highlighted the tensions within the ranks of 
the brotherhood elite* Thu3* a study of the Dakar Mosque dispute 
reveals the inter-ethnic and generational rivalries reflected by 
the different factions within the tarlqas*
The selection of a candidate from among the Tijanis had to 
satisfy three requirementsi (l) The candidate must be of sufficient 
standing in the brotherhood in order to win the backing of important 
religious leaders (2) ho should be Wolof* (3) he should be 
acceptable to the civil authority* The second condition ruled 
out any Tokolor candidate* Nevertheless the leader of the Tokolor 
Tijanis* Seydou Nourou Tall attempted to bypass this difficulty by 
persuading Abdul Aziz to claim the office of Imam* Since Abdul Aziz 
normally resided in Tivouane where his duties as Khalifa monopolised
35 J* Paden has shown how disputes concerning succession to high office 
in Kano* Northern Nigeria are expressed chiefly in terms of adherence 
to a brotherhood or to a particular faction in a brotherhood* See 
Paden* ”The Influence of Eeligious Elites on Political Culture and 
Community Integration in Kano* Nigeria”* op* cit** p* 424*
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most Of his time, his title of Imam would be more or less honorary* 
Kence a deputy Imam was needed and for this office Seydou Nourou 
proposed his own nephew Mourtada Tall*
In effect, the appointment of Mourtada Tall would increase 
Tokolor influence within the ranks of the Tijaniyya in Dakar. Criti­
cism of the Imam would be kept at a minimum since Abdul Asia would 
hold the title without exercising the role* Seydou Nourou1s plan 
resulted in the unanimous election of Abdul A2iz at a meeting of 
the Association of Imams Of Cap Vert* This association was 
controlled by Nourou Tall and did not represent all the Imams of 
the area* At this juncture Falilou Mbacke backed by Tidiane Sy 
and Ibrahim Niass, the Tijani leader of Kaolakh, decided to oppose 
Abdul Aziz Sy* Tidiane Sy, of course wished to embarrass his unole 
Abdul Aziz while Ibrahim Niass had long refused to acknowledge the 
Sy family1s claim to spiritual sovereignty of all Senegalese Tijanis*^ 
As a result of this powerful coalition, pressure was put on 
the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Doudou Thiam, who happened to be 
a Murid* At length Senghor sided with Falilou and Lamine Diene was 
acknowledged as Imam* This deoision was a blow to the Tokolor party 
and at the same time it increased the prestige of the Murid Khalifa*
As a result, Nourou Tall, who had originally been a strong supporter 
Of thcr B*D*S« and its successor the U.P.S*, became alienated for a
? On Niass*s activity in Nigeria see Paden, op* oit*t pp*259-265j 
on the significance of Niass*a nyenyo, (blacksmith caste) origin 
see Froelich, Les Musulmans de l*Afrlque Noire* op. oit*, p*238*
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37time from the government* Senghor could afford to risk a break with 
Hourou Tall since the solid backing of the Wolof Tijanis and the 
Murids would prevent Hourou from forming a coalition of religious 
leaders to oppose the government ♦ Formal political opposition was 
difficult especially after the merger of the socialists with the 
B«D*S* in 1958* The only opposition parties remaining were left- 
wing groups whose platform usually contained condemnations of 
tribalism and religious superstition* Such political alignments 
would be unacceptable to Hourou Tall with his religious background* 
Henco It was no surprise when the Tokolor leader cwallowed his pride 
and eventually rejoined Senghor13 retinue* So ended the Dakar 
Mosque dispute*
Tho wrangling which occurred during those two incidents 
illustrates tha circumspection tha administration needs' in order to 
avoid backing the losing side in a religious dispute * For this 
reason* it has been Senghor *s policy to support the Murid Tijani 
Khalifas in most disputes since the influence of the Khalifas is a 
determining factor in the electoral process* An example of this 
pragmatic attitude is the rupture which pitted Senghor against his 
erstwhile supporter Tidiane Sy*
Unlike most prominent marabouts Tidiane Sy had actively 
campaigned for political office* Although ha. was one of tha first 
major public figures to back Senghorfs break with Lamina Gueye f his 
devotion to the W*P#S* cooled when Senghor refused to support him in
37 Behrman* op* cit*» p* 79
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his bid for tho Calif ate after tha death of his father Abubacar Sy*
Indeed the Administration covertly supported the accession of Abdul
Aziz instead of the mercurial Tidiane Sy* Since Abdul Aziz was not
interested in politics and was more concerned vlth religious matters
at Tivouano* his accession was more acceptable to the administration*
An open break with the U.P«S. occurred when Tidiane together
with Ibrahim Mass end Ibrahim HlDaw, a Kaolakh trader* formed the
Parti de Solidarlte Sone&alalse» Ibrahim Niass did not stand for any
office* but Tidiane Sy ran against Senghor at Thlcs while EfDaw ran
against Voldiodio l-T*Diayo in Kaolakh* In this contest U.P.S. won
85jS of tho votes* After this defeat* Tidiane Sy was arrested on
charges of provoking a riot at tho homo of a sister of Abdul Aziz*
This was an unprecedented step for the government to take but after
'tho intervention of Abdul Asia* the troublesome Tidiane was released
in i960. The failure of Tidiane13 effort soon lead to the
dissolution of the Parti de Solidarity and both he and Niass
eventually made a public declaration of support for the U.P.S* *
Subsequently Tidiane was. ’made ambassador to Egypt where his financial
inaptitude embroiled him in b huge deficit* He was recalled in 1962
and immediately Joined forces with Itamadcu Dia, Senghor*s deposed
Prime Minister* By 1963* after a second period of detention* he
38was once again in tho good graces of Senghor*
In order to achieve a measure of stability in government policy 
the U.P*S« must be assured that the powerful marabouts will co-operate
38 M* Bappe* “I*Islam &u Senegal dans le contexts politique*1* 
op* cit*t p* 15*
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with party objectives* For this reason Senghor and other 
government dignitaries mako it a point to attend the great religious 
festivals of the brotherhoods# At the Murid * Masai or the Tijani 
Gamou Senghor frequently makes a statement expressing tha 
governments appreciation of the work of the marabouts and their 
disciples in building the Senegalese economy* The fact that Senghor 
is a Christian enables him to play a neutral role in his dealings 
with, the different brotherhood leaders# This respectful solicitude 
for the interests of the religious elites has twice helped Senghor 
ride out two crises which threatened his political career* In 
i960 when the Mali Federation broke up as a result of differences 
between Senghor and Modibo Keita* most of the marabouts sided with 
the V*P*5* Even Ibrahim Niass* who had been friendly with Keita 
came out in favour of the Senghor faction#^ Two years later# 
when Hamadou Dia attempted to oust Senghor# Falilou Mbacke 
persuaded the Tijani and Murid leaders to throw their weight behind 
the beleaguered President*^0
Because of the rivalry between the Tijaniyya and the Muridiyya, 
as well as factional disputes within each brotherhood* the religious 
elites of Senegal have not been able to form a united front with 
which to exert pressure on the government* This state of affairs 
is due in large measure to the intense economic competition between 
the maraboutic families which adds fuel to the abstract theological
39 Behrman# op* cit«» p* 93.
40 See W* Foltg» From French West Africa to the Mali Federation# 
(New Haven 1965}# PP« 49 and 177•
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and ritual differences which, mark off Mur ids front Tijanis* its a 
result# a number of young Tijani marabouts hare begun to voice 
misgivings about tho "worldly11 interests of thair confreres*
These reform-minded leaders argue that the brotherhoods should concern 
themselves with social welfare and religious education rather than 
with economic and political issues in order to preserve the
in
agricultural interests of the great family monopolies*
Nevertheless the religious leaders have made some attempts to 
organize an association of marabouts vhioh would represent the 
interests of all the Muslim brotherhoods. In 1965 when Senghor*s 
party had overcome all major opposition# some of the marabouts 
viewed the Faris-oriented government officials as a potentially 
hostile group* Seydou Nourou Tall urged tha formation of a Council 
of Marabouts to speak on behalf of the whole Muslim community 
whenever the situation might require concerted action. In November# 
1958# an association called the Council of Religious Chiefs met to 
propose a series of measures designed to safeguard the interests of 
tho Muslins of Senegal* Among its ezpressed aim3 weret (l) the 
submission of the new Senegalese Constitution to the marabouts in 
order to assure its compatibility with the principles of Islam\
(2) the right of tho Council to arbitrate differences between Muslim 
leaders and the Administration\ (3) to defend the interests of Muslims 
in the oivil service and in tho judiciary*^2
41 See Tidiane Syt op* cit. > pp# 297-298
42 See Behrman# p* 122*
tit?
The roster of officials was impressive* The Tijani President 
was Nourou Tall while the Kurid president was Falilou Mbacke * The 
two Becretaries-Goneral wore Ibrahim ifiass for the Tijanis and Cheikh 
Hbacke for the Murids* Abdul Aziz Sy was to he Treasurer while other 
posts were given to Tidiane By and to Sidi lamina Kunta,tha Qadirl 
loader* Obviously such an organisation would be a formidable 
pressure group and would seriously reduce the authority of the 
Government in matters which affected Muslims* Howeverj the Council 
never really got off the ground and soon became a paper organization* 
From the beginning Falilou Kbacko suspected the motives of Uourou 
Tall and Ibrahim Hfasa in setting up the group and his support of the 
Council was| at best* lukewarm* The fact the Seydou IJourou Tall 
represented Tokolor interests* while Miasa represented Tijani 
resistance to the By family may also have been factors in the 
alienation of the Khalifa-Oeae ral of the Murids and tho Khalifa- 
General of tho Tijanis from tho Council* Thus# the failure of the 
Council can be seen as a result of the disinterest shown by tho 
leaders of tho leading Wolof religious groups*
la recent years there have been strong indications that the 
Wolof Tijanis and the Hurid3 are becoming more closely allied*
At the solemn festivals of the Hagai and the Gamou# Tijani and Murid 
leaders exchange gifts and assist at one another13 prayer rituals*^ 
Shaikh Tidiane Sy had already sided with the Kurils in the affair 
of the Dakar Mosque* In return# Falilou Mbacke sent his own talibes
45 See By# op* cit** pp 299-300* This mixing occurs despite
Tijaniyya strictures forbidding the cult of non-Tijani saints*
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to help Tidiano Sy in harvesting his groundnut crop* Finally, in 
1965* Abdul Asia Sy was accompanied on tho pilgrimage to Mecca by 
Cheikh Kbacko* On the other hand, Ibrahim Niass lias very little to do 
with tho Murids and criticises them publicly* This pugnacious attitude 
Is connected with Jfias3fs background and religious orientation*
Unlike tho other religious loaders# Maos Is a member of the 
blacksmith caste and hence# has no toroba ancestry* Secondly# even 
though he is Wolof# the majority of Blass*s disciples are found 
outside Senegal In Camorouu and Nigeria* Thus# Blass*s interests 
are more international than those of the other Wolof leaders*^
By cultivating tho friendship of Falilou Mbacko and Abdul Aziz 
By# Senior has boon able to win considerable support from tho Wolof 
who constitute the largest ethnic group in Senegal# Hence # when 
Kamadou Dia was removed as Prime Minister and later arrested in 
lp621 Senghor could roly on tho Tijani and Murid Khalifas to keep 
th-cir followers loyal to the Government during tho crisis* Even 
though Mamadou Dia was a Tokolor and a member of the Tijaniyya#
Senghor could risk alienating the Tokolor since they wore far less 
numerous than the combined forces of the Wolof and the Sefcer# 
Interestingly enough# ITourou Tall and Ibrahim Miass declared their 
support for Senghor only after Dia had been arrested and the worst 
part of the crisis had passed*
44 Mass has added a ritual sign which distinguishes his group from 
other Tijanis * Apparently he has ordered his disciples to cross 
their arms at the Friday prayer* This has caused considerable 
tension to break out in Boko to and Kano in Nigeria. See Paden, 
pp# 276# 413# 417* On June 18# 1965 the Sar&auna of Sokoto 
convened the Council of Malians in Kaduna to condomn the practice*
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Thus Songhor ovorcamo the initial handicap of being a 
Christian and a Seror through his association with the major Wolof 
religious loaders* This strategy was an implicit recognition of the 
influence of the Sy and Ifoache families over the network .of daras 
and da1 Iras throughout Senegal* Tho. leading shaikhs of the 
brotherhoods were cast in the role of political brokers capable of 
delivering to the government largo numbers of votes drawh from the 
mss of their followers* This ability to mobilise large sectors of 
the papulation is a result both of the charismatic appeal of the 
founders of tho brotherhoods and of tho economic monopoly which 
their descendants have croc tod over tho years*
In the 195Qfs, when the political parties were jockeying for 
power, the Shaikhs realised that the sale of votes was much more 
rewarding than the sale of groundnuts* After independence tho new 
government was ridden with factions and lacked tho coercive resources 
of tho French administration* It was only natural that the rived 
factions turned to the brotherhoods in order to achieve electoral 
supremacy. In this way the factions in the formal political system 
tried to exploit the factions within tho brotherhood ranks* Thus# the 
dispute between Cheikh Iibacko and Falilou Mbacke is, in a sense# the 
mirror image of tho rivalry between Senghor and Lamine Queye • But 
as Senghor consolidated his power and eventually made Senegal a one 
party state# the brotherhoods began to co-operate more closely with 
one another* The Murids# once considered & pariah movement# now make 
pilgrimages to Mecca and interest in the life and teaching of the 
prophet Hitfiaiamd in be ginning to affect the cult of Ahmadu Samba*
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The rapprochement between brotherhoods is an indloation of the Wolof 
asoendancy in the urban centres as well as in the rural communes. liurids 
and Tijanis of the Tivouane obedience speak the same language and have 
similar spiritual goals* The "Wolofisation” of Islam has meant a 
"Wolofization" of much of the Senegalese population. Inevitably, however, 
the growing power of the central government and the consequent loss of 
electoral competition pose new problems for the shaikhs* With the dis­
appearance of the structural oiroumstances which gave the brotherhoods 
their initial impetus, the spiritual leaders must adapt themselves to a 
new situation* Whether the shaikhs will be able to perpetuate their role 
as spiritual leaders remains problematic*
« i, * 1 A
pouncs* rrUGing ad rrrmiCTPnAi. c:i'?.c>n
r a n  7ism m \ r e  r r r a n r a  m o r a l .», ( 1 9 5 0 - 1 9 6 6 )
IU0# frdth In his £tudy* Oovormont in gagssatt analysed tho changes
in tho structure of t'x? political system of tho Enirato of Baria which
to oh place as a congruence of Fulani and British ruin* Bo cuamrisco
M o  finding by postulating what ho calls ”7ho Law of Btri&turnl Drift”#
According to tnlth, a raromnontal ays ten changes internally when its
1 •
operation through tino M^JfLtchto structural voahncyooo# ■ Thus* la 
order to sunrlvoy tho ays tea nusi constantly adapt itself to changing 
circumstances and at tho c;arp tirao preserve its bpycrsonyf
This chapter will attempt to show* how tho analysis of tho- growth 
of tho Tljaniyya in Bar them Nigeria illustrates tho general validity 
of Smith's observation# Thun* the Tijanlyya Brotherhood Trill bo 
onrdned in ordor to tloicztilm how the order was involved in tho re­
distribution of power within the overarching fraraetrorl: of an Islamic 
social cystenu B&tiorna of cleavage and dis ent within the northern 
Regional Government will bo considered as reflections cal symptoms 
of tho conflicts and shifts within an essentially hierarchic and 
traditionally oriented society# Since this chapter is concerned 
with tho Tijoniyya mevcnent in Northern Nigeria * the political and 
religious Influences from tho nouthem RogLona will ho only meginally 
considered*
To assess tho role of tho Tijaniyya* two important features of 
political dovoloj^>nts in tho North have to ho tote* into account;
^ H»Q* Smith* O-ovomnont in gaagau# p«121*
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first, the failure of the N.E.P.U* (Northern Elements Progressive Union) 
to emerge as an effective opposition to the N*P#C#(Northern Peoples 
Congress) with the result that the North became a one-party region and 
Secondly, the role of tho Native Authority administrative system within 
the North which continued to exercise power both under the Indirect 
Rule system set up by Lord Lugard, and, after the departure of the 
British, under the federal system of independent Nigeria* These two 
factors meant that (!) there was no effective way to express dissent 
within an effective opposition party and, (2) within the apparently 
monolithio unity of the North there were local and regional forces 
which were potential obstacles to the centralizing tendencies of the 
Northern Government under the aegis of the Sardatma of Sokoto* Xt is 
within this structural situation that the role of the Tijaniyya is 
particularly significant*
1950 has been chosen as the point of departure since both N#E.P*tI# 
and N#P#C# took shape in that year# The Northern Elements Progressive 
Union declared itself as a political party in Kano 021 August 8, 1950* 
Its avowed aim was to emancipate the common people (talakawa) from the 
domination of the privileged few (sarakuna) through reform of the 
autocratic institutions of the Northern Region# Later that same year, 
in Jos, the Northern Peopled Congress was inaugurated as a cultural 
organization, the object of which was to afford northerners the oppor­
tunity of meeting and discussing social problems# The leaders of this
2group ordered the members to break with N#E#P#U*
2  " ' "  n i  r ™  ' " T   " "     r
C*S* Whitaker, The Politics of Tradition! Continuity and Change in
Northern Nigeria, 194&-19^t (Princeton, 1970)* p»357l B# Dudley,
Parties and Politics in Northern Nigeria, (London, I968) pp*78-8l*
155
In 1951, the "Macpherson Constitution" altered the political 
situation by prescribing elections and setting up ministerial govern­
ments and regions empowered to make laws subject to the approval of the 
British Governor. Consequently, political parties, hitherto frowned 
on by traditional rulers in the North, became officially acceptable.
At the same time, the northern leaders saw the necessity of closing 
rank3 in order to thwart the designs of tho politically more aggressive 
leaders of the South# At the Ibadan Constitutional Conference of 1950, 
the Emirs of Gwandu, Zaria, Katsina, and Abuja joined with the commoner 
Halam Abubakar Tafew| Balewa (future Prime Minister of the Federation 
of Nigeria) in tho defense of northern sectional interests. Chief 
among their several deu&nds was parity of representation for the Northern 
Region in the federal legislature. The granting of their demands, 
despite southern opposition, was paramount to giving a high degree of
political autonomy for the North which, in effect, meant a continuation
3
of the Native Authority administrative structure.
A noticeable feature in the emergence of political parties during 
the period immediately before independence was tho prominent part played 
by teachers and educators. Since a high proportion of the educated 
minority in the North wcro teachers (e.g«, both the Sardauna and 
Abub&kar Balewa), it was only natural that political movements would be 
guided by this particular group A In addition, at this incipient stage 
of party politics, the differences between N.E.P.U. and N.P.C. adherents
 ^See Dudley, op. pit., pp.23 and 80.
A
 ^See M* Last, "Aspects of Administration and Dissent in Hausaland”, 
op. cit*. p.355*
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were not clearly elaborated* Only after N.E.P.U* began to attack the
Native Authority system did traditional leaders rally to the N.P.C.
As a consequence, from 1952 to 195B, the party program of N.P.C* began
to align itself more and more in terms of traditional values such as
established hierarchy, obedience to authority, the unity of Islam,
5
and similar customary patterns of behaviour*
Eventually, the Native Authority structure became the main buttress 
of the political effectiveness of the N#P*C., a situation manifested in 
the party platform% in which was stated the aim of "Local Government 
reform within a progressive emirate system based on tradition and 
custom*" The party was committed to work within the basic emirate 
structure which had been preserved by the British policy of Indirect 
Buie* In 1952, the Sultan of Sokoto agreed to become the patron of 
the party while the Sardauna of Sokoto, Ahraadu Bello, became its 
President-General*^
At first sight, it would seem that the N*P#C* progressively assimilated 
itself to the political and administrative structure established by the 
Fulani conquest of the Hausa kingdoms* Tho Sardauna often appealed to 
the ideology of the jihad to justify policy and in his life style he 
attempted to assume tho role of religious reformer as well as political 
leader. In line with this ambiguous religio-political policy, the
Sardauna championed the claims of the Sokoto dynasty as the rightful
5 .   ..    ,..  r.... ' ■■' 1
Whitaker, op* olt*» p*362j B* Levine, Dreams and Deeds, (Chicago, I966),
p.90 and passim*
6 Dudley, op* cit*, p*152*
7
1 Dudley, op* cit*, p.83*
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rulers of the North* As a consequence, the N.P.C* became,at one and
the feame time,the vehicle for political centralization and a potential
threat to the local powers of the emirs who often bridled under the
restrictions imposed upon them by the Sultan of Sokoto# Thus, the
religious ideology of the jihad waged by Uthman dan Fodia early in the
nineteenth century and the sanction of Islamic unity underlay much of
the N.P.C# propaganda* Indeed the N*P*C* was regarded in the South
as a "Political expression for an existing system of administration
dyed In religion and innate traditions •" ®
Political commentators on the Northern scene have pointed out that
constitutional and political developments in Northern Nigeria were at
variance with the development of nationalist parties elsewhere in West 
9Africa* Most nationalist parties manifested programs and tendencies 
which would have been anathema to the N*P*C* Thus, the populist aims 
of the Bloo DemocratiqUe Senegalais relied essentially on rural support 
and was forced to ally itself with traditional Muslim leaders in order 
to attain its objectives*^ N.P.C*, on the contrary, based its program 
on the Urban-based emirate system#
This difference in approach is usually explained in terms of the 
underlying socio-economic conditions as well as the legal and con­
stitutional autonomy of the North set down in the 1954 Constitution*
A second factor is the N.P.C.*a alignment with the emirate Native
y —        .  ,        —  - ■ ■ ■ — ■ -.... * . ..... . ...........
Ibid., p.116, citing the Daily Times (Lagos, 14 Dec. I963).
o
See Sklar, Richard, Nigerian Political Parties (Princeton, 1963)#
See I. Wallerstein, "West African Politics", in Party Systems and 
Voter Alignments, eds. Lipset and Rokkan, 1967*
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Authority structure* This resulted in a regional organization "based
on local authority similar to the structure set up by dan Fodio and
11administered by his son* Huhammad Bello* Hence* the W*P*C. functioned
as a nationally organized unit only at election times* The central
secretariat exercised very little control over the locally elected party
leadership* Conversely* those local bodies took little active part in
the formulation of the broad policies of the party so long as the native
Authority structure was kept intact* But if* as Dudley maintains* the
degree of centralization in any political party can be expressed as
a function of two variables* viz** (l) the extent to which the mass
organs of the party actively participate in the formulation of the party
program and (2) tho extent of the responsibility of the leadership to
the mass organization* it follows that the W*P*C. is a centralized
organization* In this analysis Dudley disagrees with Sklar and
12Whitaker who maintain that H*P*C* la uncentralized and diffuse*
Within the predominantly Islamic structural situation* the appeal 
to religious symbolism and sentiment resulted in enhanced prestige and 
political power for the Sardauna who emerged as the leading political 
figure by far in the Iforth* However* the Sardauna1 s role as political 
leader was conditioned and circumscribed by certain historical and 
religious factors which were part and parcel of the northern Nigeria's 
cultural heritage* Because of his background and ancestry* the 
Sardauna symbolized the historic role of the Sokoto dynasty in the 
formation of the cultural and political climate of the Worth. In
jT ~ ' f"^....." ~ " 1 ~ 1 1 T r 1 ~
See U* Last* The Sokoto Caliphate*
12 Whitaker* op* cit** p*3^ 5*
1$9
addition* the Sokoto dynastic claims were closely associated with the 
Qadiriyya order since tfthman dan Fodio had been prominent in that 
brotherhood#^ In this context* the traditional rivalry between 
the Tijaniyya and Qadiriyya brotherhoods takes on an added significance# 
The rise of al-HaJjl Sir Ahmadu Bello* Sardauna of Sokoto* illus­
trates both the structural continuity of the political system of the 
Horth (hierarchic emirates) and the changes which took place in that 
structure as a result of the Sardaunafs role as head of the JT#P#C#
Thus* we have a case of Smith*s stable context together with political 
activity which generates internal change* On tho one hand* the 
political system tends to greater centralization under a one-party 
system basing its claims on a religious Ideology (dan Fodiofs Jihad)* 
while on the other hand* local political and religious sentiment based 
on a certain degree of autonomy for the emirates finds littlo outlet 
for expression in term3 of party politics* Consequently* dissent in 
an Islamic idiom had to be expressed in such a way that the aims and 
aspirations of a number of social and economic groupings could be 
articulated without disrupting the social order# Because the tf#E#P#U* 
conflicted with a number of traditional Islamic beliefs* it failed to 
marshall a significant opposition to threaten the hegemony of the 
Sardauna and the B*P.C« It remained for the Tijaniyya Brotherhood to 
crystallize thi3 opposition in an acceptable idiom during the formative 
period 1950 - 1966# It was precisely during this period that the
13 T '' ' '  , ... ■ J
On Qadiriyya-Tijaniyya rivalry* see Last* The Sokoto Caliphate* 
op# cit#* pp#215-2191 also Abun Hasr* op* cit# * pp#175-1771 
A* Cohen* Custom and Politics in Urban Africa* op# cit»* pp#150-152#
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Tijaniyya spread rapidly throughout the Rorth and penetrated the Eausa
„ 14.
emigrant trading communities as far apart as Ghana and Senegal,
This rapid growth of the Tijaniyya is an indication of the shifting
social and economic conditions in West African Muslin populations#
Northern Mger la underwent considerable economic and political
changes during the period 1950-1966* but at the same time , the politicians
of the North publicly proclaimed their acceptance of tho traditional
administrative apparatus of the Fulani emirates* Previous studies of
the patterns of leadership in the North have shown that high office was
a corollary to status which in turn was largely determined by birth and 
ISwealth# Whitaker ha3 amply demonstrated the extent to which the
relatives of emirs, district heads, alkalis» and Native Authority
16
officials filled tho seats of the Northern House of Assembly# The 
Premier of the northern Region was chosen because of his family connec­
tions and status whilo his cabinet was considered tho "social register” 
of the North.
The northern Prime Minister, AJamadu Bello, was a great-grandson of 
Sultan Bello, the eon of Shohu Uthman dan Fodio* On his mother*s side 
he was related to the Kano dynasty* In 1933, he failed to succeed to 
the Sultanate of Sokoto, losing out to his first cousin, Abubakar# In 
1943, he was brought before the Sultan1 s court and sentenced to one year's
^  Paden, op, cit*, p*424* Paden interprets this increase in membership 
of the Tijaniyya as a shift from legalistic definitions of community to 
sufistic definitions of the same# This has entailed a shift of loyalty 
from traditional authority to charismatic authority.
15* See S*I* Hogben and A.H.M* Kirk-Oreene, The Emirates of Northern Mger la, 
(Oxford, 1966) j S* Niven, How Mgeria is Governed (London, 1950} •
16
See Whitaker, op* cit*# for tables of statistics, pp#3l8-324*
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Imprisonment for misappropriation of jangali (cattle tax}* ^  He at
once appealed to the Nigerian Supreme Court and was acquitted. Thus,
early in his career, Ahmadu Bello had worsted the leader of the Muslim
community of Sokoto, who was nominally the spiritual head of the faithful
in all the Worth, with the exception of Bornu*
Despite his difficulties with the Sultan, Bello continued to defend
the traditional system and made no attempt to hide his desire to
18eventually Become Sultan* Xn 1954, upon assuming the leadership of
the M#P*C#, he Built aBout himself a mystique of office vhioh Dudley
likens to WeBerfs conception of charisma# In public statements the
Sardauna was referred;,to as 11 # * • our divine leader (who) is in a way
a reincarnation of Shehu Othman dan Fodio#11 On another occasion he was
19called a forerunner of the Mahdi# 7 To cap off this symbolio equation
with Xslamio heroes, he inserted in his autobiography a genealogy tracing
20his ancestry Back to the prophet Muhammad#
The Sardauna*s political statements and speeches often referred to 
the glories of the Fulani Empire and the religious sanction attached to 
his role as Premier# The image of a religious leader was sharpened By 
his annual pilgrimage to Mecca in the period I96I - 19^5* In the 
tradition of a champion of Islam he devoted himself to founding new
*- 1
mosques, to convening conferences of Islamic scholars and sponsoring a 
number of religious publications concerned with Muslim apologetic. The
17 Bello, My life, p,58.
18
Whitaker, op# cit#t p.348#
19 Dudley, op. cit., p.134.
20
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most striking illustration of the Sardauna*s religious conception of
his office was the series of conversion tours which he undertook in
21the non-Muslim regions of the North#
In the early 1960*s the office of Premier took on the appearance 
of a grand emirship* Indeed# the Sardauna was widely referred to as 
Sarkin Arewa (Emir of tho North)* But despite this appeal to traditional 
values and religious aspirations # the Sardauna had to work within a 
parliamentary framework. Tho fact that he was* at one and the same 
time i subordinate to the Sultan of Sokoto in tho religious sphere # and 
secular leader of tho North as Premier# rendered his policies suspect 
in the eyes of certain emirs and Native Authority officials. These 
latter viewed his program as an attempt to reduce their own local 
privileges in order to form a unified governmental system with a single 
centralized authority structure# Thus the emirs1 support of the 
N#P#C# had two resultsi first# it safeguarded tho traditional political 
system of tho North against incursions from the South# But secondly# 
while achieving this end# it also enhanced the Sardauna*s position as 
paramount leader thereby diminishing the power and prestige of the more 
powerful and ambitious emirs#
Below the level of the emirates# the Sardauna*s polioy envisioned 
the continuance of recruitment for local Native Authority offices from 
the aristocratic sarakuna class and its clients. Thus local government 
officials would remain appointees of the emirs# But on the wider federal 
level# at least during national elections# the party had to transcend
21 Whitaker# op# cit## p#349*
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local emirate politics in order to win support from talakawa (commoners)
22the majority of whom were habe peasants# It was precisely on this
level that the opposition N*E*P*tf# threatened the N.P.C # N#E*P#U*
campaigned with a program of reform appealing mainly to talakawa and
habe elements who were prevented from attaining high office in the
traditional system supported by the Sardauna and the M.P#C#
While advertising itself as a reforming populist party# the
N*E#P#U* was constrained to appeal to Islamic principles in its program
since to do otherwise would be self-defeating in an area where loyalty
to Islam was a presupposition of the social order# But its position
as a radical party attacking the functioning social and political order
based on hereditary right and patronage prevented it from producing
immediate results for its adherents# ' Since social advancement was
determined by traditional norms and since the N*E#P*W# leaders broke
with the traditional system# there was no way for them to gain power in
the system short of winning an absolute majority* Despite regional
gains# N.E.P.W# did not have access to patronage resources jealously
guarded by the N#P#C* Hence# the opposition gradually lost their
initial gains made in the early and middle 1950*3 with the result that
in 1961 and 1964 the regional and federal elections saw N.P.C• candidates
23returned in every emirate constituency# Even though the N#E*P.U* 
appealed to habe resentment of Fulani rule# it failed in its main objectives# 
22
See Dudley# op. cit## p#137« The term habe (s# kado) was used by the 
Fulani conquerors to describe the native inhabitants of Hausaland#
The term is contemptuous and also means "stupid# backward*** See 
Abraham# Dictionary of the Hausa language (London# 1962)*
23
Whitaker# op. cit*# p#377«
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since the peasants concluded that the risks of voting for N,E*P*TJ*# 
Incurring possible reprisals from the Fulani overlords# were not 
commensurate with possible gains.*
By 1964 Northern Nigeria was a one-party political unit# Dissent 
expressed through party allegiance# in this case allegiance to the 
N«E*P*U* had been overcome and N.E.P.U# exercised only a peripheral 
role on the local level* Yet the actual situation was far from the 
harmonious and monolithic consensus which voting uniformity might lead 
one to suspect* Clearly there was dissent not only in the so-called 
"Middle Belt" of tho northern region where non-Muslims were a substantial 
proportion of the population# but also in the powerful emirates of Kano# 
Zaria# Gwandu# and Katsina#^
Events reached a peak in Kano in 1963# when the Emir of Kano# 
Mukammadu al-Sanusi was deposed by the Sardauna* Eolations between 
the Sardauna and the Emir had been strained for some yoars and at length 
the Emir was forced to rosiga following a report .of a sole Commission of 
Enquiry in Kano Nfativo Authority financial matters# Tho events leading 
up to this confrontation wero closely connected with the activity of 
the Tijaniyya order in Nigeria# and in particular with tho Khalifa of 
Kaolack# Ibrahim Niass#
Kano is the most pox^ ulous of the emirates and the emir is ranked 
as one of the "Big Three" together with the Sultan of Sokoto and the 
Shehu of Bomu* Kano had for some years been at odds with the claims 
of the Sultan of Sokoto who theoretically is the emir*s superior and#
2A
T Paden# op* cit*# p*417*
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as such, receives an annual tribute payment• Last gives evidence that
the friction between Kano and Sokoto goes back to the mid~nineteenth 
25century* But the religious and ethnic ties between the two alleviated
the tension which periodically broke out on the occasion of the death
of the Emir of Kano* However a new factor was added to the disagreement
between Kano and Sokoto when the Tijani leader Ibrahim Mass initiated
the Emir of Kano, Abdullahi Bayero, into the Tijaniyya Brotherhood in
261937 during a pilgrimage to Mecca. Later Uiass went to Kano and 
initiated members of the Emir1 s family including his son and heir Al- 
Sanusi. This event had considerable bearing on the later political 
development of Northern Nigeria*
The dynasty which ruled tho former Sokoto Empire was descended 
from torobe missionaries and teachers who overthrew the Hausa states 
early in the nineteenth century* Most of these torobe were affiliated 
with the Qadiriyya Brotherhood which is still the affiliation of Sokoto 
itself* Indeed the Sokoto dynasty are called kadirawa or toronkawa 
since they originally came from Futa Toro lft Senegal* Thus a link was 
established between Fulani hegemony over the Hausa and affiliation to 
the Qadiriyya* But since the Fulani conquerors regarded their Hausa 
subjects as inferiors, they did not encourage them to seek affiliation 
with the tarlqa* Hence membership in the Qadiriyya symbolized Fulani 
particularism and ethnic superiority over the Hausa who were regarded 
as lax Muslims. In addition public ritual activity was discouraged by
25
Last, The Sokoto Caliphate, op* cit., pp.134-136.
26 Paden, op* cit*, p.259j Sharwood Smith states that Hiass and the 
Emir met after the war sometime between 1948 and 1952* B* Sharwood- 
Smith But Always as Friends (London, I969), pp*328~329*
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the Fulani since such activity might lead the Hausa to express their
27dissatisfaction with Fulani privilege# 1
During the nineteenth century, the tijaniyya Brotherhood hegan
to penetrate Hausaland and this process was speeded Up after the French
conquest of the Tijani states in West Africa* Thu3, many torobe who
belonged to the Tijaniyya fled to SokotoPaden states that these
refugees were regarded by British colonial officials as a sub-group of
the Fulani# Hence when these officials use the term llTejani,,# they
are, in fact, referring to an ethnic group of refugees from French
territory* These individuals initiated high-ranking members of the
sarakuna class into the order and in this way the Emirs of Katsina and
28Zaria became Tijanis#
However, a second wave of Tijani activity began in the late 1930fa
and mushroomed after tho war* This wave of religious activity was more
egalitarian and trans-ethnic in its proselytization since it comprised
both Fulani and Hausa elements# A H  the evidence seems to suggest that
the malams directing this branch of the Tijaniyya owed their allegiance
to Ibrahim Hiass of Senegal# Unlike the first wave of Tijaniyya
activity which was confined to urban areas, the Hiass branch gained most
of its adherents from the rural Hausa who were engaged in groundnut 
29production* ^ Thus, this second stream of Tijani propaganda embraced 
two distinct groupsi the urban Hausa who were joined by discontented
Fulani in common opposition to the monopoly symbolized by the Sardauna,
27   ' r' rT" r  1...' r 1 _,n.......
last, MAspects of Administration and Dissent”, op# cit., p#345-357*
28 Paden, op. cit*, p#417*
89 Ibid., p .286,
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and the rural Hausa peasants who resented the exactions of the Fulani 
Hative Authority officials#
With H#G* Smithfs "Law of Structural Drift” as a point of departure
we will try to show how increased Tijani activity from 1950 to I966 was
\
an indication that the categories traditionally utilised to holster 
ideological acceptance of Fulani hegemony were no longer effective in 
achieving a consensus despite apparent uniformity in party ali^iment#
The crises in the career of tho Sardauna focus attention on the rivalry 
within the emirate system and the potentially centrifugal forces at 
work within the local Hative Authority administrative structure#
nevertheless, because of the theocratic cast of the political and 
social system in Northern Wigeria, any dissenting movement which 
challenged certain featuros of the status qua could marshal support only 
by appealing in some way or other to the ideological principles of Islam# 
Thus W#E*P,TJ#, a "radical” political movement chose as its motto "To 
Glorify God, Association and Service to the Community” The party 
also sought religious Justification for its egalitarian program, stress­
ing these passages from the Q,ur * an which showed an affinity to 
Christianity and Judaism# By so doing, It hoped to allay suspicion of 
its alliance with the southern-dominated W*C*W.C* (national Council of 
Uigerian Citizens)*
Despite these efforts, the H#E*P*U* failed to gain any wide support
and actually lost ground during the 1950*9* Tet the cleavages within 
the system remained# Because these cleavages existed on different levels
and, at the same time, had repercussions throughout the society it was
^  Whitaker, op* cit#, p*394«
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impossible to attain political power merely by exploiting one level of 
cleavage while ignoring the * political implications of another level*
For purposes of analysis three levels of cleavage can be definedt
1* The cleavage between rival emirs, especially between Sokoto 
and Kano*
2# The cleavage between the sarakuna and talakawa classes*
This cleavage would be felt among Halams, merchants, 
intellectuals, and students who have little chance for 
advancement in the Native Authority structure because of 
their commoner background*
3 * The cleavage between habe peasants and landlords (mainly 
Fulani and their agents)* This cleavage is a refinement 
of (2) above*
The cleavages on levels (l) and (2) are urban based while the cleavage 
on level (3) is between rural farmers and urban based landlords* On 
the purely party-political level these cleavages are not apparent 
which explains the weakness of the N#E*F#U*
In 1949, Ibrahim Niass sent a muqaddam to Nigeria in order to
strengthen Tijani organisation in the area* The mission was quite
successful, especially in Kano where, according to the British Governor
of tho North, Sir Bryan Sharwood-Smith ”• • • the scones of mass hysteria
were so alarming in their import that Huslim leaders throughout the rest
of the region determined that such a thing must never happen again*
Despite the opposition from certain quarters, communication between
Niass and Nigeria continued unabated until 1951 when Niass made his
first public appearance in Kano# At that tirao he prayed with his arms
crossed which was a practice that distinguished the reformed Tijaniyya
32from the traditional Tijaniyya* The rise in membership was dramatic
Sharwood-Smith, op* cit*, p*329*
32 Paden, op* cit*, p*276*
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during the 1950*3, so much so* that large sectors of the population 
in the groundnut regions of Sokoto* Katsina* and Kano began to join 
the Tijaniyya* This increase in membership was at the expense of the 
Qadiriyya order and indirectly challenged. the. religious authority of 
the Sultan who was the head of the Qadiriyya. In 19491 the Sultan 
ordered the demolition of the Friday mosques erected by Tijanis.
As a result tension increased and acts of violence began to be reported 
in the press* The response from the Kano authorities was a spate of 
abusive propaganda directed against the Sultan and tho Qadiriyya.
While this dispute was raging* the A.E.P.U. began to attract a 
number of Tijani adherents and it seemed that there would bo a formal 
alliance between the reformed Tijaniyya and the A.E.P.tf. When arrests 
were made following the riots in Sokoto in 1956* many A.E.P.TJ. supporters 
went to Sokoto and deliberately courted arrest in order to fill the 
Sokoto jails thereby publicly embarrassing the Sultan*^ In certain 
respects* the political grievances of the A.E.P.W. coincided with the 
populist religious ideology of the reformed branch of the Tijaniyya 
headed by Ibrahim Hiass. Economic factors also brought the two groups 
together especially after the revolt of a number of habe villages 
against their Fulani-appointod headman* Evidence suggests that the 
outbreak was caused by a poor groundnut harvest * which encouraged certain 
Tijani nalams to preach open resistance to the exactions of the Hative
Authority officials. Finally in 19&3* events came to a head and the
3 3  "          ■ , - - - r"n "irr r" 1 r ' ~ "
In tho Algerian Citizen for Hay 16* 1956 four persons were reported
killed in riots between Qadiris and Tijanis in Sokoto. See paden*
pp. 413-415*
"  Paden* op. cit*# p.41o.
35 Sharwood-Smith, op. cit.» p.330.
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Sardauna achieved what traditional heads of the Fulani Empire had tried 
and failed to do —  dethrone an Emir of Kano,
The Emir of Kano, al-Sanusi, had been closely associated with 
Ibrahim Niass, and under the latter fs influence had dismissed all Qadiri 
and traditional Tijani advisers As a re suit , his administration 
became almost exclusively identified with the reformed branch of the 
Tijaniyya directed by Mass, Contrary to the usual practice of the 
Fulani emirs | al-Sanusi began to lead the public prayers on Friday and 
deliver the khutba (formal sermon) personally. In this way al-Sanusi 
proclaimed his ritual break with the rest of his fellow emirs with whom 
he had political differences. The Sardauna and the N.P.C, leaders 
realized the potential gravity of the situation since they feared that 
the N.E.P.U, might win over large numbers of the reformed Tijanis and 
so threaten the political monopoly of the N.P,C, In September 19^2,
I). J.M. Huffett becamo Commissioner into the financial affairs of the 
Kano Native Authority, At the conclusion of his investigation Bevcral 
high-ranking officials were dismissed including the Councillor for 
Health and Land, tho Chief Alkali, and the Councillor for Education, 
Unable to resist mounting pressure from the Sardauna and other N.P.C, 
officials, the Emir finally capitulated and resigned.
The effeot of al-Sanusi*s resignation was felt immediately within 
the ranks of the Tijaniyya, Ibrahim Niass ordered hl3 followers to
continue to recognize al—Sanusi as the only legitimate leader of the
—   - 1 1 1 ■
Paden, op, cit,, p.279* By wtraditional” Tijani is meant the first
wave of Tijani affiliation in Nigeria, Host of these initiates 
belonged to the Fulani ethnic group, e,g, the Emirs of Katsona and 
Zaria, The second wave sparked by the agents of Niass was much more 
egalitarian and included habe initiates as well. Hence the reformed 
group led by Niass was often at odds with the traditionals who stood 
for the traditional Fulani system.
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reformed Tijaniyya in Nigeria * On the political front# & now opposition 
party was formed called tho Kano Peoples1 I^rty (&*?#?♦} with tho 
expressed aim of reinstating tho deposed unir* The membership of this 
party was largely recruited from reformed Tijanis end merged with tho 
Ef#E#P#U* in 1964*^ Tho executive officers of tho K#P#P* had boon Jailed 
for ’’abusing” tho Sardauna and hence, the party turned to tho N.E.P.U* 
for support# Tho alliance between tho Niass group and the N#E#P#U* was 
confirmed when Aminu K&no, tho leader of the flow to Kaolaek
for consultations with Ibrahim Niass# In this tray tho Sardauna1 s 
position as paramount loader of the North was challenged by informal 
para-political alliances aa well aa by formal political opposition groups# 
The emotive forco of religious claims was revealed in tho campaign 
posters of the N#P*C# and tho ft*E#P#U# during the 1964 elections# The 
campaign posters used by tho N*r*C* showed photograplis of the Sardauna 
with o diagrammatic rendering of his chain of spiritual and kinship 
descent from the prophet Kuharamad* Aminu Kano, on tho othor hand, used 
a poster depicting hiraaolf receiving a "blessing" from Ibrahim Niass*^ 
But one thing was now certain# By forcing the abdication of the 
Emir of Kano, the Sardauna made it clear that his role overshadowed that 
of tho most powerful emir# As N*P#C# Bresldent-Gencral and as Prime 
Hlniater of tho Northern Ho cion, the Sardauna was gradually centralizing 
political authority to tho detriment of tho local Native Authorities 
headod by tho emirs#
37 paden, p# £0l*,
3s ib id .. p. 338.
29 ib id .. p. 560.
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Nevertheless, within tho government many high posts were filled 
hy Tijanis« Of the twenty ministers in the northern cabinet from 1956 
to I96I, nine were Tijanis whereas only two declared themselves to be 
Qadiris (the Sardauna and Sir Abubakar Tafewa Balewa), Similarly, out 
of sixty-three back benchers during the same period, twenty declared 
themselves Tijanis whereas seventeen declared themselves Qadiris#
There is a definite polarization in representation from Sokoto and Kano# 
Almost all members of the Northern House of Assembly from Sokoto who admit 
membership in a brotherhood are Qadiris, while those from Kano are 
Tijanis* In addition members of the royal house of Zaria, Gwandu, Katsina, 
Bauchi, and Kazaure have declared their Tijani affiliation#^
The fact that a majority of the Emirs and their families who identi­
fied themselves with any brotherhood were Tijanis articulates in a "para­
political manner" a centrifugal tendency in opposition to the centralizing 
process implied in the Sardauna*s policy# Consequently, on this hier­
archical level, membership in the Tijaniyya articulates a conservative, 
Fulani-backed movement which desired local autonomy for each emirate and 
which resisted the pretensions of the Sardauna and the Sokoto-based 
Qadiriyya order# This local opposition did not prevent cooperation 
with the N#P*C# on a wider political level where northern privileges were 
at stake# Hence the emirs as a body supported tho campaign of the Sultan 
of Sokoto to extract as many concessions as possible from southern
politicians before joining the Federation of Nigeria#
The second level of cleavage which Tijaniyya activity expressed was
the class division of sarakuna and talakawa * Membership in the sarakuna
^  Whitaker, op. cit#, pp.471 — 490#
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class meant that acquisition of public office (sarauta) was comparatively
easy* Since eligibility to compete for office was determined largely
by heredity, the vast majority of citizens are barred from participation
in this competition*^ Honce public office was largely a preserve of
the Fulani privileged class (roasu sarauta) and their Hausa clients*
Whitaker divides these sarauta into three basic categories«.
(l) the office of emir? (2) offices reserved to certain Fulani and Hausa
nobles whose families were associated with the Fulani conquest? (3) those
offices "In the gift" of tho emir* This third category of offices could
be awarded to dynastic members of the lineaget cognatic kin, clients, or
slaves* Hence this category was the gateway to status for those members
of the society who wore at the bottom of the social scale* The late
federal Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar Tafewa Balewa, belonged to a slave
family which rose through this means* The Prime Minister^ father was
a slave of the Ajiyan Bauchi and had the. title of Shamaki, which designated
those slaves of the omirfs entourage who guarded the horses during battle*
All three categories of office were obtained through the practice of
gaisuwa (greeting) which entailed a sum of money to bo handed over to
one*a patron* Whoever gavo the most valuable gift, other things being
equal, was invested with tho office* This system was obviously a far
cry from, the religious idealism of 'Hthman dan Fodio
Many pious malams, imams, and alkalis tried to remain outside the 
system of competition for office* But such a policy meant that they,
or their descendants would lose all social prestige and sink back into
A\     " ' ' ' " " 1' r" " 1’ T' 11 11 1 V-— -t—r - r  -  ■ - r - n - r - i  ................  . . . . . . . . . I . , . .
K*G* Smith, Economy of Eausa Communities, of Zarja, op, cit** pp«93-95* 
See Whitaker, op* cit** pp*4l6 ff*
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the ranks of tho talakawa# To avoid this* three options uero open to 
those individuals motivated by religious scruples who wished to lead 
a lifa more in conformity with the ideals preached by dan Fodio# They 
could (l) remain in tho administration and try to maintain high standards 
of professional conduct j| (2) they might Join a new religious brother­
hood! (3) they might emigrate# The second alternative * Joining a 
brotherhood such as the Tijaniyya or the Hahdiyya seemed moot attractive# 
Because of the political situation in the Sudan* Joining the Hahdiyya 
rletedincurring tho suspicion of the British colonial authorities* Thus* 
tho Tijaniyya became for those reform-willed Kuslimo a moans of expressing 
their dissatisfaction with the sarauta system which violated the prin­
ciples of tho Fulani Jihad# Hence* largo numbers of civil servant a were 
attracted to Tljanl mootings (hadra) for coiamuml prayer and recitation*
Tho corporate bonds of tho Tijaniyya “filled a need” which the more 
individualistic Qadirlyya could mot* or did no longer moot# Besides*
A3tho Qadiriyya were compromised by being identified with tho Fulani system# 
In this way the Tijaniyya offered a community organisation and an 
intellectual refuge for educated and pious talakawa and sarakuna whose 
number increased during the 19501 a as educational opportunities became 
more available *
The thirl level of cleavage la operative principally in the rural
sector of the population* On this level economic factors play a decisive
role in sharpening babe antagonism to Fulani land owners# From 1950 on*
the Hot them Region has seen a significant rise in groundnut and cotton
^  See Last* “Aspects qf Administration and Dissent in IIausalan^ i,l * 
op# clt#> p*354* Seo also A# Cohen* Custom and Politics in Urban 
Africa* op# clt»» p#156 on the fraternal bonis encouraged by the 
Tijaniyya#
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production.^ In addition, substantial numbers of Hausa peasants are
involved in long distance trade* Involvement in this type of
commercial activity has been on the distinguishing features of Hausa
culture fl-Tid itinerant Hausa merchants can be found in almost every major
market centre from Timbuktu to Accra* By establishing a network of
zangoa (way stations), the Hausa have managed to maintain a monopoly of
the Kola nut trade and are also engaged in supplying cattle to butchers
in Ghanai Ivory Coast, and southern Nigeria# The volume of this
trade is considerable and the financial returns involved constitute a
high percentage of the export economy of the emirates of Northern Nigeria*
The personnel engaged in this activity are mostly drawn from the
lower strata of Hausa society* The Fulani and the sarakuna ruling class
did not normally engage in trade since it is considered a demeaning
occupation despite the profits obtained* Indeed, the Sardauna voiced
his contempt for mercantile activity when ha criticized the efforts of
European firms to win contracts from Northern ministers# "They (European
merchants) do not realise that we are not traders or merchants and have
no desiro to be such * * * Yet, ironically the surplus income of
the merchants is often invested in maintaining the nobility at their
accustomed standard of living* In this way, the merchants, although
talakawa, find themselves in a position of great power because of their
financial support of the sarakuna who are in their debt* However, the
merchants are frequently prevented from directly exercising this power
^  See H.C. Kriesel, The Marketing of Groundnuts in Nigeria, Consortium 
for the Study of Nigerian Bural Development, (East Lansing, Michigan, 
1968)*
^  See H* Miner, The Primitive City of Timbuctoo, (New York, 1965), p*65> 
A*Cohen, Customand Politics> op* citV, pp«&-9»
^  M# Bello, My Life, op* cit,, p.160*
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since they are barred from competing for office by reason of their 
class,^
In this cleavage between sarakuna and talakawa , economic factors 
play a decisive role. Tho rapid increase in the volume of groundnut 
and cotton production have changed the peasant economy and opened up 
new avenues to wealth and prestige for those who previously were 
deprived of participating in the political life of the Northern Region 
of Nigeria* The N.P.C, responded to this challenge by proposing 
candidates drawn from the mercantile class (atta.jirai) in those con­
stituencies where M*E,P,U, opposition seemed likely to profit from the 
conflict between peasants and traders on the one hand, and tho ruling 
Fulani aristocracy on the other. Thus the leading merchant in the 
Northern House of Assembly was Musa Gasash, a Tijani whose father was 
an Arab slave from Tripoli. Significantly, Gasash was given the post 
of Minister of Land and Survey in the Sardauna*a cabinet.^
The economic position of tho merchants coupled with the altered 
peasant economy, reoriented the traditional sarakuna-talakawa relation­
ship, Patterns of protest began to emerge which threatened the 
structure, upon which tho regional government was based* . It was in 
this context that the Reformed Tijaniyya heightened a sense of community 
cohesion on the part of the talakawa, This protest focussed on four 
areas of grievance i (i) tho ethnic domination by the Fulani 5 (2) the 
feudal authority patterns which regulated the rural economy$ (3) the 
alien authority represented by British rule f (4) the low socio­
economic status accorded to the talakawa.
47 M,G, Smith, The Economy of the Eausa Communities of Zaria, pp.100-101* 
^  Paden, op. cit,, pp,286 and
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In the case of Kano, the Reformed Tijaniyya, under the leadership 
of Ibrahim Niass, re-oriented tho authority structure in the direction of 
increasing local autonomy. As the Tijaniyya became more and more power­
ful in Kano, the exercise of authority became rooted in the sub—system 
of the brotherhood itself. Thus, the Emir, al-Samsi exercised a double 
role. As emir, he was the representative of the traditional Fulani 
system and his authority wa3 based on ethnic descent from the original 
jihad leaders of the early nineteenth century. At the same time, he was 
a muqaddam (ritual master) of the Tijaniyya, and as such his authority 
rested on the possession of baraka transmitted through Ibrahim Niass,
In the dispute with Sokoto, it was the religious role which effectively 
mobilized public support, sinco tho Tijaniyya in Kano embraced all ranks 
within the society*
In the changes brought about by economic and political development * 
following the Second World War, the egalitarian ethos of the Reformed 
Tijaniyya cross-cut the ethnic boundaries which had hitherto distinguished 
Fulani, Hausa, and Kanuri, Thus, Ibrahim Niass, a Senegalese Wolof of 
the blacksmith caste, bocamo the dominant religious figure in Northern 
Nigeria and N i g e r I n  Kano city, the Tijani malams were recruited 
from all the major ethnic groups. The Emir, despite his Fulani back­
ground, became the spiritual leader of the great mass of babe peasants 
in his territory. Thus, the Reformed Tijaniyya became, in effect, a 
coalition of sarakuna and talakawa in common opposition to the policies
of the Sardauna, Although the habe and the Emir were opposed to the
Vo 11 1 T " . ........ .. ....... . .... ~" T
Niass has also had extensive dealings with the Yoruba in Southern Nigeria,
After curing the daughter of a wealthy, western-trained Lagos physician,
his reputation among the Yoruba increased. On© of the charges brought
against Chief Awolowo was that he had paid Niass a bribe in order to get
the marabout’s public support. See Paden, op. cit., pp.312 and 1522-1525,
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Sardauna for different reasons , this did not prevent an integration of
Kano society eventually giving rise to a form of "Kano nationalism*11
This nationalist sentiment was institutionalized through the Tijaniyya
order whose organisational structure formed the framework of a new
political entity# Thus Kano nationalist sentiment i3 analogous to
50the political ethnicity analysed by A# Cohen# It is not surprising
therefore| to discover that the religious authority of the Emir was
increased after his deposition in 1963» when he received, the title of
Khalifa* Despite the fact that Sanusi was succeeded by his son# most
observers realized that the deposed Emir still held tho reins of power*
Instead of alleviating the situation, the Sardauna13 policy with
regard to Kano and the Eeformed Tijaniyya only made matters worse* The
fanatical wing of the Tijaniyya# known a3 yan wa2ifa {"adepts of the
wazifa", the Tijani prayer ritual) began to atir up protests in other
areas of the north* Thoy were ‘responsible for major riots in Yeldu
district near Argungu in which eleven police were killed* The same
group was implicated in peasant outbreaks in Jega and Kano in which a
51number of village heads and tax gatherers wero killed* A3 a result 
of the increasing violence, the Sardauna issued an order banning Niass 
from Nigeria* On June 18, I965 the Council of Malams was convened 
by the Sardauna and after debating the issue, the Council ordered that 
Imams were not to pray with crossed arms while leading the Friday 
prayers* If any Imam refused to obey the order, he was to be dis­
missed* This was equivalent to banning all Imams of the Beformed
5 0 "
See A* Cohen, Custom and Politics# op* cit., pp.201-211*
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Paden, op* cit., p*417l Whitaker, op* cit*, pp*255-256*
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Tijaniyya who crossed their arms at prayer in order to distinguish 
themselves from the Qadiriyya and traditional Tijaniyya Imams.
The Sardauna made several gestures to win over the disaffected 
Tijanis# During a widely publicised visit to Senegal* he had a meet­
ing with Seydou Hourou Tall, the Tokolor Tijani leader# In the course 
of his speech delivered on that oocasion the Sardauna pointed out that 
the great Tijani reformer and jihadlst, al-Hajj TTmar had lived at the 
court of Sokoto and had married a daughter of Muhammad Bello# How­
ever, this gesture failed to win over those Tijanis who were disciples 
of Ibrahim Hiass. Finally, the Sardauna proposed tho foundation of a 
new religious order which would comprise Qadiri and Tijani malama and 
would be named after tho Shehu TTthman dan Fodio# However this new 
brotherhood, the Dihmaniyya, was still-born# In any case the ritual 
exclusiveness of the Tijaniyya forbids joining any other Muslim brother­
hood*^2
In any event political and religious disaffection had become too 
deep rooted to be solved by such facile, albeit ingenious schemes.
Do spite the increasing centralization brought about by the Sardaunafa 
manipulation of the H#P*C* and his defeat of the Emir of Kano, the days 
of his hegemony were numbered# It only remained for the political 
upheaval of 1966 to put an end to the Fulani monopoly of the northern 
political system*
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See Last, "Aspects of Administration and Dissent1*# op* cit** p#354i 
Paden, op* cit*, p*1517#
CONCLUSION
This thesis has examined the process whereby Sufi brotherhoods 
influenced the direction and shape of social change in Senegal and 
Horthern Nigeria* Although both regions had been In contact with 
Muslim traders and missionaries for several centuries, largo numbers 
of peasants remained marginally committed to the tenets of Islam*
During the nineteenth century, however, Muslim warriors of the Tokolor 
torobe caste became more active and under the aegis of the Qadiriyya 
and Tijaniyya orders they attempted to set up Muslim states throughout 
the sahel region of tho Western Sudan* In Nigeria, the jihad of 
Uthman dan Fodio resulted in the creation of the Sokoto Empire which 
embraced much of tho region formerly ruled by the Hausa city states*
In Senegal and Mali, the states set up by the Tijani marabout al-Hajj 
Umar came into conflict with French designs on the area* In both 
regions therefore, the-process of political consolidation was closely 
oonneoted with tho activity of the Sufi brotherhoods*
Muslim holy men and teachers of the torobe casto had been living 
in an uneasy symbiosis with their chiefly patrons in Senegal and 
Hausaland, This tenuous relationship was altered when the Muslim 
holy men came under the influence of the reform movements which eventually 
gave rise to open war against pagan or semi-Muslim rulers* However a 
second crucial factor in the process of political and religious change 
was the advent of tho colonial powers* Ihced with a common enemy, 
the traditional rulers allied themselves with the ever more powerful 
Muslim holy men in order to mobilize the population against the new 
enemy*
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In Senegal tho military association between mrabouts and chiefs 
re suited in marital alliances between torobe families an! royal lineages* 
Thus, when the rulers of tho Volof states were deposed or killed in 
battle and the Wolof had become an acephalous people, tho marabouts, 
fortified by baraka# become the hairs of the traditional larders#
Tho marabouta become the nuclei of new political groupings through a 
process which French observers have tensed the nWolofization" of Islam* 
This religious change was consolidated by tho agricultural initiative 
sponsored by tho cufi loaders * Devotion and cool wore undo visible 
through working tho land# In this way production became a concrete 
expression of tho efficacy of religious adherence to tho Tijaniyya or 
Iluridiyya orders* This program of the brotherhoods in Senegal coin­
cided with tho French colonial policy of encouraging exports of 
groundnuts and groundnut by-products*
The leaders in this agricultural revolution wore tho shaikhs of 
tho Iluridiyya order whoso disciples had in largo pert boon recruited 
from the tyoddo or warrior class of tho VJolof * Tho t: oddo had 
originally been slaves of tho Darnel and were used to keep tho peasant 
population under control* Tho tyeddo formed tho nucleus of the dara 
plantation system and made it the effective moans of Iluridiyya expansion# 
Before long the example of the Iluridiyya shaikhs was followed by their 
Tijani and Qadiri count o imparts * As a result, tho groundnut trade,
which was Senegal1 a major source of income, waa largely in tho hands 
of the leaders of the three dominant religious ardors# This agri­
cultural monopoly was protected by a network cf institutions and rituals 
r     , ,  , r v i  , . T .. ...f . . ,r , , , . r , . ,   ’ 1 " - r
See Ibrahima Fall, ML*Scononio do l’Arachide dans loo fiats do lfOueat 
Africain", Doc* C#g*5«A*H» No*3515 (1961), p*21*
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which perpetuated tho religious motivation of the rank and file#
Thus the rituals associated with the Hyrid K&gal cad tho Tijani Qamou 
reflected on a wider ccalo the communal dhlkr which ia a feature of 
all eufi brotherhoods*
Tho emphasis on coiraer-1 ritual has resulted in a c^ a&ttal break­
down of ethnic pr^tioulorisr; in Senegal. This is most narked in the 
urban context where Tijani and Iturid religious mooting# conducted 
mainly in Wolof# As a result# tho migrant Tokolor and Herer in Dakar 
nrid Kaolack wore gradually assimilated into the Uolof ethnic group 
through their attendance at the iiedra and dhikr coreropnios* The 
increasing tendency toward homogenisation rodueeo the likelihood of 
ethnic factionalism which would endanger the position of tho brother­
hood elites* Even in tho case of the Dakar Ho sous dispute* there 
was no overt appeal to ethnic sensibility on tho part of tho Tokolor# 
Tho fact that the Whacko nnd Vtf families vero both of Tokolor origin 
prevented tho Tall family from raising the ethnic issue. In any 
case intermarriage among tho leading holy lineages hastens the process 
of homogenisation on tho part of tho brotherhood elites*
Assimilation between Eauoa and Fulani in northern Ulgoria was 
prevented by tho administrative structure of Fulani rule* . Even 
though tho FUlani ruler a hrA given up their language end hnd for 
several generations taken Eausa women for wives* they nevertheless 
maintained their othnio exclusiveness by erecting an elaborate system
of court etiquette arid ceremonial which emphasized their right to 
o
rule#" This policy tended to isolate the ruling sarakuna clas3 from 
tho commercial and agricultural changes which gradually altered
o
H#G* Smith**Econany of the nausa ~Communities of Zarisr3 QP» 0it*jL 
p*92# “  . ■
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the status of certain talakawa merchants* Despite the fact that the 
talakawa traders had amassed considerable fortunes, they were unable 
to obtain high political office because of their Hauaa background*
In the rural sector the Hausa farmers became increasingly aware 
of the financial stakes involved in the export trade in groundnut and 
cotton which had become the leading export commodities of the Northern 
Jtegion* In this situation of economic awareness tho farmers began 
to question the right of the tax collectors (jekadu) to demand a pro­
portion of the harvest on behalf of the Fulani aristocrats* As a 
result the tension between Hausa farmers and Fulani landlords became 
particularly acute causing the.farmers to ally themselves with urban- 
based merchants who were also restive under the Fulani political system* 
Finally the class of literate malams united the farmers and merchants 
Into an informal religious organization which cut across occupational 
and status lines* The majority of these reformist malams belonged to 
the reformed Tijaniyya which owed obedience to shaikh Ibrahim Niass 
of Senegal*
Thus, on the one hand, the egalitarian ethos of the reformed 
Tijaniyya gave rise to a sense of community cohesion between urban and 
rural Hausa* On the other hand, in Kano, the long-standing political 
rivalry between the Sokoto and Kano dynasties was given a religious 
tinge when the Emir of Kano, al-Sanusi opted for the reformed Tijaniyya. 
Hence, the reformed Tijaniyya in Kano united rural Hausa, urban talakawa, 
and Fulani sarakuna. In effect allegiance to the Tijaniyya order
became an expression of Kano nationalism* Through their adherence
3 ...  ...
See G* Bicolas, et* al*, "Etude Socio-Economique de deux Village a
Hausa", op* cit*» p*136.
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to the reformed Tijaniyya# the three major groups in Kano shared a
system of communication which, J# Faden# following L# Pye and S# Verba#
has termed a "Political Culture"# According to Verba* the political
culture of a society consists of the system of empirical beliefs#
expressive symbols# and values which define the situation in which
political action takes place* Political Culture provides the sub-
A
jective orientation to politics#
This subjective orientation was achieved in Kano through the
interpersonal relationships generated by intense participation in
Tijaniyya rituals* Thu3* the Emir of Kano# by leading the Friday
Prayer and delivering the khutba or sermon* broke with Fulani custom
which had diminished the rolo of the emirs in communal worship# In
a very real sense the Emir of Kano proclaimed his solidarity with his
fellow Tijanis who were his brothers in religion* The emirs of the
other city-states could not count on this unanimity of religious
sentiment and so they seldom participated in public prayers lest they
might encounter outbreaks of protest# Thus# there were no bonds of
community which united them and their subjects in a common ritual 
5
experience #^  Alice Dewey has described how such rituals of solidarity
have broken down social barriers in Java# The slametan or ritual
feast has created a structural relationship among individuals who other-
6wise do not belong to the same corporate group* In similar fashion 
the dining companies described by Abner Cohen among the Tijanis of
Ibadan united different sub-groups among the immigrant Hausa#^
^See S* Verba# "Comparative Political Culture"# in L. lye and S# Verba (eds#) 
Political Culture and Political Development (Muoeton# 1969)# p#513*
5
M#G* Smith# Economy of the Hausa Communities of Zaria# op* clt», p#92*
^ A#G# Dewey# "Eitual as a Mechanism for Urban Adaptation"# Man* vol# 5# 
new series# Mo#3 (1970)# pp#438-448#
7
A# Cohen# Custom and Politics in Urban Africa# op# cit#* p#157*
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In Senegal and Nigeria the mediators between hitherto separate
or conflicting groups wore tho marabouts or malams who created bonds
8of confidence between new partners In a changing social situation*
By projecting their message on a universal plane, they demonstrated 
that their authority and power symbolized by bar aka» transcended the 
narrow limits of ethnic or geographic particularism# Leadership and 
authority were not to be allotted only in terms of ethnic identity or 
class membership* Religious criteria began to play a paramount role 
in community relations and tariqa allegiance expressed the political 
and social tensions within tho Wolof and Hausa ethnic groups* In 
this structural situation Muslim ritual became in Leach*s words "a 
language of argument in terms of which claims to rights and status 
are ezjpesaed".9
The role of the brotherhoods was closely connected with tho 
development of tho rural economy in tho two regions* In Senegal 
vast tracts of land were left open to colonization after the abolition 
of the rights of the Inmans» Hence, the marabouts assumed the task of 
directing their disciples to settle in these open tracts and to form 
daras or collective farms* This colonization was encouraged by the 
French in order to increase groundnut exports# In this way the 
marabouts became the informal leaders of the Wolof ethnic group*
In Nigeria, the Hausa peasants were little affected by the 
imposition of British rule in 1903* As late as 1957 the vast majority 
of peasants in the Northern Region continued to hold and use land in 
much the same way as their forefathers of pre-British times# This
Q
See Baden, op* cit*, p*5S5#
9 See leach, Political Systems of Highland Burma (Boston, Beacon Press, 
19&5)* p.278.
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meant that control of the family land and communal land was vested in
the Native Authority Administration headed by tho Fulani emirs« In
10
addition the emirs continued to collect dues and taxos# As a result
many peasants turned to trade or craft in order to supplement their
incomes# For centuries Hausa traders have plied their wares throughout
a far-flung network of mar hot settlements (Zango) which aro found in
almost every sizeable settlement from Timbuktu to Accra* Indeed the
commercial ventures of the Hausa have given rise to a distinct group
of atta.jiral (Hausai merchants), many of whom are members of the
Tijaniyya brotherhood# Some of the attajlrai havo become quite wealthy
but despite their possession of arzikl (social prestige), they can never
become masu sarauta, eligible for office which is reserved to the
Fulani# No matter how wealthy or successful a Hausa merchant might
11be, his political role is limitod to that of a client# “
With the coming of independence and the broadening of tho franchise, 
the Fulani ruler3 had to faco a new complex of problems if they were to 
maintain their position* Tho Hausa peasants began to question the 
policies of the Nativo Authority structure# However, because the 
peasants were still under the control of the jekadu and other agents 
of the Fulani system, they could not organize themselves into a formal 
political opposition movement without incurring serious disabilities# 
Thus, the failure of the N.E.P.H# to unseat the N*P*C* was largely due 
to the latter*a monopoly of political patronage* Nevertheless, Tijani 
malams became valuable links between the urban-based N.E.P.N* leaders 
^  See C.K* Keek, op# cit*, pp.111-112#
^  See M#G# Smith, Sconony.of Hausa Communities of Zaria, op# cit*#
PP .14-161 also B* Cohen, ‘‘Power, Authority and Personal Success in 
Islam and Bomu”, in Swartz# Tumor, and Tuden (eds*) Political 
Anthropology (Chicago, I966), pp.129-138*
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and the rural Eausa. Recent studies indicate that rural dissatis­
faction was quite intense erupting into violence at times* Here again 
the Tijani disciples of Ibrahim Niass were usually blamed for instigating 
the riots
In Kano Emirate the majority of the population had become affiliated 
with the reformed Tijaniyya whose activity had been openly critical of 
the Fulani emirs# The Sardauna of Sokoto realised that if the situa­
tion were not checked, the wealthiest of the emirates would slip out 
of the Fulani orbit* His efforts to stem the tide only sharpened the 
differences between Sokoto and Kano* By the time the Sardauna had the 
Emir of Kano deposed, the criteria for the exercise of power in Kano 
had shifted from genealogical descent to sufistio affiliation* Despite 
the Emirfs deposition, he still retained the loyalty and devotion of the 
people of Kano*
Tho agents responsible for this shift in the criteria for the 
exercise ol* authority were tho malams of the Reformed Tijaniyya# Through 
their various activities as preachers, healers, counsellors, and diviners 
the malams had penetrated all ranks and classes of Hausa society* In 
certain areas they had gained the confidence of tho Fulani sarakuna when 
the latter were at odds with administration which was the case at Kano#
In the rural sector disciples of Ibrahim Niass were aotive in encourag­
ing corporate activity based on membership in tho Tijaniyya brotherhood# 
These groups of Eau3a farmers began to contact their fellow Tijania 
among the attajirai living in the urban centres In order to find middle­
men to ship and process their produce* This cooperation between
12
See al-HaJj Hamidu Alkali, wThe Mahdi of Toranke", Kano Studies* 
Tol* I, No#4 (I960), pp#92-95*
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merchants and farmers threatened the monopoly enjoyed hy the Northern 
Region Marketing Boards which were controlled “by the Native Authority 
Administration* ^
In effect, the Reformed Tijaniyya united three major groups*
(i) Hausa farmers who resented the exactions of Fulani landlords and 
the policies of the Marketing Boards} (2) Merchants and educated clerks
who resented the sarakuna monopoly of patronage* (3) Disgruntled 
members of the Fulani aristocracy who had lost out in the scramble for 
offices* The machinery of the Native Authority structure had become 
too rigid and bureaucratic to break down popular discontent and curb 
the activity of the Tijani malams.
The aggressive policies of the Sardauna tended to isolate the 
Northern Administration from the political and social changes which had 
resulted from economic growth* In this situation the informal organiza­
tion of the Tijaniyya was able to spread not only in the Northern Region 
but also in the HaUsa migrant communities* Whereas the Christian 
Senghor was able to win the cooperation of the Muslim leaders in Senegal, 
the Sardauna, on the contrary, was unable to win over the Tijani malams 
since his position as leader of the Qadiriyya rendered him suspect in 
Tijani eyes* The Qadiriyya had long been identified with the Sokoto 
dynasty and therefore it had little appeal for tho mas3 of Hausa peasants* 
Despite the Sardauna*s attempts to form a sufl order which would bridge 
the gap between Fulani rulers and the discontented elements of the 
population, it became increasingly evident that the religious claims of 
the Sardauna were no longer taken very seriously* Hence, the impressive
--rr, „ ' 1 "  '..........”
See H*C* Kriesel, Marketing of Groundnuts in Nigeria, op* cit*, passim*
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electoral results of the N*P#C* did not indicate the extent of the 
dissatisfaction felt by the Hausa peasants since there was no formal 
way of expressing dissent* The opposition leaders of the N.E#P*U* were 
imprisoned and their followers soon saw that the disabilities incurred 
through support of N.E.P.U. far outweighed possible gains* It remained 
for outside elements to put an end to the political monopoly of the 
H*P*C* When the Sardauna and the political system he represented 
passed from the scene there was very little sign of public mourning* ^  
Thus, In both Senegal and Northern Nigeria the spread of the sufi 
brotherhoods was symptomatic of changes in the formal political system* 
Because of the different structural situation in the two regions, the 
brotherhoods developed along divergent lines* In Senegal the elimina­
tion of the traditional political system enabled the Muslim holy men 
to assume tho positions of authority vacated by the kings of the Wolof 
states and the lamans* In Nigeria the British policy of Indirect Rule 
helped to bolster the position of the Fulani who had conquered the 
Hausa states in the name of Islam* The granting of independence forced 
the Fulani rulers to demand special privileges as part of the price for 
the Northern Region*s acceptance of the Federal Constitution* The 
granting of these privileges to the Fulani Muslim rulers only served to 
preserve the rigid system of ranks and classes. As a result, the gap 
between Fulani rulers and Hausa subjects was widened* The sudden growth 
of the Reformed Tijaniyya order during the 1950*s in Northern Nigeria 
expressed the discontent and unease felt by Hausa merchants and farmers 
who resented the arbitrary power exercised by* the Native Authority
The Head of the N*E*P*U*, al-HaJJi Aminu Kano, the Sardauna^
major opponent is now Minister of Health in the Gowon Government.
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Administration under tho control of the Fulani emirs* Tho domination 
of political activity hy the sarakuna lineages had become an anachronism 
in a period narked by considerable economic and social change* The 
Tijaniyya order was an informal organization which expressed not only 
Hausa religious aspirations but also popular disenchantment with the 
Fulani system personified by the policies of the Sardauna of Sokoto.
Even if the army coup of 1?66 had not removed tho Sardauna by violent 
means, the imposing edifice of Fulani power wohld have crumbled under 
the strains introduced by the demands of the new elites for social and 
political reform*
The spread of the Tijaniyya movement in Northern Nigeria was 
symptomatic of tho now social and political realities which affected 
Kausaland in the post-indepondence period* Indeed, the forced resigna­
tion of the Emir of Kano revealed the extent of Tijani penetration of 
tho Fulani ranks* By cross-cutting ethnic and clas3 boundaries, 
Reformed Tijaniyya became a potent factor in the resurgence of Hausa 
political activity in tho post-independence period* The Reformed 
Tijaniyya in Nigeria became agents in the extension of the Hausa 
language and culture, just as their counterparts in Senegal have 
furthered Wolof expansion.
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